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0 N June 10, 1971, the United States and Canada issued a Joint Communique announcing their intention to conclude a broad-
ranging agreement designed to protect and enhance water quality 
in the Great Lakes and to bring the problem of Great Lakes pollu-
• Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1949, Williams College; LL.B. 
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tion under substantial control by 1975.1 The proposed Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement would establish common water quality 
objectives, commit the two governments to the development of com-
patible national water quality standards to meet those objectives, 
and provide for carrying out a wide variety of joint and separate 
pollution control programs and related measures. A major role in 
overseeing the joint program would be assigned to the International 
Joint Commission of the United States and Canada (IJC), which is 
a bilateral international commission created by the Boundary Waters 
Treaty with Great Britain of 1909 (1909 Treaty).2 In announcing 
the two governments' "agreement to agree," Mitchell W. Sharp, 
Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, noted that the pro-
posed Agreement would be the "most far-reaching ever signed by two 
countries in the environmental field."3 Russell E. Train, Chairman 
of the United States Council on Environmental Quality, described 
the proposed agreement as "an historic first" and added that its pro-
visions will be "unprecedented in scope" and provide a model for 
similar international agreements in other parts of the world.4 
The proposed Agreement would have obvious importance for 
United States-Canadian relations and the efforts of the two govern-
ments to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of Great Lakes 
pollution. But, as the Ministers' statements suggest, it might also 
have broader significance. The announcement by the two govern-
ments comes at a time of emerging global concern with environ-
mental issues and possible international approaches to their solution11 
1. U.S.-Canadian Joint Communique issued by the Joint U.S.-Canada Ministerial 
Meeting on Great Lakes Pollution, Washington, D.C., June IO, 1971, Dept. State Press 
Release No. 129, published in 64 DEPT. STATE BULL. 828 (1971) [hereinafter Joint 
Communique]. See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at 85, col. 7. The Joint Communique 
indicated the two governments' intention to conclude the agreement before the end 
of 1971. The negotiations, however, have been delayed and the agreement will prob• 
ably not be completed and signed until possibly the sprin~ of 1972, (Information 
supplied by U.S. Dept. of State.) 
2. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising 
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. II, 1909, 86 Stat, 2448 (1910), T .S. No. 
548 (effective May 13, 1910) [hereinafter 1909 Treaty], art. VII. 
3. N.Y. Times, June II, 1971, at II, col. 1. 
4. Id. 
5. The recent literature in this area is vast. See., e.g., B. COMMONER, Tm: CLOSING 
CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY (1971); R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET 
(1971); MAN'S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF THE STUDY OF CRITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (C. Wilson ed. 1970); Ritchie-Calder, Mortgaging the Old 
Homestead, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 207 (1970); Wolman, Pollution as an International 
Issue, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 164 (1968). Particularly relevant here are the various papers 
in LAW, !NSTJTUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT a. Hargrove ed. 1972); Schachter 
&: Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 AM. J. INTL. L. 84 (1971); 
Symposium, The International Legal Aspects of Pollution, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 173 
(1971). 
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-a concern symbolized in the forthcoming United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, which will convene in Stockhlom 
in June 1972.6 The Stockholm Conference will have the tasks of 
focusing the attention of governments and the public on the impor-
tance and urgency of problems of the human environment and of 
identifying those aspects of environmental and pollution problems 
appropriate for international cooperation and agreement. It will also 
consider various proposals for the creation of international institu-
tions and other cooperative measures. Yet, in considering these ques-
tions and in attempting to forge any cooperative arrangements, the 
Conference will have little guidance from the past. Precedents for 
international cooperation and regulation in the environmental area 
have thus far been sparse and the relevant international law is 
relatively undeveloped.7 This dearth of experience will increase the 
6. See G.A. Res. 2398, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); 
G.A. Res. 2567, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 
2581, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 44, U.N. D.oc. A/7630 (1969). Cf. Report of U.N. 
Secretary General to the 47th Session of the Economic and Social Council on Problems 
of the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. E/4667 (1969); Reports of the Preparatory 
Committee for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment for its three 
working sessions held in New York in March 1970, Geneva in Feb. 1971, and New 
York in Sept. 1971, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/ PC.6, .9 and .13. 
7. See authorities cited in note 5 supra. Cf. notes 156 &: 167 infra. International 
activities in the environmental area are, however, rapidly proliferating, and more than 
a score of U.N. organs and agencies and other international organizations are 
presently engaged in environmental programs. See generally CONG. REsEARCH SERv., 
STAFF OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIV., 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Print 1971) (a report prepared 
for the use of the Senate Committee on Commerce); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 200-06 (1970) [hereinafter CEQ 1970 REPORT]; COUNCIL 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 29-31 (1971) [hereinafter CEQ 
1971 REPORT]; and the various papers included in LAw, INmnmoNs AND THE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5. The activities of international organizations include the 
World Meteorological Organization's (WMO) World Weather Watch; the World Health 
Organization's (WHO) work on fresh water supplies and sewage disposal; the Food and 
Agricultural Organization's (FAO) broad concerns with resource management; the 
International Labour Organization's (ILO) regulation of the environment of the 
work place; the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and Man and the Biosphere 
Program; the International Maritime Consultative Organization's (IMCO) activities 
in the field of marine pollution; the International Civil Aviation Organization's (!CAO) 
work on air and noise pollution connected with civil air transport; and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) surveillance of radioactive substances in 
the environment. The Environment Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is conducting significant work on the inter-
national economic effects of member countries' environmental policies. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Committee on Challenges of Modem Society 
is studying special problems of industrialized societies. The Economic Commission for 
Europe is serving as a valuable forum for information exchange between Eastern and 
Western European nations on pollution control; it held an important symposium on 
this subject at Prague, Czechoslovakia, in May 1971 and has established a permanent 
body of Senior Environmental Advisers. In 1969, the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (!CSU) established a_ Special .Committee on- Problems of the Environment 
472 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '10:469 
difficulties the Conference may encounter both in developing practi-
cal programs for effective international action and in securing their 
acceptance by governments. 
In this context, a study of the proposed Agreement and, more par-
ticularly, of the long history of developing United States-Canadian 
cooperation that preceded it may be of use.8 First, this United States-
Canadian experience offers guidance for the solution of some of the 
specific problems that programs for international environmental 
cooperation may face: questions of framework and approach; insti-
tutional organization, function, and authority; determination of 
objectives; apportionment of burdens; coordination; and imple-
mentation. Second, at a time when international discussion has 
focused principally on global approaches to the solution of environ-
mental problems, it calls attention to the important, if less dramatic, 
contribution that can be made by more limited bilateral and re-
gional cooperative arrangements; indeed, it is arguable that such 
bilateral and regional arrangements will ultimately prove to be the 
most significant forms of international environmental cooperation.0 
(SCOPE), which is coordinating global research on a number of environmental prob• 
!ems. 
8. While this study deals primarily with U.S.-Canadian cooperation with respect 
to problems of pollution of the Great Lakes and other boundary waters, the two 
countries have also developed cooperative arrangements with respect to other aspects 
of environmental problems. The work of the International Joint Commission [here• 
inaner IJC] respecting boundary air pollution problems, which is briefly mentioned 
in this Article, is more fully discussed in Note, International Air Pollution-United 
States and Canada-A Joint Approach, IO ARIZ. L. REV. 138 (1968). The Treaty with 
Great Britain and Ireland for the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United States 
and Canada, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916), T.S. No. 628, which was involved in 
the famous case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), is still in force, On 
June 1, 1971, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announced that 
the United States and Canada had agreed on a joint program to use satellites and 
aircraft in surveying the natural environment. The joint program will advance remote 
sensing technology through monitoring of air, water, land, forest, and crop conditions, 
the mapping of ice movements and ocean currents in Canadian and U.S. waters, 
and the mapping of geologic, hydrologic, vegetation, and soil phenomena. NASA Press 
Release No. 71-95 Gune I, 1971). The United States is also in the process of developing 
bilateral relations on environmental problems with Mexico, Japan, and other countries. 
See CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 30. 
9. See generally Stein, The Potential of Regional Organizations in Managing Man's 
Environment, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, .supra note 5. See 
al.so Frey-Wouters, The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs, in THE FUTURE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 461 (R. Falk &: C. Black ed. 1969). 
The agenda for the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, in its 
section concerned with the international organizational implications of action pro• 
posals, includes an item on "particular organizational requirements for meeting needs 
at regional levels." Report of the Preparatory Committee for the U.N. Conference 
on the Human Environment, 2d sess., Feb. 8-19, 1971, U,N. Doc. A/Conf.48/C.9, ,i 20 
(Agenda Item 6). The Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on the Human En• 
vironment, Mr. Maurice Strong, has suggested as among the principles which might 
guide the decision of governments on organizational questions: "7. That it should 
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Finally, this experience may serve to suggest that the concept of 
international environmental cooperation has limitations as well as 
potentialities, and thus may provide a more realistic basis for the 
Stockholm Conference's work. 
!. BACKGROUND 
United States-Canadian cooperation regarding Great Lakes pol-
lution problems has developed within a special geographical, eco-
nomic, legal, and political context. A brief description of this setting 
may suggest the significance of these pollution problems and some 
of the reasons for the particular form this cooperation has taken.10 
The United States-Canadian boundary is one of the longest in 
the world, extending for about 3,500 miles from Passamaquoddy 
Bay on the Atlantic to the Fuca Straits of Vancouver on the Pacific, 
and, along the Alaskan-Canadian boundary, for another 1,500 miles 
from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean. About 2,000 miles of this 
boundary is water; it passes along rivers such as the St. Croix, St. 
John, and the St. Lawrence, through Lake Ontario, the Niagara 
River, Lake Erie, the Detroit River, Lake St. Clair, the St. Clair 
River, Lake Huron, the St. Marys River, and Lake Superior, and on 
to Rainy Lake and Lake of the Woods. In addition, a number of 
rivers, such as the Red, the Columbia, and the Yukon, flow across 
the boundary. 
The Great Lakes constitute the largest fresh-water system in the 
world, representing about a quarter of the world's total fresh water 
be an important consideration in the establishment of any additional or new machinery 
to provide strong capability at the regional level." Quoted in Gardner, The Inter-
national Organizational Implications of Action Proposals, in I.Aw, INmTIJTIONS AND 
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 6. See also MAN'S IMPACT ON 
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 6; Schachter & Serwer, supra note 5, at 
Ill ("[T)here has come to be a greater recognition of the need for regional pollution 
control organs since it is apparent that, although pollution is a global problem, it 
is not uniformly global. Regional arrangements in the Baltic, the North Sea, Mediter-
ranean, Caribbean and perhaps the Arctic are now undenvay, and it is likely that these 
organs will have a decisive part to play in achieving day-to-day practical controls.') 
IO. The factual information in this section is drawn or collated principally from 
the following sources: GREAT LAKES BASIN COMMN. & GREAT LAKES PANEL OF THE 
COMM. ON MULTIPLE USE OF THE COSTAL ZONE, NATL. COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES &: 
ENCR, DEV., GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS: A SURVEY OF INSTITUTIONS CONCERNED WITH THE 
WATER AND RELATED RESOURCES IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN 1-2, 7, 12 (1969) [hereinafter 
GREAT I.AKES INSTITUTIONS]; INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM., CANADA AND UNITED STATES, 
POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. 
LAWRENCE RIVER (1970) [hereinafter IJC LowER LAKES REPORT]; D. PIPER, THE INTEit-
NATIONAL LAw OF THE GREAT LAKES (1967); MacNish &: Lawhead, History of the 
Development of the Great Lakes and Present Problems, in ENc1NEERINc INST. OF CAN-
ADA&: AM. Soc. CIVIL ENCRS., PROCEEDINGS OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER REsoURCES CON• 
FERENCE 1, June 24-26, 1968, Toronto; Great Lakes :Basin Commn. Communicator, March 
1971 (monthly newsletter). 
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supply. Of the total Great Lakes water area of 95,000 square miles, 
about two thirds is within United States jurisdiction and one third in 
Canadian jurisdiction. Of the total Great Lakes drainage basin area 
of some 300,000 square miles, about 59 per cent is in the United 
States and 41 per cent in Canada. Eight states, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin, border on the Great Lakes and a number of others have close 
economic links with the region. In Canada, only the Province of 
Ontario borders on the Lakes, although the Province of Quebec also 
has considerable concern with Great Lakes problems. 
In 1966 some 30 million people lived on or near the Great Lakes, 
comprising about one out of every three Canadians and one out of 
every eight Americans.11 All indications are that the Great Lakes 
population is rapidly expanding; projections for the year 2000 sug-
gest the emergence of a Great Lakes megalopolis with a population 
approaching 60 million people.12 
The immense importance of the Great Lakes region to the two 
countries is indicated by the fact that the region accounts for over 
one half of the Canadian gross national product and about one fifth 
of the American gross national product. About 50 per cent of United 
States steel production and much of its automotive production is 
concentrated about the Lakes. With the development of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway the Great Lakes have now become part of a major 
international waterway stretching over 2,300 miles from the Atlantic 
Ocean to Duluth, Minnesota. Each year over 600 foreign vessels uti-
lize the Great Lakes system, in addition to a domestic United 
States-Canadian fleet of another 600 vessels; over 250,000 pleasure 
craft are estimated to use Lakes Erie and Ontario alone.13 
In view of the length of this common boundary and the substan-
tial clustering of people and industry along certain portions of it, it 
is not surprising that problems of boundary waters and transbound-
ary pollution have assumed a growing importance in United States-
Canadian relations. While the concern of the two governments with 
11. IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 17. Major cities on the rim of the 
Lakes include Toronto, Hamilton, Port Huron, and Windsor in Canada; and Duluth• 
Superior, Milwaukee, Chicago, Gary, Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, Erie, Buffalo, and 
Rochester in the United States. 
12. MacNish &: Lawhead, supra note 10, at 19. 
13. IJC LowER I.AK.Es REPORT, supra note 10, at 75-76. In 1966, a total of about 
246 million net tons of cargo moved via the Great Lakes. Of this total, about 185 
million net tons were domestic, within either the U.S. or Canada; 47 million net tons 
moved between the two countries; and 14 million net tons were overseas traffic. In terms 
of ton miles, over 40% of all traffic on U.S. waterways moved on the Great Lakes. 
MacNish &: Lawhead, supra note 10, at 26. 
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boundary pollution problems dates back at least to the early years 
of the twentieth century, these problems have assumed a new d~-
mension and importance as a result of rapid industrial and popula-
tion development during and after the Second World War. , 
It is now widely recognized that at a time when water demand 
problems have become more pressing and complex the environmen-
tal quality of the Great Lakes is rapidly deteriorating.14 Recent 
studies have confirmed that Lake Erie, particularly its western basin, 
is in an advanced state of eutrophication, largely as a result of ex-
cessive enrichment by nutrients, especially phosphorus; indeed, Lake 
Erie has become a prime example of the consequences of environ-
mental neglect.15 Accelerated eutrophication is also occurring in 
Lake Ontario and the other Lakes are considered seriously threat-
ened.16 A number of industries, such as fishing and recreation, have 
already been affected and there is growing concern that future in-
dustrial and urban development may be impeded. The sources of 
pollution include waste disposal from municipalities and industries, 
agricultural run-off, dredging, sedimentation, and waste from com-
mercial vessels and pleasure craft.17 The consequences of this' pol-
lution on the water of the Lakes include eutrophication, oxygen 
depletion, biological changes, organic contamination from substances 
such as DDT and PCB, accumulation of solids, and accumulation 
14. The IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, represents the most current and 
comprehensive discussion of the problem of pollution in the Lower Lakes, and this 
discussion is broadly applicable to many aspects of Upper Lakes problems as well. 
For good summaries of sources, processes, effects, and costs of water pollution and 
water pollution control programs more generally, see, e,g., CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra 
note 7, at 29-59; CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 99-153; A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, 
l\IANACING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968); WATER POL• 
LUTION CONTROL AND ABATEMENT (T. Willrich & N. Hines ed. 1967). See also D. ZWICK 
& M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND (1971) (Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on 
Water Pollution). 
15. See, eg., IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, Conclusion 9, at 140-41. 
For comprehensive discussions of Lake Erie problems, see B. CoMMONER, supra note 5, 
ch. 6; U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, 
LAKE ERIE REPORT: A PLAN FOR WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (1968); Reitze, Wastes, 
Water, and Wishful Thinking: The Battle of Lake Erie, 20 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. !, 
(1968). 
16. See !JC LOWER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, Conclusion 9, at 140-41. See also 
U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR & N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, WATER POLLUTION PROBLEMS 
AND IMPROVEMENT NEEDS: LAKE ONTARIO AND ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASINS (1968). The 
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Canadian Centre for 
Inland Waters have recently announced plans for a joint U.S.-Canadian year-long 
intensive study of Lake Ontario. This effort, which is called the International Field 
Year for the Great Lakes, will begin April 1, 1972, and will be the most ambitious 
research effort ever directed at any of the Great Lakes, involving some 600 scientists 
and technicians and an estimated cost of $15 million. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1972, § M, 
at 31, col. 4. 
17. !JC LowER LAxEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 72-83. 
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of oil and toxic materials, such as mercury, in trace amounts.18 While 
pollution occurs on both sides of the border, the bulk of the problem 
appears to originate from the larger concentrations of population 
and industry on the American side.19 
As these dangers have become more widely perceived, public con-
cern on both sides of the border has mushroomed, and the problem 
of control of Great Lakes pollution has now achieved a leading place 
on both governments' agendas. A measure of government recognition 
of the seriousness of this problem is the statement by Mitchell Sharp, 
made at the recent Joint Ministerial Meeting, that pollution of the 
Great Lakes had reached the point where "two of the richest societies 
on earth are knowingly and wantonly poisoning this unique resource, 
and by extension, each other."20 A variety of national and inter-
national measures to cope with this situation are now being under-
taken, but it has become increasingly clear that effective solutions 
will involve major governmental commitments, years of intensive 
effort, and very substantial costs. 
Solutions may also involve more subtle difficulties. In view of 
the federal character of both governments, efforts to control pollu-
tion in the Great Lakes raise particularly complex jurisdictional 
questions. The waters of the Lakes are not "high seas" for inter-
national purposes; each nation treats the Lakes' waters on its side 
of the international boundary as its own "internal waters." United 
States law regards each of the eight riparian states as owning, in its 
respective public capacity, the Lake beds adjacent to its coast out to 
the international boundary and also as having certain broad regula-
tory powers in its adjacent waters, at least in the absence of federal 
assertions of authority.21 The same principle appears to be appli-
18. Id. at 84-107. On the mercury pollution problem, which in April 1970 resulted 
in Canada's banning fishing on its side of the St. Clair River and Detroit River and 
Lake St. Clair, and in partial bans by Ohio in Lake Erie, see, e.g., TIME, May 4, 1970, 
at 85; Wall St. J., April 28, 1970, at 1, col. 1. This situation gave rise to the case 
of Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), discussed in note 176 infra. 
19. As to the Lower Lakes, see IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, Table 2 
at 80, and Table 3 at 82. This U.S. concentration is particularly true of phosphorus 
inputs into Lake Erie. In 1967 the input of total phosphorus from U.S. municipal 
sources into Lake Erie was 35.7 million pounds, of which 25 million pounds came 
from detergents; whereas the input of total phosphorus from Canadian municipal 
sources into Lake Erie was 2.5 million pounds, of which 1.3 million pounds came 
from detergents. As to Lake Ontario, the U.S. municipal input of phosphorus was 
7.7 million pounds, of which 5.4 million came from detergents, and the Canadian 
municipal input was 7.0 million pounds, of which 3.5 million came from detergents. 
Id. at 83. 
20. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1971, at 11, col. 1. 
21. See, e.g., D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 19. The principle of state ownership of the 
Lake beds is affirmed in § 3 of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 
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cable in Canada with respect to the Province of Ontario, the only 
Great Lakes riparian province.22 In each country, however, the federal 
government retains substantial regulatory powers with respect to mat-
ters affecting the Lakes, though the division of power between the 
respective federal and state or provincial governments appears to dif-
fer somewhat between the two countries. In the case of the United 
States, there is little question that the federal government has broad 
constitutional authority under the commerce power and other consti-
tutional grants to regulate and control virtually any activity contri-
buting directly or indirectly to Great Lakes pollution. Should the 
federal government choose to exercise its authority, any state or local 
government interference with such regulation would be considered 
unconstitutional and invalid.23 Moreover, the treaty power may con-
stitute an additional source of federal authority in this area.24 In 
Canada, however, it is less clear that federal powers are so broad. 
Respectable arguments have been made that under relevant pro-
visions of the British North America Act provincial authority over 
(1970). See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Hilt v. Weber, 
252 Mich. 198, 200, 233 N.W. 159, 161 (1930). The Supreme Court has recognized 
the vital interest of the states in the control of water resources and has specifically 
conceded the power of the states to exercise control over navigable waters for the 
interests of their citizens until Congress in some way asserts a superior power. United 
States v. Rio Grande Dam &: Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). 
22. D. PIPER, supra note IO, at 19. 
23. Congress has power to regulate all navigable waters under the commerce 
clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, and navigability is broadly defined. See, e.g., 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 212 (1845). With respect to pollution, see United States v. Republic Steel 
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). See also Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation 
of Water Quality, Part III: The Federal Effort, 52 IowA L. REV. 799, 800 (1967), who 
suggests: "It seems relatively clear that constitutionally Congress could preempt nearly 
the entire field of water quality control, if it so elected." See generally 2 R. CLARK, 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 7 (1967); H. ELLIS, J. BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD & J. 
DEBRAAL, WATER USE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN WISCONSIN ch. 17 (1970); Edelman, 
Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power To Abate 
Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1067 (1965). 
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI. A treaty dealing with Great Lakes pollution problems 
appears to be a clearly legitimate subject of U.S. foreign policy concern. See, e.g., 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 117, 121 (1965). The interests of the nation are more 
important than those of any state, and the federal government may act to prevent 
a state from interfering with a national treaty obligation. Sanitary Dist. v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925). Cf. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 
152, 171 (1946); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Treaty obligations may give 
the federal government an additional basis for authorizing improvements in inter-
national waterways. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 457-58 (1931). However, in 
view of the broad expanse of the article I powers of Congress it may be questioned 
whether the exercise of the treaty power with respect to Great Lakes problems would 
in practice constitute any significant addition to existing congressional authority. See, 
e.g., Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and 
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959). 
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most aspects of water pollution affecting the Great Lakes is consti-
tutionally protected from federal intrusion and that Canadian federal 
authority in this field, even when exercised pursuant to treaty, is 
inherently limited.25 
In any event, whatever the theoretical reach of American and 
Canadian federal powers, in practice the regulation of water pollu-
tion in each country has remained largely in state, provincial, and 
local hands. It is only recently that the respective federal governments 
have begun to exercise their regulatory authority in any substantial 
way, and the burden of regulation is still primarily nonfederal in 
character.26 As a result, the law governing Great Lakes pollution 
continues to be a complex hodgepodge of proliferating and occasion-
ally inconsistent laws, regulations, and ordinances issued separately 
by the two federal governments and their various agencies, the eight 
riparian states of the United States, the Province of Ontario, and the 
hundreds of cities, towns, and other local jurisdictions that exercise 
relevant authority. This jurisdictional complexity has been a major 
obstacle in efforts for the coordinated handling of over-all Great 
Lakes problems.27 
Finally, it is worth noting that United States-Canadian efforts to 
deal with Great Lakes pollution problems are but one aspect of a 
broader system of relations between the two countries, which has a 
unique and special character. On the one hand, United States-Cana-
dian relations have been remarkably amicable: the two countries 
have been at peace since 1814, the border has been demilitarized 
since 1817,28 and the tw-o nations have long been linked by strong 
cultural and economic bonds. Moreover, the two governments have 
developed a strong tradition of formal and informal peaceful adjust-
ment of their disagreements and disputes. They have relied heavily 
on such formal legal techniques as international agreement, the 
25. See Landis, Legal Control in Canada of Pollution in the Great Lakes Drainage 
Basin, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE GREAT LAKEs REsoURCES CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 
158-200; Landis, Legal Controls of Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin, 48 CAN. B. REV. 
66, 96-106 (1970). See also Gibson, The Constitutional Context of Canadian Water 
Planning, 7 ALBERTA L. REv. 71 (1969); Note, An Opinion on the Constiutional Validity 
of the Proposed Canada Water Act, 28 U. OF TORONTO FACULTY OF L REv. 74 (1970), 
26. See text accompanying notes 228-52 infra. 
27. See pt. III. F. infra. 
28. The Rush-Bagot Agreement, April 28-29, 1817, 8 Stat. 231 (1817), T.S. No. 110 1/2. 
On the U.S.-Canadian disarmament arrangement, see generally D. PIPER, supra note 10, 
at 104-11; 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 741-52 (1964), On inter-
national boundary arrangements and the Permanent International Boundary Com• 
mission established by the Treaty with Great Britain in Respect of Boundary Between 
the United States and Canada, Feb. 24, 1925, 44 Stat. 2102 (1925), T.S. No. 720, see 
D. Pll'ER, supra note 10, at 8-17. 
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establishment of joint institutions, and arbitration.29 There are, for 
example, presently some 200 bilateral agreements in force between 
the two countries, as well as numerous lower-level and less formal 
arrangements.30 On the other hand, United States-Canadian relations 
have also .been marked by certain strong and continuing differences. 
In particular, Canada has manifested a persistent, strongly felt, and 
understandable fear of political, economic, and cultural domination 
by its more populous and powerful neighbor to the south, and Cana-
dian nationalists have frequently responded with resentment to any 
United States policies that appeared to exploit superior American 
power or wealth at Canada's expense.31 When issues of this nature 
have arisen United States-Canadian relations have on occasion proved 
sensitive and delicate. 
In recent years, the problem of Great Lakes pollution appears to 
have become, to some extent, one of those sensitive issues between 
the two countries.32 The Great Lakes are regarded by Canada as 
crucial to its future. Not only does a substantial part of Canada's 
population and industry cluster on the Lakes, but in addition Canada 
is currently experiencing a broad reawakening of national pride in 
its natural environment, and the government has been militant in 
efforts to protect the Canadian environment from harm by external 
interests.33 Since much of Great Lakes pollution stems from the giant 
urban and industrial concentrations on the American side of the 
border, the situation from a Canadian viewpoint may seem to call 
for the most urgent and far-reaching measures by the United States 
in order to prevent irreversible harm to Canadian environmental 
interests and economic development. Canadians may consider that, 
in view of Canada's lesser contribution to the problem, it should 
arguably assume less of the burden of correction. The United States 
29. See generally D. DEENER, CANADA-UNITED STATl:S TREATY REr.AnoNs (1963); D. 
PIPER, supra note 10. 
30. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 30-42 (1970). 
31. See generally NEIGHBORS TAKEN FOR GRANTED (L. Merchant ed. 1966), esp. ix-xv, 
148-64; THE AMERICAN AssEMBLY, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 0- Sloan ed. 1964), 
esp. ch. 6; and the various proceedings of the recent series of annual Seminars on 
Canadian-American Relations held at the University of Windsor. Cf. Lynch, Canada's 
New Anti-Americanism, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1971, at 12, cols. 4-6. 
32. Certain aspects of this issue, in particular the questions of apportionment and 
detergents, are more fully discussed in pt. II. D. & E. infra. 
33. I have described this Canadian concern in another context also involving some 
element of United States-Canadian policy conflict. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L, REv. I (1970). 
It is relevant that Canada chose as its project for exploration in connection with the 
NATO program on "~hallenges of Modern Society" (see note 7 supra) the subject of 
control of pollution in inland waters, with particular reference to the Great Lakes. 
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would, of course, prefer that Canada share with it the costs and 
burdens of remedial action to the fullest extent possible. Moreover, 
while the United States views the problem of Great Lakes pollution 
as an important one, it has a relatively smaller proportion of its pop-
ulation and industry centered on the Lakes and tends to see this issue 
as only one among a great many problems that press with equal 
urgency for its limited resources. These differences between the two 
countries have only rarely surfaced publicly and, it is hoped, have 
been at least temporarily resolved by the proposed Agreement. Should 
current efforts to resolve these Great Lakes pollution problems prove 
ineffective, however, significant foreign relations issues could re-
emerge. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION: FRAMEWORK, INSTITUTIONS, AND HISTORY 
A. The 1909 Treaty 
The basic framework for American-Canadian cooperation respect-
ing boundary waters problems is the 1909 Treaty,34 which establishes 
the International Joint Commission between the United States and 
Canada.35 The Treaty, which developed out of earlier ad hoc efforts 
34. The 1909 Treaty was signed by Great Britain on behalf of Canada, which did 
not acquire full powers in treaty-making until 1923. However, the Treaty has been 
implemented completely by Canada. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 5-7, See generally 
C. BEDARD, LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DES GRANDS LACS DE L'AMERIQUE DU NORD ET DU SAINT• 
LAURENT (1966). 
35. The literature on the 1909 Treaty and the International Joint Commission 
is surprisingly extensive, if relatively inaccessible. L. BLOOMFIELD &: G. FITZGERALD, BOUND• 
ARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
COMMISSION 1912-1958) (1958), is an extremely useful, concise study containing a history 
of the Commission, a summary of its dockets through 1958, and appendices that 
include the Treaty, Rules of Procedure, national implementing legislation, membership 
on the Commission between 1911-1958, related treaties, lists of boundary waters and wa• 
ters crossing the boundary, a selected bibliography, and maps showing the location of 
the various references and applications. For an earlier study, see C. CHACKO, THE INTER• 
NATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DO• 
MINION OF CANADA (1932). The Commission is also described and its dockets through 
the early 1960's summarized in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 826-71, See also 
D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 72-90. 
Various IJC Commissioners have also written excellent brief descriptions of the 
Commission and its work. I have drawn particularly on Welsh, Role of the Inter• 
national Joint Commission, in ENGINEERING INsr. OF CANADA &: AM. Soc, CIVIL ENGRS,, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE 1969, Toronto, at 871-75: 
Welsh, The Work of the International Joint Commission, published in 59 DEPT, STATE 
BuLL. 311 (1968); Welsh & Heeney, International Joint Commission-United States 
and Canada, in 5 INTL. CONFERENCE ON WATER FOR PEACE 104-09 (1967) (Paper P/217 
presented at Conference held in Washington, D.C., on May 23-31, 1967): C, Ross, 
The International Joint Commission, March 7, 1970 (address at the International 
Symposium on Legal Aspects of Pollution, University of Manitoba, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). See also Heeney, Diplomacy with a Difference: The Inter• 
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to deal with boundary waters questions,36 was designed primarily to 
protect the levels and navigability of the Great Lakes and other 
boundary waters against unilateral diversion or obstruction, but it 
has provided the basis for an increasing involvement by the Com-
mission in pollution and other problems as well. While the Treaty 
is usually referred to as the "Boundary Waters Treaty," its full title, 
"Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Ques-
tions Arising Between the United States and Canada," is significant. 
According to its Preamble, the purpose of the Treaty is 
to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to 
settle all questions which are now pending between the United States 
and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations, or 
interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of 
the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for 
tl1e adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter 
arise ..•• 
Thus, the potential reach of the Treaty extends beyond boundary 
waters issues to all boundary questions, and arguably to other ques-
tions of common concern as well. 
The Treaty distinguishes (1) "boundary waters," which are de-
fined as those waters along which the international boundary runs; 
(2) "tributary waters," which are defined as the waters flowing into 
national Joint Commission, reprinted from INCO [International Nickel Co.] MAGAZINE, 
Oct. 1960, on file with the Michigan Law Review; G. Kyte, Organization and Work of 
the International Joint Commission (pamphlet issued at Ottawa in 1937); Weber, 
Activities of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, 31 SEWAGE 
&: INDUS. WASTE 71 (1959); Weber, Functions of the International Joint Commission, 
J. OF POWER DIV., PROC. OF fill. Soc. CIVIL ENGRS., Nov. 1968, at 177. 
For scholarly discussions, see the excellent recent articles by Erichsen-Brown, Legal 
Implications of Boundary Water Pollution, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 65 (1967); Jordan, Re-
cent Developments in International Environmental Pollution Control, 15 MCGILL L.J. 
279 (1969). See also Adams, Water Pollution Control in the Great Lakes Region, 37 
U. DET. L.J. 96 (1959); Griffin, A History of the Canadian-United States Boundary 
lVaters Treaty of 1909, 37 U. DET. L.J. 76 (1959); Waite, The International Joint Com-
mission-Its Practice and Its Impact on Land Use, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 93 (1963); Note, 
supra note 8. 
36. The history of the Treaty is summarized in L BLOOMFIELD &: G. FITZGERALD, 
supra note 35, at 2-14; G. Kyte, supra note 35; D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 72-82; Griffin, 
supra note 35; Heeney, supra note 35. Briefly, the Treaty grew out of the work of an 
Ad Hoc Temporary International Watenvays Commission created by concurrent legis-
lation of the U.S. and Canada in 1903 for the purpose of investigating and reporting 
upon the condition and uses of the boundary waters and making recommendations for 
navigational improvements and regulations. The temporary group, and particularly its 
Chairman George Gibbons, an Ontario lawyer, became convinced that effective devel-
opment of the boundary water res·ources required some prior agreement on principles 
and a permanent body to apply them. Gibbons went to Washington in 1907 to explore 
possibilities. U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root was at first unenthusiastic but was 
finally won over. The International Waterways Commission was discontinued after 
the 1909 Treaty entered into force. 
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boundary waters~ (3) waters flowing from boundary waters; and (4) 
the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary.87 For example, since 
the International Boundary does not run through Lake Michigan, 
that Lake is considered a tributary water rather than a boundary 
water. 
The rights and obligations of the countries under the Treaty 
differ among these various categories of waters. Thus, the Treaty 
provides that navigation of all boundary waters shall be free and 
open to the inhabitants and vessels of each country without discrimi-
nation; this same right shall apply to the waters of Lake Michigan 
and to canals connecting boundary waters.88 On the other hand, the 
Treaty provides that each country retains exclusive jurisdiction and 
control over the use and diversion of all waters on its own side of the 
boundary that in their natural channels would flow across the bound-
ary or into boundary waters.39 However, if through interference with 
or diversion of such waters injury is caused on the other side of the 
boundary, any injured party is entitled to the same legal remedies 
as if that injury had taken place in the country where the diversion 
or interference occurred.40 Moreover, neither party surrenders rights 
it may have to object to interference with or diversion of waters on 
the other side of the boundary that would have the effect of materially 
injuring navigation on its own side of the boundary.41 
A P!incipal purpose of the 1909 Treaty is the regulation of uses, 
obstructions, or diversions of the boundary waters, and the Com-
mission is given broad powers in this respect, which again are stated 
with reference to particular categories of waters. Unless othenvise 
provided by special agreement, the Commission's approval is required 
for any uses, obstructions, or diversions of boundary waters on either 
side of the boundary that affect the natural level or flow of boundary 
waters on the other side of the boundary.42 Moreover, the Commis-
sion's approval is required for the construction or maintenance "of 
any remedial or protective works or any dams or other obstructions 
in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a lower level 
than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the effect 
of which is to raise the natural level of waters on the other side of 
37. 1909 Treaty Preliminary Article. 
38. 1909 Treaty art. I. 
39. 1909 Treaty art. II, first para. 
40. 1909 Treaty art. II, first para. 
41. 1909 Treaty art. II, second para. 
42. 1909 Treaty art. m, first para. I • 
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the boundary. "43 In passing upon such cases, the Commission is to be 
guided by certain rules and principles.44 One of these is that each 
party shall have, on its own side of the boundary, equal and similar 
rights in the use of the boundary waters. 45 Another is that an order 
of precedence is established among various uses of the waters, namely: 
(I) uses for domestic and sanitary purposes; (2) uses for navigation; 
and (3) uses for power and irrigation purposes. No use shall be per-
mitted by the Commission that tends materially to conflict with or 
restrain a preferred use.46 
Article IV of the Treaty includes a provision that "boundary 
waters and water flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted 
on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."47 
Neither the term "pollution" nor the term "injury" is defined, and 
the Treaty is silent with respect to any procedures for enforcement 
of this obligation. 
Finally, the Treaty establishes broad and flexible provisions con-
cerning the handling of disputes and other questions between the 
governments. Article IX authorizes the Commission to render advi-
sory reports to the governments at their request. It provides that 
"any other questions or matters of difference arising between [the 
two countries] involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either 
in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the 
common frontier ... shall be referred from time to time to the ... 
Commission for examination and report" whenever either govern-
ment requests such reference. The Commission is authorized in each 
case so referred to examine and report upon the facts and circum-
stances of the particular questions, together with such conclusions 
and recommendations as may be appropriate, subject, however, to 
any restrictions that may be imposed by the terms of the reference. 
"Such reports of the Commission shall not be regarded as decisions 
of the questions or matters so submitted either on the facts or the 
law, and shall in no way have the character of an arbitral award."48 
Procedures are set forth governing such advisory references. In ad-
dition, Article X provides detailed procedures under which questions 
or matters of differences may be referred to the Commission, by the 
consent of the two governments, for a binding arbitral decision or 
43. 1909 Treaty art. IV, first para. 
44. 1909 Treaty art. Vill. 
45. 1909 Treaty art. VIII, second para. 
46. 1909 Treaty art. Vill, third para. 
47, 1909 Treaty art. IV, second para. 
48. 1909 Treaty art. IX, third para. 
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finding. To date, however, the provisions of Article X have never 
been utilized. 49 
B. The International Joint Commission and Its Procedures 
The provisions of the Treaty are implemented principally 
through the activities of the International Joint Commission. The 
Commission consists of six members, three (including a chairman) 
from each country.50 United States Commissioners are appointed by 
and serve at the pleasure of the President; Canadian Commissioners 
are appointed by order-in-council of the Canadian government and 
serve at the pleasure of that government.51 Each of the two national 
sections has appointed a permanent secretary; the two national sec-
retaries act as joint secretaries at Commission meetings.52 Otherwise 
the Commission maintains an exceptionally small staff, typically draw-
ing on personnel of agencies of the respective governments, as need 
has arisen, for the performance of specific tasks. Permanent IJC offices 
are maintained in Washington and Ottawa,53 but meetings and public 
hearings are held wherever convenient,54 the Canadian chairman 
presiding at meetings in Canada and the United States chairman 
presiding at meetings in the United States.mi Under its rules the 
Commission is required to meet at least semiannually,56 but in prac-
tice, especially in recent years, it has met much more frequently. 
Decisions of the Commission are made by a majority of the Commis-
sioners, irrespective of their nationality, with provision for separate 
dissenting reports. 51 
Broadly speaking, the IJC's responsibilities fall into two principal 
categories. First, under Articles II, IV, and VIII, it exercises the essen-
tially regulatory or licensing function of passing upon applications 
for works that affect boundary water levels or flows. No individual or 
corporation may erect a mill or dam upon a boundary water or cer-
tain other waters without securing the Commission's prior approval. 
This licensing process is initiated with the filing of an application 
49. See, e.g., 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 816. 
50. 1909 Treaty art. VII. 
51. 1909 Treaty art. VII. 
52. 1909 Treaty art. XII, second para.; IJC R.P. 4. (The Commission's various 
activities are governed by published Rules of Procedure. 1909 Treaty art XII, final 
para. The Rules are available from the Commission in pamphlet form.) 
53. IJC R.P. 3. 
54. 1909 Treaty art. XII, first para.; IJC R.P. 5. 
55. IJC R.P. 2. 
56. IJC R.P. 5(1). 
57. 1909 Treaty art. VIII, final para. 
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for approval by the persons or corporate bodies concemed.158 Such 
applications have concerned work ranging from simple log booms on 
the Rainy River to major hydroelectric developments on the St. 
Lawrence. The applicant has the burden of furnishing all necessary 
information and data, and other persons interested may intervene in 
support of or opposition to the application. The Commission usually 
holds public hearings on the application, frequently in both coun-
tries. The Commission then issues its order, which is final. If it 
wishes, the Commission may make its approval conditional upon the 
construction of remedial or protective works to compensate as far as 
possible for the particular use or diversion proposed, and may also 
require suitable and adequate provision for protection against injury 
of any interests on either side of the boundary. In some cases, when 
the IJC has given only conditional approval, it has appointed an 
international board of control to exercise continuing supervision and 
ensure compliance with the conditions.69 
The Commission's responsibilities under Article IX of the Treaty, 
which concerns requests by the two governments for investigation of 
and recommendation on specific problems, are performed pursuant 
to "references."00 Only the national governments can initiate investi-
gations; the Commission has no independent power of inquiry. 
Moreover, while the Treaty suggests that a single government may 
make a reference, in practice all references have been made by 
joint or concurrent requests.61 Under Article IX, the subject of 
a reference is not restricted to boundary waters or to even closely 
related problems but may embrace "any other questions or matters 
of difference arising between [the two countries] involving the rights, 
obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the 
inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier." References 
have in fact been made on an extremely wide range of subjects,62 
including regulation of the level of the Great Lakes,63 preservation 
58. The application procedures are contained in !JC R.P. 12-25. 
59. Fourteen international boards of control are presently operating; they cover 
Kootenay Lake, St. Lawrence River, Niagara River, Rainy Lake, Osoyoos Lake, Skagit 
River, Columbia River, Souris River, Prairie Portage, Lake Champlain, St. Croix River, 
Lake Superior, Lake of the Woods, and the apportionment of the waters of the St. 
Marys and Milk Rivers. 
60. Reference procedures are contained in IJC R.P. 26-29. 
61. See, e.g., Waite, supra note 35, at 111. 
62. See, e.g., the listing and description of the various dockets, including references, 
in L. BLOOMFIELD &: G. FITZGERALD, supra note 35, and in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 
28, at 826-72. 
63. IJC Doc. No. 82 (1964). 
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of the American Falls at Niagara,64 the water resources of the Colum-
bia River region,65 the tidal power potential of Passamaquoddy 
Bay, 66 and a considerable number and variety of water and air 
pollution problems.67 Some of these references have been of out-
standing significance: The 1944 Columbia River reference laid the 
basis for the negotiation of the landmark Columbia River Treaty of 
1961 between the two countries;68 the 1964 Great Lakes water levels 
reference, which is in effect today, involves the most extensive hydro-
logical survey ever attempted;69 and the 1964 Lake Erie-Lake On-
tario-International St. Lawrence Pollution Reference involved what 
is probably the most extensive, detailed, and scientifically sophisti-
cated study of a major water environment yet undertaken and has 
led to current negotiation of the proposed Agreement.70 
A reference is normally initiated by identical letters from each 
government to the IJC specifically describing the subject matter for 
investigation and the action requested.71 The letters typically author-
ize the Commission in conducting its investigation to utilize the 
services of specially qualified personnel of the technical agencies of 
the two countries, acting in an expert rather than a representative 
capacity, and also to draw upon such information and technical data 
as those agencies may possess.72 
Upon receipt of the reference, the Commission has occasionally 
held an initial round of public hearings to acquaint itself with the 
problem. When appropriate it has frequently carried out the in-
vestigative phase of its assignment through appointment of an inter• 
national technical advisory board, which normally includes personnel 
64. IJC Doc. No. 86 (1967). 
65. IJC Doc. No. 51 (1944). 
66. IJC Doc. No. 60 (1948). 
67. See pt. II. C. infra. 
68. See, e.g., J. KRUTILLA, THE Coun.mIA RIVER TREATY: THE ECONOMICS OF AN INTER• 
NATIONAL RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT (1967), esp. ch. 4. 
69. See, e.g., Piper, A Significant Docket for the International Joint Commission, 
59 AM. J. INTL. L. 593 (1965). 
70. See notes 110-16 infra and accompanying text. 
71. See, e.g., the questions presented in the Lower Lakes Pollution Reference, IJC 
Doc. No. 83 (1964), set forth in text accompanying notes 125 infra. For the text of the 
Reference in that matter, see IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 161·62, 
72. See, e.g., the language in the Lower Lakes Pollution Reference: 
In the conduct of its investigation and otherwise in the performance of its duties 
under this reference, the Commission may utilize the services of engineers and 
other specially qualified personnel of the technical agencies of Canada and the 
United States and will so far as possible make use of information and technical 
data heretofore acquired or which may become available during the course of 
the investigation. 
IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 162. 
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from federal, state, provincial, or other official departments or 
agencies of the two governments, who have particular responsibilities· 
and expertise concerning the subject matter of the reference.73 The 
technical board organizes and carries out the necessary technical 
work and field studies, drawing when necessary upon the facilities 
of relevant agencies of the two governments and consulting with 
interested and knowledgeable persons. Progress reports may be 
submitted to the Commission as appropriate. Upon completion of 
its work the board files its formal report and recommendations with 
the Commission. 
Upon receipt of the board's report the Commission normally 
publishes and distributes it to interested persons and organizations 
in both countries. It will then usually schedule public hearings, 
typically in each country in the particular areas concerned, during 
which interested persons may under informal procedures present 
evidence or comment on the board's findings and recommendations. 
Then, drawing upon the board's report, material presented at the 
hearings, and other information and advice received, the Commis-
sion prepares and submits its own report and recommendations to 
the tw'O governments. In contrast with applications, the Commis-
sion's recommendations respecting references are not binding, and 
either government is free to accept or reject them. With but few 
exceptions, the governments have formally "accepted" the recom-
mendations,74 although such acceptance does not necessarily imply 
that further governmental action has been taken pursuant to those 
recommendations. 
While the IJC's role in the reference procedure has typically ended 
with the submission of its report, in recent years the Commission has 
on occasion recommended that the governments authorize it to ap-
point an international advisory board to maintain continuing sur-
veillance over compliance with objectives recommended in the 
Comission's report. The governments have in several instances 
complied with this recommendation and five such advisory boards 
are presently operating.75 In addition to the regular activities of the 
73. Eight international investigative boards are currently operating; these concern 
the American Falls, St. Clair-Detroit Rivers air pollution, Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence 
River water pollution, Lake Erie water pollution, Great Lakes levels, St. John River 
engineering, Souris-Red Rivers engineering, and Roseau River engineering. · 
74. The Commission's 1967 Report on the 1962 reference on cooperative develop-
ment of the water resources of the Pembina River Basin, Doc. 76, has not yet been 
accepted. 
75. International Air Pollution Advisory Board; International Red River Pollution 
Board; International Rainy River Water Pollution Board; Advisory Board of Control 
of Water Pollution St. Croix River; and Advisory Board to the IJC on Control of 
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advisory boards, the IJC has recently experimented with the tech-
nique of calling public international meetings to inquire into the 
progress being made with respect to recommendations accepted by 
the governments.76 These developments have involved the Commis-
sion in a continuing, though very limited, administrative role. 
Since the IJC commenced operations in 1912, it has dealt with 92 
applications and references.77 During this sixty-year period, there has 
been a gradual but steady shift in the burden of the Commission's 
work from applications to references: During the period 1912 to 
1944, the Commission dealt with 39 applications and 11 references; 
in the period since 1944, it has handled 19 applications and 23 
references.78 Moreover, many of the recent applications have been 
comparatively minor in importance, whereas a number of the recent 
references have involved issues of major significance. The fact that 
references now comprise the major work of the Commission reflects 
the increased willingness and desire of the two governments to em-
ploy the IJC for a widening range of common problems and tasks, a 
situation which imposes upon the Commission a far greater role than 
the limited one originally envisioned in 1909. It also demonstrates 
the remarkable adaptability of the 1909 Treaty, which through this 
change of emphasis in the nature of the Commission's work has as-
sumed a growing importance in United States-Canadian relations. 
Pollution of Boundary Waters (Lake Erie-Ontario Section and Lakes Superior-Huron• 
Erie Section). For an example of the work of such boards, see the Report prepared by 
the Lakes Erie-Ontario Advisory Board, The Niagara River Pollution Abatement 
Progress (Aug. 1971). 
76. See Welsh, The Work of the International Joint Commission, supra note 35, at 
313. The first such meeting was held in January 1968; it concerned pollution of the 
Niagara River. Similar meetings have been held at St. Stephen, New Brunswick (pol, 
lution of the St. Croix River), at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan (pollution of the St 
Marys River), and Windsor, Ontario (pollution of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers), 
See, e.g., the IJC Notice of Oct. 8, 1971, of the convening of a public meeting on 
Dec. 16, 1971, in Niagara Falls, N.Y., "to inquire into the progress made in the U.S', 
and Canada since 1967 in the abatement of pollution of the Niagara River from 
municipal and industrial sources and to ascertain why the Water Quality Objectives for 
the River are not being met," and also informing the public of the availa'!>ility of the 
Advisory Board Report on this subject, supra note 75. 
77. See IJC Doc. Index. The dockets are also listed and described in L. BLOOMFIELD 
8: G. FITZGERALD, supra note 35, at 65-205 (through Doc. No. 72, Aug. 1956), and in 3 
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 826-72 (through Doc. No. 80, March 1964). The latest 
docket number is No. 93 (1971), an application concerning Cominco Kootenay Lake. 
The discrepancy in the docket numbers may be explained by the fact that Doc. No. 50 
was assigned to the Rainy Lake Investigation under the Protocol, which was technically 
neither an application nor a reference. 
78. See IJC Doc. Index. For a similar breakdown of the docket as of several years 
ago, see Welsh &: Heeney, supra note 35, at 106; Welsh, The Work of the International 
Joint Commission, supra note 35, at 313. 
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C. The Commission's Activities Regarding Pollution 
Our particular concern, of course, is the IJC's work in dealing 
with problems of boundary waters pollution and, in particular, 
pollution of the Great Lakes. While Article IV of the Treaty pro-
vides that boundary and transboundary waters shall not be polluted 
on either side of the boundary to the injury of health or prcperty on 
the other, it does not confer any specific power on the IJC to enforce 
the provision or provide any other procedures for implementing this 
obligation. Nevertheless, the IJC has been gradually entrusted with a 
growing role in dealing with pollution matters through a series of ref-
erences under Article IX, and pollution has become one of the Com-
mission's principal concerns. To date, the IJC has handled ten 
references relating to pollution, eight of which have been received 
since the Second World War.79 
It is interesting to note that one of the first references to the IJC 
under Article IX of the Treaty, made only shortly after the Com-
mission was constituted, was a 1912 request that it investigate and 
report upon the causes, extent, location and remedies of pollution 
of boundary waters on one side of the boundary which extended to 
and affected the boundary waters on the other side. so The request 
was apparently related to recurrent outbreaks of typhoid fever in 
various of the Great Lakes and connecting waters communities, and 
the Commission's subsequent investigation was essentially a bacterio-
logical study of this region. The Commission submitted a compre-
hensive report in September 1918 with a finding that, while the 
Great Lakes beyond the coastal waters and mouths of tributary 
rivers were pure, the shore waters and river mouths themselves were 
in various states of serious pollution to an extent that rendered the 
water unpure and unfit for drinking purposes.81 The survey dis-
closed "a situation along the frontier which [was] generally chaotic, 
79. These pollution references have the following IJC docket numbers and titles: 
No. 4, Pollution of Boundary Waters (1912); No. 25, Trail Smelter (1928); No. 54, 
Pollution of Boundary Waters (1946); No. 55, Pollution of Boundary Waters from 
Lake Erie, Lake Ontario-Waters of Niagara River (1948); No. 61, Smoke Abatement 
Investigation (1949); No. 71, St. Croix River (1955); No. 73, Pollution of Rainy River 
and Lake of the Woods (1959); No. 81, Pollution of the Red River (of the North) 
(1964); No. 83, Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and International Section of the 
St. Lawrence River (1964); No. 85, Air Pollution (1966). The St. Croix River reference 
(Doc. No. 71) was not by its terms a pollution reference, but since the IJC dealt with 
basin pollution problems in some detail, I have included it in the subsequent dis-
cussion. 
80. Pollution of Boundary Waters, IJC Doc. No. 4 (1912). 
81. !JC, FINAL REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS REFERENCE (1918). 
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everywhere perilous, and in some cases disgraceful."82 Pollution was 
"very intense along the shores of the Detroit and Niagara Rivers" 
and "conditions exist[ed] which imperil[ed] the health and welfare 
of the citizens of both countries in direct contravention of the 
treaty."83 To deal with this situation, the IJC recommended that 
the two governments confer jurisdiction upon the Commission to 
regulate and prohibit such transboundary pollution. The govern-
ments accepted the report and requested the IJC to prepare recipro-
cal legislation or a draft convention for this purpose. 
The IJC submitted a draft convention in October 1920.84 In view 
of the current proposed Agreement, some history of this early effort 
may be of interest. In submitting the draft convention, the IJC stated 
that it was 
firmly of the view that the method best adapted to avoid the evils 
which the Treaty is designed to correct is to take proper steps to 
prevent dangerous pollution crossing the boundary line rather than 
to wait until it is manifest that such pollution has actually physically 
crossed, to the injury of health or property on the other side; and 
that to this end the Convention should clothe the Commission with 
authority and power, subject to all proper limitation and restrictions, 
to make such orders, rules and regulations ... as may be proper and 
necessary to maintain boundary waters in as healthful a condition 
as practicable in view of conditions already created, and should con-
tain proper provisions for the enforcement of such orders, rules and 
directions. 85 
Under the draft convention, the Commission would have been given 
authority to investigate any alleged violation of Article IV of the 
Treaty and to report its findings to the governments. On the basis of 
the Commission's findings of fact, which were to be "final and con-
clusive," the governments would have been obligated to take such 
measures as might be necessary to prevent a continuation of the 
breach. The Commission would also have been given authority to 
define classes of vessels "in which apparatus for the disinfection of 
the sewage, bilge-water or water ballast discharged therefrom should 
be installed to prevent the pollution of waters,"86 and the parties 
could not have granted licenses to vessels that fa:iled to meet IJC 
requirements. Finally, the parties would have agreed to enact or 
82. Id. at 31. 
83. Id. at 51, quoted in IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. 
84. Draft Convention of October 6, 1920, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
85. Letter accompanying Draft Convention, supra note 84, at 5, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. 
86. Draft Convention, supra note 84, art. V, 
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recommend legislation: for full enforcement of the convention. The 
draft convention was discussed by the governments, but they were 
unable to reach agreement and negotiations terminated in 1929.87 
Apparently, one obstacle was the objection of the United States to 
the provision that the Commission's findings of fact regarding the 
existence of pollution and its injurious nature would be final.88 
Canada attempted to reopen the negotiations in 1942, but the State 
Department took the position that the time was not propitious.89 Many 
years were to pass before the governments were again to consider an 
expansion of the IJC's formal authority, 90 and even then the proposal 
was framed in much less sweeping terms than in the Commission's 
1920 draft. 
The IJC's activities regarding pollution were limited during the 
interwar years. However, the Commission did play a role in the 
famous Trail Smelter arbitration,91 a landmark case in the develop-
ment of pollution law. In 1928 a reference was filed by the United 
States and concurred in by Canada concerning the extent to which 
property in the State of Washington had been damaged by fumes 
drifting from a smelter located at Trail, British Columbia; the 
amount of indemnity to compensate for past damage caused by such 
fumes; the probable effects of future operations of the smelter on 
the State of Washington; and the method of providing indemnity 
for any future damages. In its report of February 28, 1931, the IJC 
recommended payment of $350,000 to cover damages sustained in 
the State of Washington by reason of the operation of the Trail 
Smelter to the end of 1931.92 The two governments decided to en-
trust the remaining aspects of this problem to a special tribunal and 
under the terms of a 1935 convention93 established an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal to determine, inter alia, whether further damage had been 
caused in the State of Washington by the Trail Smelter subsequent 
to January 1, 1932, and, if so, the amount of that damage. In its 
decision, reported to the two governments on April 16, 1938, the 
arbitral tribunal concluded that damage had indeed been caused 
87. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 86; 3 M. WlilTEMAN, supra note 28, at 828-29. 
88. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 86. 
89. Id. 
90. See pt. II. D. infra. 
91. Trail Smelter, IJC Doc. No. 25 (1928). 
92. See 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 789. 
93. Convention with the Dominion of Canada Relative to the Establishment of 
a Tribunal To Decide Questions of Indemnity and Future Regime Arising fro~ the 
Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia, April 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935), 
T.S. No. 893 (effective Aug. 7, 1935). 
492 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '10:469 
between January 1932 and October 1937, and that an indemnity of 
$78,000 with interest should be paid.94 In its final decision, reported 
March 11, 1941, the tribunal concluded that no damage had occurred 
since 1937, but recommended a "prescribed regime to avoid future 
damage."95 In the course of its opinion, the tribunal made what is 
still the broadest judicial suggestion of international liability for 
transnational pollution: 
[U]nder principles of international law, as well as of the law of the 
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of another or the property or persons therein, when the case 
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. uo 
Following the Second World War, the problem of pollution of 
boundary waters, as well as other transboundary pollution problems, 
assumed a position of increasing importance in the two countries. 
In view of the provisions of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty and the 
expertise and patterns of United States-Canadian cooperation already 
developed by the IJC, it is not surprising that the two governments 
turned increasingly to the Commission in an effort to deal with these 
problems. 
In 1946 the two governments requested that the IJC investigate 
problems arising from pollution in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, 
the Detroit River, and the St. Marys River-the so-called Connecting 
Channels Reference.91 A further reference was submitted in 1948 to 
include the Niagara River as well,98 and the two references were there-
after administered as one. The Commission's 312-page report on the 
Connecting Channels Reference,99 submitted on October 11, 1950, 
constituted a major advance in international pollution control ex-
perience in terms of both its technical comprehensiveness and the 
nature of its recommendations. The report disclosed serious pollu-
94. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N,R.I.A.A. 1911 (1949), 
33 AM. J. INTL. L. 182 (1938). 
95. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N,R.I.A.A. 1938 (1949), 
35 AM. J. INTL. L. 684 (1941). 
96. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1965 (1949), 
35 AM. J. INTL. L. 716 (1941). Since Canada had accepted liability by the terms of the 
arbitral agreement, the statement is technically dictum. The history of the arbitration 
is well covered and the decisions analyzed in Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, l CAN, 
Y.B. INTL. L. 213 (1963); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 
50 ORE. L. REv. 259 (1971). 
97. IJC Doc. No. 54 (1946). 
98. Pollution of Boundary Waters from Lake Erie, Lake Ontario-Waters of Niagara 
River, IJC Doc. No. 55 (1948). 
99. IJC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS (1951). 
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tion in the various connecting channels, which resulted principally 
from the discharge of domestic sewage and industrial wastes and 
which, the Commission suggested, required urgent action. As a 
method of dealing with the problem the Commission recommended 
adoption by the two governments of a number of specific "Objectives 
for Boundary Water Quality Control." In essence, these objectives 
were technical criteria to be met in order to maintain the waters in 
a satisfactory condition. The idea of recommending technical water 
quality objectives was a major innovation, which the Commission 
has followed in subsequent pollution references. The objectives, 
which were the first of their kind to be formulated on an interna-
tional basis, anticipated national action in both countries;100 the con-
cept was ultimately embodied in the federal Water Quality Act of 
1965101 fifteen years later. The Commission also recommended ap-
pointment of two advisory boards on control of pollution--one 
for the Superior-Huron-Erie section connecting channels and the 
other for the Erie-Ontario section connecting channels. The boards 
were to assist the Commission in surveillance of the connecting 
channels to ensure compliance with the recommended objectives, 
notifying those responsible for objectionable pollution, and, in the 
absence of corrective measures, making appropriate recommendations 
to authorities having jurisdiction. Again, it has now become standard 
practice for the Commission to recommend that an advisory board 
be established to maintain surveillance on developments surrounding 
a particular reference. The Connecting Channels Report was ap-
proved by the governments, and the two boards were established 
and have since functioned continuously. A program of periodic con-
ferences with interested persons was also commenced to assist in 
promoting compliance, and this practice has also continued. 
In 1949 the IJC was asked to investigate the contribution made 
by vessels on the Detroit River to atmospheric pollution in the 
Detroit-Windsor area.102 The Commission established a technical 
board on atmospheric pollution to conduct the investigations. The 
IJC's report, issued May 31, 1960, found serious air pollution on 
both sides of the river causing health and economic injuries.103 The 
Commission concluded, however, that the major sources of atmos-
pheric pollution were industrial and transportation activities in the 
100. IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. 
101. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1151-75 (1970). 
102. Smoke Abatement Investigation, IJC Doc. No. 61 (1949). 
103. !JC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE DETROIT RlvER 
.AREA (1960). 
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surrounding land areas and that fumes from vessels contributed only 
a minimal amount to this pollution. It recommended that the govern-
ments adopt certain regulations for the emission of smoke from 
vessels and concluded that for other sources there was already ade-
quate legal and administrative authority in each country to enforce 
proper controls on emission of wastes into the atmosphere. On Jan-
uary 30, 1961, the governments authorized the IJC to continue its 
surveillance program pending communication of the views of the 
governments on the report. An advisory board has been established 
and its work continues. 
On June 10, 1955, the two governments submitted a reference 
to the IJC requesting it to investigate and study redevelopment of 
the St. Croix River Basin for the purpose of the improvement of the 
use, conservation, and regulation of the waters of the basin.104 While 
the reference did not expressly refer to pollution the Commission 
dealt with that subject extensively. The Commission established the 
International St. Croix River Engineering Board to conduct the in-
vestigation. In 1957 the Engineering Board completed a preliminary 
report and on October 13, 1959, the Commission reported to the two 
governments on the regulation and pollution of the waters of the 
Basin.105 The report recommended, inter alia, that the "Objectives 
for Boundary Waters Quality Control," which were set forth in the 
Commission's Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters (the 
Connecting Channels Report) be adopted by the governments of 
Canada, the United States, New Brunswick, and Maine as the criteria 
to be met in maintaining the Basin Waters in satisfactory condition; 
that those responsible for existing or potential pollution put into 
effect remedial measures necessary to meet these "Objectives"; and 
that the Commission be authorized to establish and maintain super-
vision over boundary waters pollution problems in the Basin through 
a technical advisory board. On October 2, 1961, the governments 
announced that they had approved the recommendations of the Com-
mission, with an exception not here pertinent. The advisory board 
was established and is presently functioning. 
In May 1959 the two governments submitted a reference to the 
IJC concerning pollution of Rainy River and the Lake of the 
Woods.106 The Commission established a technical board on water 
104. St. Croix River, IJC Doc. No. 71 (1955). 
105. !JC, REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATER REsoURCES OF THE ST. CROIX 
R.lvER BASIN (1959). 
106. IJC Doc. No. 73 (1959). 
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pollution, which submitted a comprehensive report to the Commis-
sion on April 4, 1963. The Commission issued its report in February 
1965, which concluded that the waters of the Rainy River were being 
seriously polluted, primarily by the discharge of wastes from pulp 
and paper industries, but that the water quality of Lake of the Woods 
appeared satisfactory.107 It recommended that the concerned state and 
provincial governments adopt specified water quality objectives for 
the Rainy River; that appropriate authorities require the industries 
and municipalities concerned to initiate, at the earliest possible date 
and pursuant to a definite time schedule, construction of pollution 
abatement facilities; and that the Commission be authorized to es-
tablish and maintain supervision over pollution of the waters of the 
Rainy River. The report was accepted by the governments and a 
supervisory board established. 
In October 1964, in the only pollution reference concerning a 
river that was not a boundary water, the two governments requested 
the IJC to investigate pollution of the Red River.108 The Commis-
sion created the International Red River Pollution Board to under-
take the necessary technical investigations and studies, and the Board 
submitted a two-volume report in October 1967. In its final report, 
submitted in April 1968,109 the Commission concluded that during 
the survey period the river waters crossing the boundary were not 
polluted to an extent that caused injury to health or property in 
Canada, and that injury was unlikely to occur if standards established 
pursuant to legislation in Minnesota and North Dakota were adhered 
to in those states. It further concluded that to ensure maintenance of 
satisfactory water quality conditions at the boundary it was necessary 
to adopt mutually acceptable water quality objectives for the Red 
River at the international boundary and to provide for continuous 
supervision to assure compliance with such objectives. Accordingly, 
the IJC recommended general and specific water quality objectives 
for the area and the establishment of an international board to main-
tain supervision. These recommendations were accepted and the 
board established. 
Also in October 1964, in one of the most significant and broad-
ranging postwar pollution references, the two governments requested 
that the IJC inquire into the extent, causes, and location of pollution 
of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the International Section of the St. 
107. !JC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF RAINY RIVER AND LAKE OF THE WOODS (1965). 
108. IJC Doc. No. 81 (1964). 
109. !JC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF THE RED RlvER (1968). 
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Lawrence River-the so-called Lower Great Lakes Pollution Refer-
ence.110 The Commission established two international technical ad-
visory boards, the International Lake Erie Water Pollution Board 
and the International Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence Water Pollution 
Board, to conduct the technical investigations. The Boards' investi-
gation was the most extensive water pollution study to be undertaken 
anywhere to date, involving the concerted efforts of twelve agencies 
of the two national governments, the states of New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, and Michigan, and the Province of Ontario, and the 
work of several hundred scientific, engineering, and technical experts 
from a variety of disciplines.111 During the period from 1964 to 1970 
the Boards submitted 10 semiannual progress reports and two interim 
reports to the IJC.112 The IJC itself made three interim reports to 
the two governments. In September 1969 the Boards submitted to 
the Commission a comprehensive 800-page joint final report on the 
subject of the reference, containing detailed technical findings and 
a wide variety of recommendations.113 During the period of Decem-
ber 1969 through February 1970 the IJC held six hearings on this 
report in eight United States and Canadian cities. On January 14, 
1971, the IJC issued its own final report to the two governments114 
which adopted most of the Board's recommendations.116 These rec-
ommendations, which were to play a crucial role in the proposal and 
negotiation of the proposed Agreement, will be described later in 
greater detail. 116 
On September 23, 1966, the governments expanded upon the 
1949 Detroit River air pollution reference by requesting the !JC to 
llO. I.JC Doc. No. 83 (1964). See also Dept. of State Press Release No. 441 (Oct. 8, 
1964). The reference is reprinted in full in the IJC LOWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 
IO, at 161-62. The Commission's procedures and method of work with respect to this 
reference are set out in detail in IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 1·6, 25•33. 
111. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 25. The Board's multimillion 
dollar investigation required nearly 450 man years of work by scientists, engineers, 
and technical experts. The offshore studies involved over 100 cruises on Lake Erie 
and 200 on Lake Ontario to obtain water samples on a regular basis and to retrieve 
data at 13,000 stations. The Ontario Water Resources Commission alone deployed 
as many as 12 survey vessels to collect data at 50,000 sampling locations. In all, 
600,000 samples were analyzed for various constituents. Id. at 26-27. 
ll2. See, e.g., International Great Lakes Levels Bd., Interim Report to the IJC: 
Regulation of Great Lakes Levels, Feb. 1968. 
ll3. International Lake Erie Water Pollution Bd. &: International Lake Ontario• 
St. Lawrence River Water Pollution Bd., Report to the IJC on Pollution of Lake Erie, 
Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River, Sept. 1969 
(3 vols.). 
114. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO. The Report is summarized in 64 
DEPT. STATE BULL. 203 (1971). 
115. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 149-57. 
116. See text accompanying notes 125-29 infra. 
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ascertain whether the air in the Port Huron, Michigan-Sarnia, On-
tario, and Detroit, Michigan-Windsor, Ontario vicinities was being 
polluted on either side of the boundary to an extent that was detri-
mental to the public health, safety, or general welfare of citizens or 
property on the other side of the boundary.117 If this question were 
answered in the affirmative, the Commission was to indicate the 
sources and extent of the air pollution and to recommend to the 
governments the most practical preventive or remedial measures. 
This reference also authorized the IJC to call the attention of the 
governments to any air pollution situation along the entire boundary 
meriting concern.118 The Commission assigned this study to its 
existing International St. Clair-Detroit Air Pollution Board. 
On February 4, 1971, the Board submitted a report to the Com-
mission.110 The report concluded that the transboundary fl.ow of air 
pollutants produces pollution levels that are in excess of the air 
quality standards established in Ontario and about to be established 
in Michigan. In the Detroit-Windsor area far more sulfur oxides and 
particulate matter are being transported from the United States into 
Canada than are carried in the opposite direction. In the Sarnia-
Port Huron area the contribution of sulfur oxides and particulate 
matter from each country to transboundary air pollution is ap-
proximately equal; however, odors that have long been a source of 
complaint by residents in the Port Huron area are considered in the 
Board report to be a mixture caused by petroleum refining and 
petroleum-related organic chemical maunfacturing in Sarnia. The 
report recommends that the responsible control agencies in both 
countries accelerate abatement programs to bring all sources of air 
pollution into compliance; that both countries and their respective 
air pollution control agencies establish uniform air quality standards 
as soon as possible; and that the governments of Canada, the United 
States, the State of Michigan, and the Province of Ontario cooperate 
to control transboundary air pollution from existing sources and to 
prevent creation of new sources. At the time of this writing, a final 
report on this reference is reportedly in preparation. 
117. Air Pollution, IJC Doc. No. 85 (1966). 
118. The penultimate paragraph of the reference states: 
The Commission is also requested to take note of air pollution problems in 
boundary areas other than those referred to in Question I [the vicinity of 
Port Huron-Sarnia and Detroit-Windsorl which may come to its attention from 
any source. If at any time the Commission considers it appropriate to do so, 
the Commission is invited to draw such problems to the attention of both gov-
ernments. 
119. Joint Air Pollution Study of St. Clair-Detroit River Areas for International 
Joint Commission, Canada and the United States, Jan. 1971. 
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Following the Santa Barbara Channel oil pollution incident off 
the coast of California in the winter of 1969,120 the two governments 
became concerned with the situation in Lake Erie, where some oil 
and gas exploration has been carried on in Canadian waters since 
1913. In March 1969 the governments requested the IJC, within the 
framework of its existing study of Lower Lakes pollution and as a 
matter of urgency, to investigate and make a special report on the 
adequacy of existing safety requirements applicable to underwater 
drilling and production operations to prevent oil from spilling into 
Lake Erie; the adequacy of knmm methods of clearing up any major 
oil spill that may occur from any source; and the adequacy of existing 
contingency plans in both countries for dealing with oil spills.121 The 
Commission instructed its existing International Lake Erie Water 
Pollution Board to carry out the technical investigation. Five months 
later the Board issued a report122 concluding that the current regula-
tions of Ontario, New York, and Pennsylvania pertaining to oil and 
gas exploration and production are adequate and if effectively en-
forced would provide satisfactory protection for the water resources 
of the Lake. It further found that while oil and gas exploration and 
development is a potential source of oil pollution in Lake Erie, 
other potential sources might pose a greater threat. It pointed out 
that the daily discharge of oil to the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers 
exceeds the peak daily flow that escaped from the well off Santa 
Barbara and that possibly the greatest threat to the water resources of 
the Lake is the significant amount of oil carried in ships for their 
own use, on the average 1,000 tons per vessel, as well as the oil and 
other hazardous cargoes carried by some ships. The Board carefully 
examined technical aspects of containment and clean-up of major oil 
spills and existing contingency plans in both countries and empha-
sized the urgent need for international coordination and cooperation 
to set up procedures to deal effectively with a major oil spill. It 
recommended an accelerated and expanded program for containment 
and clean-up of oil spills; the development of a coordinated inter-
national contingency plan and more complete national contingency 
plans; the temporary limitation of drilling and production in certain 
parts of Lake Erie pending development of such plans and programs; 
120. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at 50, col. 3. 
121. The text of the request is set forth in the IJC LoWER LAKE.s REPORT, supra 
note 10, at 163·64. The U.S. letter, which is identical to the Canadian letter, is re• 
printed in 60 DEPT. STATE BULL. 296 (1969). 
122. International Lake Erie Water Pollution Bd., Report to the IJC on Potential 
Oil Pollution Incidents from Oil and Gas Well Activities in Lake Erie: Their Pre• 
vention and Control, Sept. 1969. 
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the exclusion from the Great Lakes of ships and masters likely to 
present unreasonable risks of oil pollution; and provisions to alert 
appropriate officials when hazardous materials are in transit over 
Lake waters. 
The Commission held public hearings on the Board's report in 
December 1969. On May 21, 1970, the IJC submitted to the two 
governments its third interim report on the progress of its Lower 
Lakes study. The report, entitled "Special Report on Potential Oil 
Pollution, Eutrophication, and Pollution from ·watercraft," adopted, 
inter alia, most of the conclusions of the Board with respect to the oil 
pollution question.123 The Commission's interim conclusions were 
subsequently confirmed in its January 1971 final Report on the 
Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference.124 
This survey may be concluded by returning to a fuller description 
of the final Report on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference, 
perhaps the most important reference on the topic of pollution. 
Briefly stated, the questions posed to the Commission in the refer-
ence were as follows: 
I. Were the boundary waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and 
the international section of the St. Lawrence River being 
polluted on either side to an extent injurious to health or 
property on the other side? 
2. If so, to what extent, by what causes, and in what localities was 
such pollution taking place? 
3. What remedial measures would be the most practical from 
economic, sanitary, and other points of view, and what would 
the probable cost of these measures be?125 
The IJC's Report is extremely comprehensive. It contains an 
extensive discussion, based on the Joint Boards' technical studies, of 
all aspects of the Lower Great Lakes pollution problems; a number 
of specific conclusions; a listing of both general and specific pro-
posed water quality objectives; and twenty-two specific recommenda-
tions for action by the two governments and responsible jurisdictions 
in both countries. 
In response to the particular questions posed, the Co:mmission 
found that the waters of the Lower Great Lakes are being seriously 
polluted on both sides of the boundary to the detriment of both 
countries. While it is difficult to establish positively that the concen-
tration of a particular pollutant on one side of the boundary is due 
123. The report is summarized in 62 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 807 (1970). 
124. IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 52-61. 
125. Id. at 5. The full reference is reprinted in id. at 161-62. 
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to a specific source on the other side, there is no doubt that con-
taminants originating in one country do move across the boundary 
and degrade the quality of water in the other country to the extent 
of causing injury to health and property on that side of the bound-
ary. 
In answer to the second question, the Commission found that 
water pollution extends throughout the Lower Lakes; that the prin-
cipal causes are wastes discharged into the boundary waters and 
tributaries by municipalities and industries; and that pollution is 
taking place in all jurisdictions sharing the boundary waters. It 
found that Lake Erie, particularly its western basin, is in an ad-
vanced state of eutrophication, or aging, and that accelerated eutro-
phication is occurring in Lake Ontario. A controlling factor in this 
process is the discharge of phosphorus from detergents and other 
municipal and industrial wastes. 
Finally, in answer to the third question, and as a result of its pre-
vious answers, the Commission found that urgent measures are re-
quired, and it recommended that both Canada and the United States 
adopt specific water quality objectives-as set out in the Report-
and enter into agreement on a wide range of programs, measures, 
and schedules to achieve them. The Report lists specific remedial 
actions to be taken on an urgent basis, including immediate reduc-
tion of the phosphorus content in detergents and the prompt im-
plementation of a vigorous program to treat municipal and 
industrial waste to reduce phosphorus inputs. Estimated cost in terms 
of 1968 dollars for municipal and industrial treatment facilities in 
Canada is 211 million dollars and in the United States 1,373 million 
dollars.126 The Commission recommends that, until it is in a position 
to recommend quality objectives for Lake Huron and Lake Su-
perior, the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and the 
Province of Ontario recognize the objectives recommended for the 
Lower Lakes as the initial basis for the establishment of water pol-
lution control programs for the Upper Lakes. 
The Commission Report, however, is not limited to technical 
evaluations and recommendations. It also deals extensively with the 
surveillance, monitoring, and implementation required to achieve 
the recommended remedial measures,127 and, to this end, concludes 
by recommending a substantial expansion of its own authority and 
jurisdiction. Recommendation 20 urges that the two governments 
extend, at the earliest practicable date, the existing Lower Lakes 
126. Id. at 137-38. 
127. Id. at ll!0-35. 
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Reference to authorize the Commission to investigate pollution in the 
remaining boundary waters of the Great Lakes system and the waters 
tributary thereto.128 The final recommendation of the Report is more 
far-reaching. The Commission recommends that 
The Governments of Canada and the United States specifically con- , 
fer upon this Commission the authority, responsibility and means for 
coordination, surveillance, monitoring, implementation, reporting, 
making recommendations to governments all as outlined in Chapter 
XIII of this Report [which contains a detailed discussion of needs 
respecting surveillance, monitoring, and implementation], and such 
other duties related to preservation and improvement of the quality 
of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence System as may be agreed by the said 
Governments; the Commission to be authorized to establish, in con-
sultation with the Governments, an international board or boards 
to assist it in carrying out these duties and to delegate to said board 
or boards such authority and responsibility as the Commission may 
deem appropriate.120 
D. The Proposed Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
The completion in September 1969 of the two Lower Lakes 
technical boards' intensive study of Lower Great Lakes pollution, 
and the boards' strong conclusions and recommendations to the 
IJC concerning the grave deterioration of water quality in many 
areas of the Lakes, coincided with several factors that surely aided 
their effectiveness: a surge of public anxiety over environmental 
problems in both the United States and Canada, public demands in 
both countries for government action to deal with these problems, 
and strong international pressures by the Canadian government upon 
the United States government for the adoption of more effective 
measures to cope with Great Lakes pollution. Influenced no doubt 
by all these factors, President Nixon charged the Council on Environ-
mental Quality to work with Canada on this matter.130 
On June 23, 1970, the two governments convened a high level 
ministerial meeting in Ottawa to discuss common Great Lakes pol-
lution problems. 131 The Canadian delegation was led by Mitchell 
Sharp and the American delegation by Russell Train. Both dele-
gations included state and provincial as well as federal officials 
and representatives. At the conclusion of the initial meeting the 
128. Id. at 155. 
129. Id. at 156. 
130. Information based on interviews with U.S. government officials. 
131. See Dept. State Press Release No. 189 CTune 23, 1970) (Communique of the 
Canada-United States Ministerial Meeting on Great Lakes Pollution), published in 
63 DEPT. STATE BULL. 36 (1970}, 
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Ministers expressed deep concern about the critical situation in the 
Great Lakes, noted the determination of the governments to take 
decisive action, and agreed on a number of specific remedial mea-
sures.132 The Ministers further agreed to the establishment of a 
joint Working Group, composed of representatives of federal, state, 
and provincial agencies with responsibilities in the field of water 
quality, to consider various aspects of the problems of Great Lakes 
pollution, possible common water quality objectives, and such 
implementing programs as either government might wish to propose. 
The Working Group was charged to report back to the Ministerial 
Conference, which would be reconvened subsequent to the IJC's 
issuance of its final Report on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution 
Reference.133 
The Working Group divided into ten subgroups, each dealing 
with particular aspects of the Great Lakes problem. The reports of 
the subgroups were presented to the full Working Group in Febru-
ary and March 1971, and the final report of the Working Group was 
approved by the full Group in April 1971 and presented to the 
Ministerial Meeting in June 1971.134 The central recommenda-
tion of the Working Group report was that the United States 
and Canada enter into a comprehensive new agreement on Great 
Lakes water quality control and that the agreement should include 
adoption of common water quality objectives for the Great Lakes, 
programs for achieving these objectives, and an expansion of the 
IJC's authority to permit it to monitor effectively these efforts. 
On June 10, 1971, the Ministerial Conference reconvened in 
Washington to review the Working Group's report. The result of 
that meeting was broad acceptance of the Working Group's major 
recommendations, including its proposal for a new agreement on 
Great Lakes water quality control. A Joint Communique was issued 
at the conclusion of that meeting committing the two governments 
to conclude such an agreement.135 
The details of the proposed Agreement are still in the process of 
negotiation by the two governments. However, the general character 
and coverage of the proposed Agreement and associated arrangements 
are spelled out at some length in the Joint Communique, and at 
132. Id. The agreed measures included coordination of national contingency plan5 
for spills of oil and hazardous materials, reduction of inputs of phosphates into the 
Lakes, and achievement of compatible regulations concerning waste disposal by com• 
mercial vessels and watercraft. 
133. Id. 
134-. Information supplied by U.S. government officials. 
135. Joint Communique, supra note 1. 
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least some of the probable details may be surmised from the recom-
mendations in the IJC's Report and other sources.136 
The Agreement will be a formal and binding international agree-
ment, which will, however, reportedly be entered into by the United 
States as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty ratified 
pursuant to formal constitutional processes.137 It will presumably 
first establish certain broad general objectives for water quality 
throughout the boundary waters of the Great Lakes system. These 
will probably conform closely to the general objectives stated in the 
IJC's Report and will include, for example, such objectives as keep-
ing the waters free from substances in concentrations that are toxic 
or harmful to human, animal, or aquatic life; free from nutrients in 
concentrations that create nuisance growths of aquatic weeds or 
algae; and free from floating debris or other materials in amounts 
sufficient to be deleterious or objectionable.138 
To achieve these general objectives, the parties will agree to 
adopt specific common water quality objectives,139 perhaps with 
associated target loadings and target dates, applicable to specific 
areas. Most likely, these specific water quality objectives will again 
be essentially the same as those recommended by the IJC in its Re-
port; these suggest specific technical criteria for the quality of the 
receiving waters with regard to microbiology, dissolved oxygen, total 
dissolved solids, temperature, taste and odor, pH, iron, phosphorus, 
radioactivity, and, as required, toxic materials, oils, and heavy met-
als.140 Presumably there will be some arrangement under which these 
136. See, e.g., OCEAN SCIENCE NEws, Sept. 10, 1971, at I, which reports that the 
heart of the Agreement will be contained in nine annexes dealing with water quality 
objectives, contingency plans, vessel construction, vessel wastes, a navigation study, 
dredged spoils, onshore and offshore facilities, transportation by land, and coordination 
of research. It also notes that the 1975 target date for implementation of objectives will 
be set back to 1976 and that among the differences remaining to be negotiated is 
the fact that, while Canada wants a definite financial commitment from the U.S. 
for setting up the Joint Water Quality Board under the IJC, the U.S. must anticipate 
variations in the funds that will be approved by the House Appropriations Committee, 
whose Chairman, Representative John Rooney, has not reacted favorably to IJC fund-
ing requests. 
137. The proposed Agreement will presumably be an "umbrella-type" arrangement 
in that it will commit each government to use the legislative and regulatory powers 
available to it from time to time to take action to control pollution. Thus, the initial 
U.S. programs will not require additional legislation, but, with enactment of new 
legislation, the U.S. will be able to expand such programs. (Information supplied by 
U.S. government officials.) 
138. See IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 144-45, set out in note 191 
infra. 
139. Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,r 5. 
J40. See IJC LoWER LAKEs REPoRT, supra note 10, at 145-48, set out in part in note 
192 infra. 
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objectives, loadings, and dates may be supplemented or modified from 
time to time under agreed procedures without the necessity for 
revising the Agreement as a whole. 
To meet these specific objectives, each party will undertake to 
establish, through its own legal procedures, a broad range of national 
water quality standards for the boundary waters of the Great Lakes 
system; these standards must be compatible with and, it is hoped, 
may exceed the common water quality objectives set forth in the 
Agreement.141 
As a further measure to achieve the common water quality ob-
jectives, the two governments will exchange commitments to carry 
out a variety of pollution control programs within agreed time peri-
ods, or as rapidly as feasible, including: 
(a) construction of treatment facilities for municipal and industrial 
wastes and animal husbandry operations, (b) reduction of phospho-
rus discharges, ( c) elimination of mercury and other toxic metals 
from discharges, (d) control of thermal pollution, (e) control of pollu-
tion from radioactive wastes, (f) control of pollution from pesticides, 
and (g) developmentof controls for pollution from combined sewer 
overflows.142 
The two governments will also agree to effective and compatible 
regulations "(a) for ship design and construction to prevent fuel and 
cargo loss, (b) for control of vessel waste discharges, (c) for disposition 
of polluted dredge spoils, and (d) for preventing discharges of oil and 
hazardous polluting substances from on- and off-shore facilities and 
transportation on land."143 The Agreement will also provide for a 
joint investigation by the two governments for the purpose of agree-
ing upon measures respecting new navigation equipment, establish-
ing traffic lanes on the Lakes, and the manning and operating of 
vessels.144 The Communique also announces that, without waiting 
for the negotiation of the Agreement, the governments are proceed-
ing immediately with certain additional measures, including "a joint 
contingency plan for a coordinated response to pollution incidents 
involving spills of oil and other hazardous materials" on the Great 
Lakes.145 
The Communique expresses the two governments' agreement 
141. Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,i 5. 
142. Id. 
143. Id., ,I 7. 
144. Id., ,I 8. 
145. Id., ,I 13. 
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that they should assign additional responsibilities and authority to 
the I JC to assist the governments in their efforts to restore and pro-
tect Great Lakes water quality and gives considerable emphasis to the 
enhanced role envisioned for the Commission.146 More specifically, 
the Commission will be given a greater role in collecting, analyzing, 
and disseminating relevant data and information; surveillance of 
water quality in the Great Lakes system; monitoring of the effective-
ness of governmental programs to achieve the common water quality 
objectives; coordinating activities to improve water quality; tender-
ing advice and assistance; and recommending legislation and pro-
grams.147 Arrangements will be established within the IJC for the 
coordination of water quality research. Presumably the IJC will 
render regular reports on progress made under the Agreement. The 
Communique also states that the governments intend to extend new 
references to the IJC, requesting it (a) to conduct an investigation of 
water quality in Lake Superior and Lake Huron and (b) to extend 
its surveillance of water quality to Lake Huron and Lake Superior.148 
A separate reference may provide for a study by the IJC of pollution 
from agriculture, forestry, and other land sources. 
The Communique also addresses the question of IJC institutional 
arrangements to carry out these new responsibilities.149 The two 
governments agreed that it will be necessary to provide the Commis-
sion additional staff and resources; the new appointments will be the 
Commission's responsibility, although the governments will be con-
sulted. The establishment of an IJC office in the Great Lakes area is 
suggested. The Ministers further suggest establishment of a special 
pollution advisory board under the Commission to assist in imple-
menting the new Agreement; it is also suggested that subboards 
might be created to deal with specific functional responsibilities and 
specific geographical areas within the Great Lakes basin. The pollu-
tion advisory board or boards should have a balanced binational 
membership. The Communique makes clear, however, that the two 
governments do not intend to grant the Commission any specific en-
forcement authority. While the Commission is to aid the governments 
by providing an independent overview and other assistance, the var-
ious agencies of the federal, state, and provincial governments will 
146. Id., 11 9. 
147. Id. The authority contemplated is presumably a reflection of the arrangements 
for surveillance, monitoring, and implementation suggested and more fully dis-
cussed in IJC LOWF.R LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 130-35. 
148. Joint Communique, supra note 1, 11 13. 
149. Id., 1111 10-11. 
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continue to implement the programs and measures required to 
achieve the water quality objectives.150 
In the Joint Communique, each government addressed itself 
J:>riefly to certain domestic measures that it was already undertaking 
to meet these problems and various related issues.151 American repre-
sentatives reviewed the extensive federal programs directed toward 
remedying Great Lakes pollution that were underway. The Canadian 
Ministers indicated the desirability of a 1975 deadline for completion 
of certain of the proposed Lower Great Lakes programs, particularly 
those directed to the reduction of phosphorus inputs. They also 
noted that implementation of many of the Canadian commitments 
under the proposed agreement will be the joint responsibility of the 
Canadian federal government and the government of Ontario and 
that the apportionment of responsibility among the Canadian govern-
ment, the government of Ontario, and the municipalities concerned 
for the financing of the required accelerated program of improve-
ments to municipal sewage treatment facilities in the Lower Lakes 
area will be the subject of a detailed agreement to be negotiated be-
tween the Canadian government and the government of Ontario. 
Bodi groups of Ministers expressed in the Communique their 
optimism for the future. But in a significant note of caution they 
added: "In designing the agreement, it was accepted that programs 
and other measures established to meet urgent problems would in no 
way affect the rights of each country in the use of its Great Lakes 
waters.''152 In an interesting conclusion to the substantive part of the 
Communique, the Ministers noted that the process of intergovern-
mental.cooperation employed in designing the proposed Agreement 
might be applied to the solution of other common environmental 
problems-for example, air pollution.153 Finally, it should be noted 
that the Communique makes no mention of any special procedures 
for dispute-settlement for use in the case of claims of noncompliance 
·with the proposed Agreement. Presumably, such claims will be dealt 
with under the dispute-settlement provisions of the 1909 Treaty. 
Ill. SOME AsPECTS OF THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
While every international environmental arrangement is neces-
sarily unique, there are certain common problems that the parties 
will face in reaching any agreement. These include the initial de-
150. Id., 11 12. 
151. Id., 1111 13-18. 
152. Id., ,I 17. 
153. Id., 1[ 18. 
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cision that a particular environmental problem or set of problems 
is an appropriate subject for international treatment; the determi-
nation of the form any international cooperation should take; the 
structuring of required institutions; the determination of objectives; 
the apportionment of burdens; the establishment of coordination; 
and the formulation of provisions for implementation. It may be use-
ful to take a closer look at how the United States and Canada have 
dealt with these pro~lems. 
A. The Need for International Cooperation 
'A threshold stage of any arrangement for international environ-
mental cooperation is a recognition by governments that the partic-
ular problems involved are appropriate matters for international 
treatment. With a few exceptions,154 pollution and other environ-
mental problems were long regarded as primarily of national rather 
than international concern. It is only within the past few years that 
this view has undergone substantial change and the propriety of 
broader international involvement in environmental issues has be-
come more widely accepted. Nevertheless, states are still inclined to 
think of these questions as primarily national in character and, un-
less they see some national interest that can be pursued through 
international environmental cooperation, will have little inclination 
to participate. Thus, with respect to each proposal for international 
environmental measures, it is useful to ask why such measures are 
needed and what they can add to approaches based on national action 
alone.165 There are at least three types of situations in which inter-
national treatment seems generally advisable. 
First, the clearest case for international cooperation is the one in 
which a particular environmental problem both produces significant 
and potentially harmful international effects and is of such a nature, 
or manifested in such a context, that measures to deal effectively 
with it inherently require some type of joint or coordinated inter-
national action. The typical case arises where several countries share 
a river, a lake, or an enclosed sea, or :where all nations share an en-
vironment beyond the reach of any single national jurisdiction, such 
as the high seas or outer space. Clearly, pollution problems in these 
settings cannot be adequately assessed or controlled except through 
154. See note 178 infra. 
155. See generally CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra note 7, at 199-200; Russell & Lands-
berg, International Environmental Problems: A Taxonomy, 172 SCIENCE 1307 (1971); 
Report of the U.N. Secretary General on Problems of the Human Environment, supra 
note 6; authorities cited in note 5 supra. · 
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common or joint action by all of the states that are contributing to 
the problem or sharing control of the relevant environments. Over 
time a broad consensus has developed favoring international treat-
ment of many of these issues.m In the broadest sense, perhaps all 
environmental problems are of this character because of their ulti-
mate effect on the global environment. Of course, different types of 
measures may be appropriate to different cases: some situations may 
suggest only limited programs of exchange of information and data, 
coordinated or joint monitoring or surveillance, or, as in the case of 
recent American-Canadian cooperation, the setting of minimum com-
mon objectives; other situations may call for more far-reaching 
techniques of international or supranational regulation or enforce-
ment. 
Second, international measures may be useful when a state fails 
for some reason to control adequately what is primarily its own na-
tional environmental problem, with consequent spill-over effects of 
a type that damage other countries. The passage of fumes from a 
smelter across an international boundary, as in the Trail Smelter ar-
bitration,157 is an example of such a situation. The type of interna-
tional measures suggested may vary with the case. Thus, a state may 
156. See note 178 infra. The principal convention dealing with pollution of the 
oceans is the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil, opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S, No, 
4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended April 11, 1962, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S, No. 
6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332, and 1969 (annexed to IMCO Ass. Res. A.175(VI) (Oct, 21, 1969), 
See also Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 
[1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 24 (oil pollution): art, 
25 (pollution by radioactive materials and other harmful agents); Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T, 471, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 5(7) (coastal state engaged in c.xploring or 
exploiting the resources of the shelf must take appropriate measures for protection 
of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents); International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Nov, 29, 1969, re• 
printed in 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 481 (1970); International Convention Relating to Inter-
vention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, opened for signature 
Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 471 (1970); Agreement for Cooperation 
in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, June 9, 1969, between the various 
states bordering on the North Sea, reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 359 (1969), 
During the past several years, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted a number of 
resolutions dealing with various aspects of marine pollution. See generally Hardy, 
International Control of Marine Pollution, 11 NATURAL REsouRCEs J. 296 (1971): 
Schachter &: Senver, supra note 5. 
Both the Antarctic Treaty, Dec, 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 
402 U.N.T.S. 71, and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No, 6347, contain provisions 
directed at protecting these unique environments. The Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed at 
Moscow Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S, 43, was also 
motivated largely by global environmental considerations. 
157. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra. 
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simply be unaware of the international impact of its environmental 
policies, in which case international admonitions may alert it to the 
problem. Or a state may be indifferent to the international environ-
mental consequences of its actions, in which case some type of inter-
national persuasion or pressure may be required to induce it to 
change its attitude. A state may be concerned that, in taking national 
measures to control pollution, it will be put at an economic or mili-
tary disadvantage vis-a-vis other states that have similar problems but 
do not take any corrective action. This situation is illustrated by the 
current widespread concern regarding the impact of different national 
environmental quality programs on international trade and invest-
ment.158 Problems of this nature might be met by international 
measures requiring similar levels of national action by all, or at least 
most, of the states concerned.159 Finally, a state may simply not have 
the financial resources or scientific and technical expertise necessary 
to develop and maintain required pollution control programs; mea-
sures of international financial and technical assistance could help to 
fill such a gap. 
Third, even in cases in which the international impact of partic-
ular environmental problems is minimal and in which the national 
governments are prepared to take necessary action to control them, if 
the problems are common to various countries, there may be sub-
stantial mutual gains to governments from sharing and exchanging 
relevant scientific data, technology, and institutional experience. 
The problem of pollution of the internationally shared environ-
ment of the Great Lakes and other United States-Canadian boundary 
waters is one in which both countries have an obvious common con-
cern and in which the solution can clearly be advanced by interna-
tional cooperation; indeed, it is perhaps the best example of a 
situation for which international treatment is appropriate. A major 
accomplishment of the 1909 Treaty was its early recognition of this 
158. See, e.g., CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 131-33. The Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development is currently experimenting with techniques for 
harmonizing environmental standards, as in its introduction, for an initial period of two 
years, of a "Procedure for Notification and Consultation on Measures for Control 
of Substances Affecting Man or His Environment," adopted on May 18, 1971, O.E.C.~. 
Doc. C (71), 73/Annex (1971) (described by Stein, The Potential of Regional Organiza-
tions in Managing Man's Environment, in I.Aw, INSTITtJnONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 15-16). 
159. Compare the analogous concept of mutual limitation in the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed 
at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T .S. 43. Similar 
considerations are an important factor in the negotiation of international commodity 
arrangements. See, e.g., Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement. A Case History 
in Negotiation, 28 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 328 (1963). 
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fact at a time when m_ost o~her countries with similar problems still 
regarded pollution as strictly a matter of national concern. By in-
cluding in the Treaty the provision of Article IV prohibiting pollu-
tion, the United States and Canada not only recognized this common 
concern but established a broad international jurisdictional basis for 
subsequent joint treatment of environmental problems. Indeed, pol-
lution references under Article IX of the Treaty have traditionally 
contained language directing the IJC to conduct its investigations 
"with reference to the principles contained" in Article IV, and it can 
be assumed that the Preamble to the proposed Agreement will con-
tain a similar direction. 
However, while Article IV provides a broad jurisdictional basis 
for further cooperative efforts between the United States and Canada 
to implement its prohibition of pollution, it does not in itself require 
such action. Despite the broad acceptance by both countries of the 
principle of international concern in Article IV, they have in practice 
continued to exercise careful control over the extent to which spe-
cific boundary waters environmental problems are dealt with on an 
international basis. 
The technique by which the two governments make a particular 
boundary waters pollution problem the subject of international 
treatment is submission of a joint reference on the problem to the 
Commission under Article IX of the Treaty.160 While unilateral 
Article IX references are theoretically possible,161 neither govern-
ment has sought to make a unilateral reference. The suggestion and 
initiative for particular pollution references may come from various 
sources-from concerned agencies of the federal, state, or provincial 
governments of either country; from complaints by affected groups 
or individuals; or from information brought to the attention of the 
governments by the Commission itself. The governments have not as 
yet seen fit broadly to authorize the Commission to institute investi-
gations on its mm motion, though on occasion, as in the case of the 
"watching brief" given the Commission under an air pollution refer-
ence, the governments have in effect conferred certain limited in-
vestigatory powers.162 If one of the governments considers a proposed 
reference too sensitive, it will simply refuse to agree to its submission. 
160. The reference procedure is described in text accompanying notes 60-70 supra. 
161. Article IX provides that questions or matters of differences shall be referred 
to the IJC for examination and report "whenever either the Government of the 
United States or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that such 
questions or matters of difference be so referred." 1909 Treaty art. IX, first para. 
(emphasis added). 
· 162. See note ll8 supra and '.1CC01:f1.panying text. 
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In any event, the terms of the reference will be carefully negotiated. 
Moreover, the Commission's jurisdiction, and thus the scope of in-
ternational cooperation, is limited by the terms of the reference. The 
reference procedure permits each country to retain an effective veto 
over the Commission's investigation, and consequently over the in-
ternational handling of particular problems; and such vetoes have 
occasionally been exercised.163 The reference procedure is nonethe-
less important, for, as previously discussed,164 the history of United 
States-Canadian Great Lakes cooperation is in effect a history of the 
various references agreed to by the two governments. 
The proposed Agreement and its related arrangements will pre-
sumably serve to bring the entire range of Great Lakes problems into 
the sphere of the IJC's concern and ,rill involve at least limited joint 
action by the two countries. But the caution and reluctance of the two 
governments to abandon the prerogatives of sovereignty remain evi-
dent. The proposed Agreement will probably provide little in the 
way of effective international enforcement procedures and the Com-
mission's role in this respect continues to be carefully restricted. 
B. The Role of Legal Prohibitions and Remedies 
One way of attempting to prevent transnational pollution is sim-
ply to prohibit it through some operation of international law, with 
resort by an injured state to the usual processes of international 
claim and adjudication. One interesting aspect of American-Cana-
dian experience is that, while this technique is expressly available to 
each country, it has been employed on only one occasion-the Trail 
Smelter arbitration,165 which dealt with air rather than water pol-
lution. Instead, the two countries have chosen to deal with their 
common pollution problems through the establishment of ongoing 
institutional arrangements and cooperative techniques of investiga-
tion and assessment, or, more recently under the proposed Agree-
ment, through the establishment of broad cooperative programs and 
agreed minimum water quality objectives. 
As previously noted, the 1909 Treaty contains a specific prohibi-
tion on transnational pollution. The relevant provision states that 
"It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary 
waters and water flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted 
163. For example, Canada has reportedly been reluctant to extend a pollution 
reference to the Commission concerning pollution of the St. John's River. (Information 
based on interviews with U.S. government officials.) 
164. See pt. II. C. supra. 
165. See text accompanying ·notes 91-96 supra. 
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on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."160 
This provision is an early and still significant precedent in interna-
tional environmental law, for even today there is considerable ques-
tion whether customary international law has progressed to the point 
where transnational water pollution is clearly prohibited.167 While 
166. 1909 Treaty art. IV, second para. 
167. See generally the excellent discussions in Bourne, International Law and 
Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 193 (1971); Jordan, 
supra note 35, at 285-89; Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. INTL. 
L. 828 (1963); Lester, Pollution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 89 
(A. Garretson, R. Hayton 8: C. Olmstead ed. 1967). The authors appear to agree that 
relevant international law is sparse, general in terms, and often closely related to 
specific situations and agreements-in the words of one of the authors, "rudimentary" 
and "embryonic" Gordan, supra at 285). 
International agreements that do refer to water pollution problems generally do 
so in differing terms and with respect to special situations, so no clear rule can be 
adduced from them other than a very general tendency to condemn pollution, a term 
which is usually undefined. See Lester, River Pollution, supra at 841-42, See also 
Bourne, supra at 200; Jordan, supra at 287-88; Lester, Pollution, supra at 102-06. See 
generally the compilation in Legal Problems Relating to the Utili:iation and Uses of 
International Rivers, U.N. Doc. A/5409 (1963); 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 
1043-45. Bourne, supra at 200, notes that up to 1965 there were some fifty-two treaties 
that referred to pollution. Of these, some forty were European and twelve were non• 
European; and only six dealt exclusively with pollution questions, all of these six 
being European and all being entered into between 1960 and 1965, The agreements 
establishing permanent international commissions are, of course, of particular interest. 
See note 178 infra. State practice is similarly sporadic and specialized and docs not 
permit assertion of any clear customary norms. See Lester, Pollution, supra at 109, 
Relevant decisions by international tribunals are few in number and largely dicta. Thus, 
in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949) I.C.J. 3, in dealing with 
the alleged responsibility of the Albanian government for the mining of an interna• 
tional strait, the Court referred to "[e]very State's obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." [1949] I.C.J. 22, 
In the Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), which involved the right of 
France to divert and use certain waters of a transnational river system that flowed 
into Spain when it eventually returned those waters to the system unchanged in 
quantity or quality, the tribunal, while refusing relief to Spain, commented that its 
decision might have been othenvise if pollution of the waters had been established. 
The arbitral decision is reported in 53 AM. J. INTL, L. 156 (1959), and commented 
on in Laylin 8: Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication on International River Disputes: 
The Lake Lanoux Case, 53 AM. J. INTL. L. 30 (1959). In the Trail Smelter arbitration 
(see text accompanying notes 91-96 supra), the tribunal asserted in very broad language 
the existence of a principle of international responsibility for transnational air pollu• 
tion of serious consequence (see text accompanying note 96 supra), but since Canada 
had already assumed responsibility, the tribunal's statement is essentially dictum. 
A recent effort to restate the international legal principles relating to international 
drainage basins is the International Law Association's Committee on the Uses of 
the Waters of International Rivers HELSINKI RULES, adopted by the International 
Law Association in 1966. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AssN., FIFTY-SECOND REPORT-HELSINKI 
484-533 (1967); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra at 779-830. Article 
IV of the Rules provides that "[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a 
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international 
drainage basin." Article V provides that "[w)hat is a reasonable and equitable share 
within the meaning of Article IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant 
factors in each particular case." With reference to pollution, the Rules provide as 
follows: 
Article IX 
As used in this Chapter, the term "water pollution" refers to any detrimental 
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provisions in treaties relating to water pollution have become more 
numerous, they vary widely in content, context, and application. 
The 1909 Treaty is silent about specific procedures to be followed 
in the event that either country claims a violation of Article IV and 
seeks traditional international legal remedies. However, since Article 
IX permits either government to refer "any other questions or mat-
ters of difference arising between them" to the IJC for examination 
and an advisory report, each country may, at least in theory, uni-
laterally compel an advisory opinion on its claim that the other has 
violated Article IV. Article X goes further by providing procedures 
under which both governments, by common consent, may submit 
questions or differences to the Commission for a binding decision. 
Since the Treaty predates the establishment of either the Permanent 
Court of International Justice or its successor, the International 
Court of Justice, there is, of course, no reference in the Treaty to the 
submission of disputes to those bodies. However, between the years 
1946 and 1970 international pollution disputes under the 1909 
Treaty would arguably have been within the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice under the terms of both the 
United States and Canadian acceptances of the International Court's 
change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or 
quality of the waters of an international drainage basin. 
Article X 
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an 
international drainage basin, a State 
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree 
of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would 
cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State, and 
(b) should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in 
an international drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial dam-
age is caused in the territory of a co-basin State. 
2. The rule stated in paragraph I of this Article applies to water pollution 
originating 
(a) within the territory of the State, or 
(b) outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's conduct. 
Article XI 
1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph l(a) of Article X 
of this Chapter, the State responsible shall be required to cease the wrongful 
conduct and compensate the injured co-basin State for the injury that has been 
caused to it. 
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph l(b) of Article X, if 
a State fails to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter 
into negotiations with the injured State with a view toward reaching a settle• 
ment equitable under the circumstances. 
See Bourne, supra at 195-98 for a recent analysis of the Rules. 
On the law of international drainage basins more generally, see, e.g., THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra, which contains a number of excellent 
monographs and reprints; 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 872-1075; the HELSINKI 
RULES, supra; Bourne, The Development of International Water Resources: "The 
Drainage Basin Approach," 47 CAN. B. REV. 62 (1969); Griffin, The Use of Waters of 
International Drainage Basins Under Customary International Law, 53 AM. J. INTL. L. 
50 (1959); Shapiro-Libai, Development of International River Basins: Regulation of 
Riparian Competition, 45 IND. L.J. 20 (1969). 
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jurisdiction through the "optional clause" of the Court's Statute; and 
either country could have sought to invoke the Court's jurisdic-
tion.168 While the Connally Amendment160 might have been invoked 
by the United States to attempt to defeat the Court's jurisdiction over 
any such claim brought by Canada or invoked on the basis of reci- . 
procity by Canada with respect to a claim brought by the United 
States, the propriety of the reservation's use in a case so clearly in-
volving international treaty as well as customary rights would at least 
have been open to serious question.170 Thus, while the Treaty's dis-
168. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice generally depends 
upon specific consent of the parties to the dispute, expressed either in a special agree• 
ment or in a dispute settlement provision of a more general international agreement, 
However, under Article 36(2) (the so-called "optional clause" of the Statute of the 
Court (59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993)) the state parties to the Statute may at any 
time declare that they recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in certain broad classes 
of legal disputes as compulsory without special agreement in relation to any other 
state accepting the same obligation. 
Canada made such a declaration, with certain conditions, with respect to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, on September 20, 1929, and this declaration 
was made applicable to the International Court of Justice, as the Permanent Court's 
successor, by I.J.C. STAT. art. 36(5). The 1929 Canadian Declaration is reprinted in 
[1960-61] I.C.J.Y.B. 198; J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 844 (1965). 
The U.S. made a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter• 
national Court under the "optional clause" on Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat, 1218 (19-17), 
T.I.A.S. No. 1598, reprinted in [1960-61] I.C.J.Y.B. 217; 15 DEPT. STATE BULL. 452 
(1946). The U.S. acceptance, however, includes a "self-judging" reservation added 
by the much-criticized Connally Amendment. By the terms of that Amendment the 
U.S. acceptance does not apply to "disputes with regard to matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determi11ed 
by the United States of America" (emphasis added). 
On April 7, 1970, the Canadian representative to the United Nations presented 
to Secretary General U Thant a declaration amending Canada's acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court by adding a reservation that 
Canada retains jurisdiction over 
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised 
by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution 
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the 
coast of Canada. 
See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1970, at 12, col. I. The full text of the present Canadian 
declaration is reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 598 (1970). There is some ques• 
tion whether the language "prevention or control of pollution or contamination of 
the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada" was intended 
to cover or could be interpreted to cover pollution control in the Great Lakes. If so, 
since the U.S. acceptance of the "optional clause" is on terms of reciprocity, the U.S. 
could presumably now invoke the Canadian reservation as a bar to any attempt by 
Canada to bring the U.S. before the Court under the "optional clause." 
169. See note 168 supra. 
170. The reciprocal availability of such a self-judging reservation was sustained 
by the International Court in the Case of Certain Non11egian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9, 
The Department of State was subjected to heavy criticism when it invoked the 
Connally Reservation in the Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6, with respect to the 
limited issue of its right to sell or otherwise dispose of General Aniline and Film Co. 
shares after Switzerland had taken that case to the International Court. The case 
was ultimately disposed of on other grounds. For references to the criticism of the 
U.S. action in the Interhandel Case, and on the Connally Amendment problem gen• 
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pute-settlement procedures leave something to be desired, traditional 
international claims procedures for Treaty violation would appear 
to have been available to the United States and Canada with respect 
to Great Lakes pollution problems~ at least in principle, for over 
sixty years. Pollution problems benveen the two countries have been 
of growing urgency and significance in this period, and Canada has 
not been remiss in charges that the United States bears major respon-
sibility. Nevertheless, the provisions of Article IV have never been 
invoked by either government as the basis of a formal specific inter-
national claim. 
This is not to suggest that Article IV has not had an important 
influence in the handling of pollution problems. As previously indi-
cated, the Article has traditionally been invoked as an additional 
jurisdictional basis for pollution references to the IJC under Article 
IX of the Treaty; typically, the reference directs the Commission to 
conduct its investigation "with reference to the principles contained 
in Article IV," and the first question usually asked by the govern-
ments in each pollution reference is, in effect, whether the situation 
in question reveals a general violation of Article IV.171 But, with a 
few exceptions such as the Trail Smelter reference,172 the terms of 
such references have been broad rather than specific, with their 
thrust clearly toward technical assessment and the recommendation 
of ongoing and future-directed proposals rather than the determina-
tion of legal responsibility and specific remedies for past treaty viola-
tions. 
Various explanations have been suggested for this failure of the 
United States and Canada to use traditional legal techniques as a 
method of dealing with boundary waters pollution problems.173 First, 
any specific claim by one government that the other is in violation of 
Article IV would probably encounter both legal and evidentiary 
difficulties. The scope of the prohibition is unclear; the terms "pol-
lution" and "injury" are undefined, and their interpretation would 
raise difficult issues of policy. Evidentiary issues likewise abound. It 
may be relatively easy for one country to show broadly the existence 
of specific sources of pollution· on the other side of the boundary 
waters and specific injury from pollution on its side. But to establish 
erally, see, e.g., Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer 
and Foreign Affairs, 56 A11r. J. INTL. L 633 n.77 (1962). 
171. See, e.g., Question l of the Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference, indicated 
in text accompanying note 125 supra. 
172. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra. 
173. See, e.g., Erichsen-Brown, supra note 35, at 65-66; Jordan, supra note 35, at 
292-93; Lester, River Pollution, supra note 167, at 848. 
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the necessary causal link between the two will usually be extremely 
difficult. Absent exceptional situations, such as a massive oil spill or 
possibly a significant discharge of particularly toxic heavy metals or 
chemicals, the pollution of a large body of water such as a lake typi-
cally occurs through gradual and cumulative processes. Normally, 
pollution arises from a variety of sources on both sides and the efflu-
ents and other inputs into the lake's waters slowly mix under complex 
hydrological processes. In general, the most that can be said with 
confidence is that mutual transboundary pollution does occur. Thus, 
in the IJC's Report on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference, 
the Commission concluded: 
It is difficult to establish positively that the concentration of a par-
ticular pollutant on one side of the boundary in the lakes is due to 
a specific source on the other side. However . . . there is no doubt 
that contaminants originating in one country do move across the 
boundary and degrade the quality of the waters in the other 
country.174 
Second, even if a causal link could be established, obtaining a 
binding decision with traditional international legal remedies may be 
difficult, cumbersome, and, in the end, impractical. Article X per-
mits a binding decision only with the consent of both governments. 
While it has been suggested that the International Court of Justice 
might arguably have had compulsory jurisdiction over such matters 
during most of the postwar period, this question is not free from 
doubt. Even if resort to an international tribunal is possible, the 
process of adjudication is likely to be expensive and time-consuming. 
Moreover, in view of the rudimentary state of international pollution 
law, the outcome will necessarily be uncertain. Finally, the impact of 
pollution is most typically an accumulation of small and often subtle 
harms, affecting large numbers of people, and money damages may 
be hard to calculate and ineffective as a solution. The injunctive 
powers of international tribunals are limited, and, in any event, in-
junctions appropriate to the complexities of large scale Great Lakes 
pollution would be difficult to fashion and administer. 
174. IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 70. These considerations may also 
help to explain why there has been no use made of the following provisions of Art. 
II, first para. of the 1909 Treaty: 
[l]t is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural channel 
of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the 
other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the in• 
jured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the 
country where such diversion or interference occurs •••• 
Both the U.S. courts (including state courts) and the Canadian courts are open to 
foreigners. See generally . D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 77-78; Scott, The Canadian• 
American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article 111, 36 CAN. B. R.Ev. 511 (1958}; 
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Third, each country has been well aware of its own contributions 
to boundary waters pollution and consequently of its own potential 
exposure to complaints under Article IV. A resort to formal claims 
by one country might have invited a retaliatory submission of coun-
terclaims by the other, with considerable risk to both and little pos-
sibility of gain to either. 
Finally, governments have traditionally been reluctant to entrust 
their own significant national concerns to the unpredictable and 
inflexible outcomes of international adjudicative processes and have 
in general preferred the less risky technique of negotiated settlement 
of their mutual differences.175 
In view of these considerations, it is not surprising that the two 
governments have chosen not to adopt liability-based approaches to 
Great Lakes pollution problems and have tended instead to use the 
technique of advisory references to the Commission under Article IX 
of the Treaty. In effect, the Article IX technique offers each country 
significant advantages at little risk. It permits the two countries to 
explore the possibilities of useful international cooperation while 
retaining full control over the most significant decisions and policy. 
Moreover, it reflects their judgment that the most sensible way of 
dealing with such technically complex and politically sensitive prob-
lems is through flexible and ongoing programs that take account of 
a multiplicity of factors and are founded on the necessity for compro-
mise and balancing of interests, rather than through legal techniques 
based on rigid rules and adjudication of past liability.176 
Waite, International Law Affecting Water Rights in the Western States, 4 LAND 8e WATER 
L. REv. 67, 74.79 (1969). Cf. 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 767-68. 
175. See, e.g., L. BLOOMFIELD, LAW, PoLmcs AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, (Intl. 
Conciliation Pamphlet No. 516, 1958); Falk, Realistic Horizons for International Ad-
judication, 11 VA. J. !NTL. L. 314 (1971). 
176. The desirability of handling international pollution problems through co-
operative procedures rather than through adjudicative techniques has been stressed by 
a number of commentators. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 35, at 288-89; Lester, Pollution, 
supra note 167, at 109-10. See also Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation 
of Water Quality, Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L 
REV. 432, 434 (1966): 
Although it has long been settled that one state may maintain an action against 
another state to enjoin harmful pollution of shared waters, the states almost 
never resort to litigation to settle their water quality differences. Instead, where 
real or potential conflicts appear in the uses to be made of water in a watershed 
encompassing two or more states, the states involved usually seek to resolve their 
differences through cooperative arrangements. 
While the Supreme Court has adjudicated pollution controversies between one state and 
another state or citizens of another state (see New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 
(1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 
206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), 200 U.S. 496 (1906)), 
it has noted the difficulties involved in such adjudications. A recent illustration is 
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), in which the State of Ohio 
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C. Institutional Structure 
International environmental cooperation can be implemented 
through a variety of formal or informal institutional arrangements.177 
The United States and Canada, of course, have employed principally 
the technique of the binational commission,178 thus far with con-
siderable success. 
As previously indicated, the IJC is composed of six members, 
three of whom are nationals of each country selected by their respec-
tive governments. The Commissioners need not be technical experts; 
they have in general tended to be well qualified, though varied in 
background.179 During recent years at least, only the chairman of the 
United States section has received a regular salary; other members 
for some time received only expenses but are presently being paid 
when they are actually working on Commission affairs. Up to the 
present, the Commission's permanent staff has been very small, con• 
sisting principally of permanent secretaries for each of the nvo na-
tional sections, who together act as the Commission's administrators. 
filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint invoking the Court's original 
jurisdiction against Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. (incorporated in Michigan), Dow Chem• 
ical Co. (incorporated in Delaware), and Dow Chemical Company of Canada, Ltd. 
(incorporated in Ontario). The complaint was directed at an alleged nuisance resulting 
from the contamination and pollution of Lake Erie by the dumping of mercury into 
its tributaries. The Court, in an eight-to-one decision with Justice Douglas dissenting, 
declined to exercise jurisdiction since the issues involved local law that the Ohio 
courts were competent to consider, several national and international bodies were 
actively concerned with the pollution problems involved, and the nature of the case 
required the resolution of complex and novel technical questions that the Court felt 
did not implicate important problems of federal law, which are the primary responsi-
bility of the Court. 
177. See generally LAw, !NsrrrunoNS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5. 
See also the various arrangements noted in notes 7 and 156 supra and note 178 infra. 
178. A number of international agreements relating to international rivers or lakes 
establish international commissions to implement certain of their provisions, For 
listings of agreements establishing such commissions, see Stein, The Potential of Re• 
gional Organizations in Managing Man's Environment, in Li\W, INSTITUTIONS AND THE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 46; Yates, Unilateral and Multilateral 
Approaches to Environmental Problems, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 182, 187-88 n.27 (1971). 
See generally Ely & Wolman, Administration, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE 
BASINS, supra note 167, at 126; Kiss & Lambrechts, La lutte contre la pollution de 
l'eau en Europe occidentale, 15 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTL. 718 (1969); Stainov, 
Les Aspects Juridique de la Lutte Internationale contre la pollution du Danube, 72 
REVUE GEN. DE DROIT INTL. PUB. 97 (1968). 
179. The present membership of the Commission is as follows: U.S. Section-Chris-
tain A. Herter, Jr., Chairman, an attorney and presently a high official in the U.S. 
State Department; Eugene W. Weber, an engineer who was for many years Chief of 
Civilian Planning with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Charles R. Ross, an 
attorney and formerly a member of the Federal Power Commission; Canadian Section 
-Louis J. Robichaud, Chairman, an attorney and former Premier of New Brunswick; 
'A. ,D. Scott, a Profei,sor of Economics at the University of British Columbia; Bernard 
Beaupre, an engineer with long experience in the field of water resources. 
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While the Canadian section has long included an ~ttorney and a~ 
engineer on its staff, the American section 'has not; this situation· is in 
process of being changed by additions of an attorney and an environ-
mental expert to the United States staff. The Commission has typi-
cally operated on a limited budget.180 The recent Joint Communique 
raises a possibility that the Commission's situation, with respect to 
both staffing and budget, may improve. 
An important characteristic of the IJC has been its tradition of 
independence and impartiality, a characteristic somewhat akin to an 
international civil service tradition. The Commission has long 
prided itself on the fact that, despite its binational structure, it has 
consistently put aside national loyalties and operated in an essentially 
apolitical manner. It has seen its task primarily as one of reaching 
reasoned judgments on the basis of scientific investigation, technolog-
ical data, and impartial assessment. The strength of this tradition is 
suggested in a recent article by the two then joint chairmen: 
The concept of the treaty negotiators was that solutions to problems 
in which the two countries had differing-even opposing-interests 
should be sought, not by the usual bilateral negotiation, but in the 
joint deliberations of a permanent tribunal composed equally of 
Canadians and Americans. In other words, the commissioners were 
to act, not as separate national delegations under instruction from 
their respective governments, but as a single body seeking common 
solutions in the joint interest .... 181 
The fact that the Commission has divided along national lines or 
failed to reach agreement in only three of the cases and references 
it has dealt with is often cited in Commissioners' writings as evidence 
of the effectiveness of this commitment to impar~iality and a search 
for the common interest.182 
Another significant characteristic of the Commission has been its 
use of the technique of appointing special joint technical and advi-
sory boards. As indicated, these are composed of var:ious experts 
dra,;vn from knowledgeable federal, state, and provincial agencies of 
the nvo governments, who serve in an expert rather than representa-
180. For fiscal year 1972, the total budge~ for the U.S. section of the IJC is ap-
proximately $549,000. Of this amount, $138,000 is allocated to the Environmental 
Protection Agency for its work on pollution references, $221,000 to the Geological 
Survey for hydrologic data gathering, and the balance of $190,000 is available for U.S. 
Section staff and administrative expenses. (Information supplied by IJC, U.S. Sectibn.) 
181. Welsh &: Heeney, supra note 35, at 106. · 
182. See, e.g., Heeney, supra note 35, at 4; Welsh, Role of the International Joint 
Commission, supra note 35, at 4. The U.S. Section has identified one of the cases as the 
Belly-Waterton Rivers Investigation, Doc. No. 57 (1948), a reference in which each 
Section of the Commission reported separately to its government and no joint report 
was filed. • - • ... • 
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tive capacity. A joint board is given the task of carrying out the neces-
sary investigations and making preliminary recommendations on the 
reference in question, and the Commission in most cases bases its 
own report largely on that of the board. The governments in their 
references to the IJC have frequently specifically authorized the use 
of this technique.183 Through the use of such boards, the Commision, 
while retaining its nominally small staff, has been able to mobilize 
and deploy a substantial task force of highly trained experts whose 
collective services might not othenvise be available on a permanent 
basis. There is apparently an international civil service type of tradi-
tion associated with the boards as well as with the Commission itself. 
A third important feature of the Commission has been its capacity 
to respond effectively to the varied tasks the governments have as-
signed it. Over the years, the Commission has dealt successfully with 
a remarkable variety of references involving a wide array of problems 
and disciplines. Its flexibility in dealing with these problems is, of 
course, in large part a reflection of the breadth of the reference pro• 
cedures of Article IX itself. But it may also reflect both the adapta• 
bility of the joint technical board technique and the Commission's 
own spirit. 
However, while the IJC's performance as an international insti-
tution generally merits high marks-and it has achieved considerable 
respect and credibility-a note of caution may be in order before any 
generalizations are drawn from this experience. In particular, it may 
be worth reflecting upon whether the Commission's independence 
and impartiality are necessarily inherent in its structure, or may in-
stead be related to factors that are coincidental and temporary. It is 
arguable that the Commission has been left relatively free from poli-
tical pressures by the two governments principally because until 
recently they have had only limited interest in its work and have con-
sequently had little reason to exert such pressures. From the perspec-
tive of the United States government at least, the Commission has 
been relatively obscure; its work for the most part has been regarded 
as of minor political significance. Its functions have been largely 
limited to scientific and technical investigations, the results of which 
government officials would presumably not wish to, and probably 
could not, influence. It has in general had little occasion or tendency 
to ruffie important feathers. Moreover, the governments have been 
in a position readily to protect their national interests against adverse 
Commission action through means other than attempts at direct in-
fluence· on their national sections. They have consistently retained 
183. See note 72 supra. 
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careful control and veto power over the submission and the terms of 
references and are, in any event, free to reject, or to "accept" and ig-
nore, the Commission's advice. 
It is possible that with the growing political importance of the 
problems with which the IJC deals, with increasing governmental 
concern over those problems, and with the Commission's growing 
responsibilities, the two governments may in the future prove less 
inclined to respect its traditional independence. There may conse-
quently be at least some pressures toward its politicization. The recent 
appointment of Christian A. Herter, Jr., the Director of the Office 
of Environmental Affairs and Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
State, to serve simultaneously as chairman of the United States sec-
tion could herald such a trend, though that appointment was re-
portedy based more on budgetary than on policy considerations. 
Attempts to bring governmental political influence to bear on the 
Commission's purely scientific and technical investigations and rec-
ommendations would, of course, have a disastrous effect on the Com-
mission's usefulness and credibility. But there are also arguments 
that limited politicization of the national sections in other respects 
would be less threatening and might enhance rather than diminish 
the Commission's usefulness. Thus the governments might be more 
prepared to give greater regulatory or enforcement powers to a more 
"political" Commission, in which they could trust their national sec-
tions to better reflect and protect their respective interests, than to an 
"independent" Commission, whose actions they could neither predict 
nor control. A "political" Commission might also better reflect the 
real problems and differences between the countries and furnish a 
continuing forum for negotiation of these differences. Moreover, 
each national section of a "political" Commission would presumably 
have more direct access to and influence with the respective national 
agencies on whose decisions the real solutions of Great Lakes pol-
lution problems must ultimately depend. 
D. Determining Objectives 
A basic issue in any pollution control program is deciding how to 
define pollution: what types of man-made changes in the environ-
ment should be regarded as unacceptable and made the target for 
corrective action.184 Clearly, it is neither possible nor desirable to 
184. On the special problems of international standard-setting in the area of 
pollution, see, e.g., International Environmental Regulation: Means of Achieving En-
vironmental Quality (prepared by D. Serwer in consultation with O. Schachter}, and 
Contini 8: Sand, Methods To Expedite Environmental Protection: International Eco-
standards, in I.Aw, INsrrrunoNs AND nm GLOBAL ENvmoNMENT, supra note 5. 
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prevent every kind of human impact on the environment. Human 
activity inevitably produces waste as a by-product, and the capacity 
of the natural environment to receive, assimilate, and recycle such 
waste is one of its most significant resource characteristics. As an 
essentially pejorative term pollution is typically applied not to all 
waste discharges into the environment but only to those types or 
levels of wastes whose adverse impact on particular receiving environ-
ments suggest a need for social action. Even within this framework 
scientists, engineers, economists, social planners, and politicians 
might each define pollution differently. Pollution control thus in-
volves determining the kinds and levels of wastes that merit atten-
tion, assessing the costs and benefits of alternative ways of dealing 
with particular wastes, deciding on priorities, planning balanced pro-
grams, deploying and implementing effective measures of control, 
and monitoring progress made with a view to possible readjustment 
of programs. 
There is increasing recognition that many of these tasks involve 
essentially policy or value judgments rather than purely scientific or 
technical assessment.18l• The role of science in this process is, of 
course, vital. Scientists alone can alert societies to the existence of 
environmental threats and provide data relevant for rational deci-
sions-in particular, the sources, amounts, and pathways of various 
pollutants and the potential consequences in terms of the specific 
degrees of risk that may result from exposure to particular types and 
levels of pollutants under varying circumstances. Similarly, engineers 
perform an essential role in defining technological possibilities and 
options for control. But questions about the goals, priorities, and 
weights a society should properly give to the costs, risks, and benefits 
of alternative courses of action in differing circumstances-the basic 
choices about what we really want and what we are willing to pay to 
get it-are questions that science and technology can rarely answer, 
although we could, if we desired, let scientists or engineers make the 
necessary policy decisions for us. 
The 1909 Treaty does not define pollution,186 and the difficulties 
185. See, e.g., J. DAVIES, THE PoLmc.s OF POLLUTION 17-21 (1970). 
186. See 1909 Treaty art. IV. In practice, however, the Commission has frequently 
been prepared in its reports on various references to conclude that transboundary 
pollution was occurring to the detriment of both countries. Note also the following 
statement by the Commission: 
The Commission regards the word "injury" when used in the reference or 
treaty as having a special significance-one somewhat akin to the term "injuria" 
in jurisprudence. It does not mean harm or damage but harm or damage which is 
in excess of the amount of harm or damage which the sufferer, in view of all the 
circumstances of the case, and of all the co-existence rights • • • and of the para-
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of formulating a simple, sufficiently broad, generally applicable, and 
operationally useful definition are apparent.187 The Commission, 
however, has in effect provided a way of defining pollution, applica-
ble to varying circumstances, through its technique of recommending 
common water quality objectives.188 Since the water quality objec-
tives recommended in the IJC Lower Lakes Report189 will reportedly 
be incorporated in substance in the proposed Agreement, the Com-
mission's approach should be briefly described. 
The Lower Lakes Report defines common water quality objec-
tives as desirable levels of quality to be attained in the receiving 
waters, taking into account the scientific requirements or criteria for 
a broad spectrum of water uses: "supplies for municipal, industrial 
and agricultural purposes, recreation, aesthetic enjoyment and the 
propagation of aquatic life and wild life."190 The Report recom-
mends both "General Objectives" and "Specific Objectives." The 
General Objectives are the goals of an effective pollution control 
program stated in very broad terms.191 The Specific Objectives are 
mount importance of human health and life, should reasonably be called upon to 
bear. ' 
IJC, REPORT ON POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS (1918), quoted in Erichsen-Brown, 
supra note 35, at 68. 
187. For an example of such a definition, see Article IX of the HELsINKI Ruu:.s, supra 
note 167, at 494: 
As used in this Chapter, the term "water pollution" refers to any detrimental 
change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or 
quality of the waters of an international drainage basin. 
Compare § 2(l)(k) of the Canada Water Act, STAT. CAN. c. 52 (1969-1970), which defines 
"waste" as 
any substance that, if added to any waters, would degrade or alter or form part 
of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of those waters to an 
extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by any animal, fish or plant that 
is useful to man, and includes any water that contains a substance in such a 
quantity or concentration, or that has been so treated, processed or changed, by 
heat or other means, from a natural state that it would, if added to any waters, 
degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality 
of those waters to an extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by any 
animal, fish or plant that is useful to man. 
The definition of "waste" is similar in the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act, STAT. CAN. c. 47, § 2(h) (1969-1970). 
188. As indicated in text accompanying notes 99-100 supra, this technique was first 
used in the Commission's 1950 Report in the Connecting Channels Reference. 
189. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 112-29, 144-48. 
190. IJC LOWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 113. 
191. The proposed General Objectives, which are described as the "five freedoms" 
of a pollution control program, are 
The receiving waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, the International Section of the 
St. Lawrence River and the Connecting Channels of the Great Lakes at all places 
and at all times should be: 
(a) free from substances attributable to municipal, industrial or other dis-
charges that will settle to form putrescent or otherwise objectionable sludge 
deposits, or that will adversely affect aquatic life or waterfowl. 
(b) free from floating debris, oil, scum and other floating materials attributable 
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the desirable levels of water quality, stated for the most part in terms 
of specific scientific indices. These indices set forth the maximum per-
missible levels and concentrations of the pollutants in the waters 
considered necessary to achieve the General Objectives. These objec-
tives are to apply to all jurisdictions sharing the waters of the Lower 
Great Lakes at all times and places; they apply in particular to in-
shore waters. Specific Objectives are recommended for microbiology 
(coliform group), dissolved oxygen, total dissolved solids, tempera-
ture, taste and odor, pH, iron, phosphorus, and radioactivity; when 
required, appropriate specific standards will be established for water 
quality including, but not restricted to, toxic wastes, oils, and heavy 
metals.192 
The Report contemplates that these objectives will be imple-
mented by each government through appropriate national, state, or 
provincial action. Thus, the Specific Objectives are intended both as 
the minimum basis for formulating provincial and state water 
quality standards and as parameters against which the effectiveness 
of such programs can be measured.193 Presumably governmental au-
thorities will establish compatible ambient water quality standards 
for the Lakes with at least as stringent maximum permissible levels 
for each relevant pollutant; will establish, as needed, effluent, dis-
charge, or emission standards setting the ma."'imum acceptable release 
of a particular pollutant from a given source to the water under 
specified circumstances; and will take other action to ensure that the 
to municipal, industrial or other discharges in amounts sufficient to be un• 
sightly or deleterious. 
(c) free from materials attributable to municipal, industrial or other dis• 
charges producing colour, odour or other conditions in such a degree as 
to create a nuisance. 
(d) free from substances attributable to municipal, industrial or other dis-
charges in concentrations that are toxic or harmful to human, animal or 
aquatic life. 
(e) free from nutrients derived from municipal, industrial and agricultural 
sources in concentrations that create nuisance growths of aquatic weeds and 
algae. 
Id. at 144-45. 
192. Id. at 145-48. Examples of the Specific Objectives are 
{a) Microbiology (Coliform Group)--The geometric mean of not less than five 
samples taken over not more than a 30-day period shall not exceed 1,000/100 
ml total coliforms, nor 200/100 ml fecal coliforms in local waters. Waters used 
for body contact recreation activities should be free from bacteria, fungi, 
or viruses that may produce enteric disorders, or eye, ear, nose, throat and 
skin infections. 
{b) Dissolved Oxygen-In the Connecting Channels and in the upper waters of 
the Lakes not less than 6.0 mg/I at any time; in the hypolimnetic waters not 
less than the concentrations necessary for the support of fishlife, particularly 
cold water species. 
Id. at 145-46. Contrast the objective for: "(d) Temperature-No change which would 
adversely affect any local or general use of these waters." Id. at 146. 
193. Id. at 114-15. 
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objectives are achieved. The Commission stresses that the important 
criterion of compliance is not the degree of treatment of wastes but 
the amount of wastes left in the effluent and, from the standpoint of 
a broad pollution control program, the total amount of contaminants 
discharged by all sources within the jurisdiction.194 
The Lower Lakes Report gives special emphasis to the problems 
of phosphorus wastes as a critical factor in Lower Lakes pollution. It 
points out that of the nutrients involved in eutrophication of Lake 
Erie and Lake Ontario, "phosphorus is the only one that is both 
growth-limiting in the lakes and controllable effectively by man with 
present technology."195 The Commission takes the position that the 
reduction of phosphorus input into the waters will significantly delay 
further eutrophication and will permit the recovery of the Lakes to 
begin through natural processes.196 It indicates that the recom-
mended Specific Objective for phosphorus197 can be achieved if all 
phosphorus is eliminated from detergents, and if ninety-five per cent 
of the predicted 1986 load of phosphorus is removed at municipal 
and industrial waste plants.198 The Commission gives the following 
reasons for emphasizing a reduction in phosphorus in detergents: (1) 
if a replacement for detergent phosphorus can be developed rapidly, 
a significant reduction of phosphorus input can be achieved before 
completion of phosphorus removal facilities at sewage treatment 
plants; (2) the effect would be to reduce phosphorus input from small 
communities, cottages, and individual homes, in which it would be 
very costly to install phosphorus removal facilities; and (3) treatment 
costs for phosphorus removal at sewage treatment plants would be 
reduced substantially by removing phosphorus from detergents.199 
194. Id. at 115-16. 
195. Id. at 141. 
196. Id. at 123. 
197. Phosphorus-Concentrations limited to the extent necessary to prevent nui-
sance growths of algae, weeds and slimes which are or may become injurious to any 
beneficial water use. (Meeting this objective will require that the phosphorus load-
ing to Lake Erie be limited to 0.39 g/m2/yr and the phosphorus loading to Lake 
Ontario be limited to 17 g/m2/yr.) 
Id. at 147. 
198. Id. at 125. "The major source of phosphorus is municipal sewage. In the U.S. 
70% of the phosphorus in sewage originates· from detergents, and most of the remainder 
from human excreta. In Canada, approximately 50% originates from each sewage 
source. Apart from municipal sewage the other significant sources of phosphorus are 
agricultural run-off and some industrial wastes." Id. at 141. The research results of 
"Project Hypo," a joint U.S.-Canadian project carried on in Lake Erie in the summer 
of 1970 to obtain more precise data on Lake nutrients, suggest that the 95% removal 
goal may have to be attained by 1975 rather than 1986 if eutrophication of the Lake 
is to be effectively reversed. (Information based on interviews with U.S. government 
officials.) 
199. Id. at 125. 
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Canada has already taken steps to limit the phosphorus content of 
detergents, expressed as phosphorus pentoxide, to twenty per cent by 
weight, effective August 1, 1970, and has announced a further re-
duction to five per cent by December 31, 1972. Some of the Lake 
states and local authorities have adopted or introduced legislation to 
limit the phosphorus content ·of detergents.200 
The Commission's concept of establishing specific water quality 
objectives is a significant contribution to pollution control techni-
ques and is being widely copied.201 It focuses on a matter of principal 
international concern-the quality of the receiving waters-while 
leaving to each jurisdiction wide flexibility regarding the 'choice of 
the means that, in terms of local circumstances and conditions, are 
best suited to achieving those objectives. It embodies an approach to 
to problems of international pollution that is based on continuing 
regulation and control to attain goals, rather than on rights, duties, 
and legal liability for past actions. It provides concrete scientific 
standards against which performance and compliance can be mea-
sured. Finally, it permits ready revision and adjustment of objectives 
in the light of new information or other current considerations. 
The process by which the Commission arrives at its recommen-
dations of Specific Objectives is not entirely clear. Presumably, the 
Commission will as a rule accept the Specific Objectives suggested 
by its technical boards. Since the boards include members from the 
principal federal, state, and provincial standard-setting and imple-
menting agencies, it is not surprising that the recommended inter-
national objectives in general tend to be compatible with and do not 
exceed already established state and provincial standards. In some 
cases, however, the recommended international objectives will re-
quire a tightening of particular state or provincial standards. Despite 
the policy component in all such decisions, the process of establishing 
200. See Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,I 6; note 245 infra. Compare the 
European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in Washing 
and Cleaning Products, adopted by the Council of Europe on Sept. 16, 1968, 16 Euno-
PEAN Y.B. 335 (1968), and already implemented by several member states, establishing 
an 80% biodegradability level. 
201. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra. See also, e.g., the 1971 Draft Euro• 
pean Convention on the Protection of Freshwater Against Pollution, prepared by the 
Council of Europe, which now envisages the establishment of "minimum water 
quality standards," Report of the First Meeting (Feb. 1971) of the Expert Commission 
on a Draft European Convention on the Protection of Freshwater Against Pollution: 
and the 1971 Draft Agreement on Water Conservation and Utilization in the Lake 
Chad Basin, prepared by FAO and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which provides 
standards for water abstraction and pollution control. FAO Doc. AGL:SF/REG/79 
(1971). See Contini &: Sand, Methods To Expedite Environmental Protection: Inter• 
national Ecostandards, in LAw, lNSflTUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra 
note 5, manuscript at 12. 
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objectives has apparently been treated as a matter of purely scientific 
and technical judgment, though some internal negotiation may occur. 
I£ the Commission were ever to consider recommending Specific 
Objectives considerably more stringent than those then applicable 
in the various states and provinces, it is conceivable that substantial 
policy issues might emerge. This situation would, of course, cast the 
Commission in a new and more difficult role. 
A final issue is posed by the September 15, 1971, announcement 
of the United States Surgeon General, Jesse L. Steinfeld, advising 
housewives to continue using phosphate detergents.202 The basis for 
the Government's shift of policy is its judgment that some phosphate 
substitutes are highly caustic and may constitute a health hazard. 
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William A. Ruckels-
haus stated, in connection with the Surgeon General's announce-
ment, that the Government would increase its financial assistance for 
the removal of phosphates at sewage treatment plants as an alterna-
tive to the banning of phosphate detergents.203 The new United 
States position could raise doubts about its ability to achieve the 
Commission's recommended phosphorus objectives by the proposed 
Agreement's 1975 target date. First, it is questionable whether, if the 
use of phosphate-based detergents is permitted to continue, it will 
be technically possible through more intensive sewage treatment 
techniques alone to reduce phosphate loadings into the Lakes to the 
extent recommended by the Commission. Second, the additional 
techniques proposed will presumably involve substantial additional 
costs, making the programs more politically vulnerable. In view of 
the pivotal role of phosphorus in the solution of Great Lakes pollu-
tion problems and of Canada's particular concern over high United 
States phosphorus loadings204 and its present commitment to the 
202. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at I, col. 2 (joint announcement with William 
D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator, Russell E. Train, and Dr. Charles C. Edwards, 
FDA Chairman). For further comments and developments following the announcement, 
see id., Sept. 16, 1971, at 37, col. 2; id., Sept. 17, 1971, at I, col. 4, and at 20, col. I; id., 
Sept. 18, 1971, at 58, col. I; id., Sept. 19, 1971, at 52, col. 3; id., Sept. 22, 1971, at 46, col. 
I (editorial); id., Sept. 24, 1971, at 40, col 3 (letter to editor). 
203. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at I, col. 2. See also the October 27, 1971, statement 
by CEQ Chairman Russell E. Train before the House Government Operations Sub-
Committee on Conservation and Natural Resources that the elimination of phosphates 
would not eliminate eutrophication, that the principal strategy in controlling eutro-
phication will be provision of adequate waste treatment, and that, given the present 
state of knowledge, there is no one answer as to which discharges of phosphorus should 
be controlled to limit accelerated eutrophication and the possible problems with cur-
rently available substitutes for phosphates. See BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CURRENT DE-
VELOPMENTS 763 (1971). 
204. See, e.g., the comment by J.J. Greene, the Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines 
and Resources, Policy on the Environment, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 246 (1971): 
Even between nations that do not have disparate levels of economic development, 
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banning of phosphate detergents,205 the recent United States action 
could raise new difficulties for the negotiators of the proposed Agree-
ment. 
E. Apportioning Burdens 
Another major issue of international environmental cooperation 
is how the burden of international pollution control is to be shared 
or apportioned among the various governments contributing to a 
particular pollution problem. This question arises most clearly in 
situations involving pollution by several riparian states of a confined 
and complex mixing environment, such as the Great Lakes and en-
closed or semi-enclosed seas such as the Baltic, Mediterranean, Black, 
Caribbean, and North Seas. 
A first step in any process of apportionment is agreement on broad 
water quality objectives, from which can be derived at least a broad 
estimate of the maximum total amount of each pollutant that can 
be permitted to be discharged into the total basin environment. 
Once this total basin-wide maximum for permissible waste discharges 
is determined, the job of complying with the standard might then be 
divided or apportioned among the contributing states according to 
various bases or formulas.206 The possible apportionment formulas 
might include division in equal shares; in proportion to relative total 
populations; in proportion to relative total gross national products; 
in proportion to relative basin populations; in proportion to relative 
basin GNPs; in proportion to the ratio of basin to total populations; 
in proportion to the ratio of basin to total GNPs; in direct proportion 
to relative past waste discharges or contribution to total existing 
pollution; in inverse proportion to relative past waste discharges or 
contribution to total existing pollution; and so forth. Alternatively, 
a total basin-wide quota of the necessary or desired amounts of 
agreement is difficult to achieve. The record of co-operation between Canada and 
its closest friend and neighbour, the USA, is anything but bright, notwithstanding 
the excellent investigatory work of the International Joint Commission. It is now 
clearly established on the basis of independent expert evidence that the Great 
Lakes water system will not be cleaned up until the USA takes the tough decision 
to ban phosphates from detergents. This it seems reluctant to do. I feel that the 
only way to achieve real progress in the cleaning of our international boundary 
waters would be to equip the IJC with the authority to enforce its ruling with 
regard to pollution of international boundary waters. 
205. See Joint Communique, supra note I, ,I 6; note 245 infra. 
206. See, e.g., the interesting paper by A. Sparring, Pollution Control as a Problem 
of International Politics: Models for a Baltic Convention, prepared for the 21st Pug• 
wash Conference on Science and World Affairs, "Problems of World Security, Environ• 
ment, and Development," Sinaia, Romania, Aug. 26-31, 1971, on file with the Michigan 
Law Review. 
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reductions in waste discharges could be determined, and this system 
of necessary cutbacks could then be apportioned on one or another 
of the above bases. Finally, the burden of pollution control could 
be indirectly apportioned through the establishment of uniform 
specific quality, discharge, or technological standards. Obviously, 
uniform rules will affect various states differently. 
In the context of Great Lakes pollution, the issue of burden 
sharing might have been posed in considerable complexity. For ex-
ample, while the United States has both greater total and Great Lakes 
basin population and GNP than Canada and in general contributes 
more wastes to the Lakes than Canada, the Canadian Great Lakes 
population and GNP are of considerably greater relative importance 
to that country than the same factors are to the United States. On the 
other hand, about two thirds of the Great Lakes water area is in the 
United States and only one third in Canada. In practice, however, 
the differences between the two countries have been primarily shaped 
less by abstract theories of apportionment than by differing interpre-
tations of the express provisions of the 1909 Treaty. 
The Canadian position is reportedly based primarily on Article 
VIII of the Treaty, which, inter alia, provides: "The ... Parties shall 
have, each on its own side of the boundary, equal and similar rights 
in the use of the waters hereinbefore defined as boundary waters." 
Apparently, the Canadian view is that "use of the waters" in this 
provision includes their use as a receiver of wastes and that Canada 
is consequently entitled to an equal right to, or a share in, the use 
of the Lake's capacity to assimilate polluted effiuents.207 Since the 
United States has already discharged wastes into its waters in amounts 
far in excess of the wastes that Canada has discharged into its waters, 
Canada argues that it is in principle entitled to continue discharging 
wastes into its waters until these discharges reach the level of United 
States discharges into United States waters. Put otherwise, if the IJC 
standards are to be met and Great Lakes pollution prevented, the 
United States must restrict its discharges to a level not to exceed fifty 
per cent of the total loading the Lakes can receive without exceeding 
the IJC's water quality objectives. Carried to the extreme, this posi-
tion would place virtually the entire burden of the reduction of waste 
discharges and of effective Great Lakes pollution control on the 
United States. In practice, however, Canada apparently does recognize 
207. The discussion of these differing interpretations of the Treaty by the two gov-
ernments is based on interviews with government officials. The author cannot, of course, 
speak for either government or reflect more than his own understanding of the issues 
involved, 
530 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '70:469 
some obligation to reduce its discharges in order to help prevent 
pollution. 
The United States reportedly rejects the Canadian position and 
takes the view that the broad prohibition on pollution in Article IV 
of the Treaty is controlling.208 It argues that use of the Great Lakes 
water as a receptor for waste efiluents is not one of the uses protected 
by Article VIII; that Article VIII is by its terms concerned only with 
establishing rules and principles for the specific purpose of governing 
the Commission in passing upon applications for the use or obstruc-
tion or diversion of the waters;200 and that the "equal and similar 
rights" language relied upon by the Canadians consequently has no 
relevance to broader questions of pollution. In the American view 
the relevant Treaty provision is the provision in Article IV that "[i]t 
is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters 
and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on 
either side to the injury of health or property on the other." Under 
this provision, neither country has a right to pollute the boundary 
waters and consequently there is no question about the division of 
any such right to pollute. Instead, the two countries have equal obli-
gations to take measures to limit and control harmful discharges that 
the Commission has indicated emanate from both of their territories 
even if these in fact come principally from the United States shore. 
The important consideration is not how much waste each country 
has in the past contributed to the Lakes but the fact that the Lakes, 
for whatever reason, are now in a condition of threatened danger. 
Faced with such a situation each nation has, under Article IV, an 
equal obligation to act to correct it. 
Neither country appears to have carried its position to the logical 
extremes the above arguments suggest, and the differences have in 
effect largely been bypassed and accommodated in the relevant ar-
2os. Id. 
209. Article VIII provides in relevant part: 
This International Joint Commission shall have jurisdiction over and shall pass 
upon all cases involving the use or obstruction or diversion of the waters with 
respect to which under Articles III and IV of this Treaty the approval of this 
Commission is required, and in passing upon such cases the Commission shall 
be governed by the following rules or principles which are adopted by the 
High Contracting Parties for this purpose: 
The High Contracting Parties shall have, each on its own side of the boundary, 
equal and similar rights in the use of the waters hereinbefore defined as boundary 
waters. 
The requirement for an equal division may in the discretion of the Commission 
be suspended in cases of temporary diversions along boundary waters at points 
where such equal division can not be made advantageously on account of local 
conditions, and where such diversion does not diminish elsewhere the amount 
available for use on the other side. 
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rangements. In practice, Ontario has imposed strict 'o/ater q~ality 
and discharge standards and other pollution controls and the United 
States is apparently willing to concede that control of the situation 
on its shore will require substantially greater expenditures-perhaps 
as much as six times greater-than those Canada must assume. More-
over, it would seem that the IJC's recommended Specific Objectives, 
if incorporated in the proposed Agreement, will as a practical matter 
impose a substantially heavier burden on the United States than on 
Canada. Since the objectives apply uniformly to inshore waters and 
since the United States in general contributes more waste to the 
Lakes, it will presumably have to take m.ore stringent measures of 
control than Canada in order to maintain the same inshore water 
quality. The proposed Agreement may thus in effect settle this issue. 
However, neither government has formally abandoned its position. 
This is made clear by the fact that, in the Joint Communique an-
nouncing the proposed Agreement the Ministers were careful to note: 
"In designing the agreement, it was accepted that programs and other 
measures established to meet urgent problems would in no way affect 
the rights of each country in the use of its Great Lakes Waters."210 
The question of apportionment remains one that could on occasion 
reappear and in principle prove very troublesome. 
F. Coordination 
One of the more complex and confusing aspects of Great Lakes 
pollution problems is the diversity of jurisdictions and the multi-
plicity of official and unofficial agencies and institutions that are 
involved in these problems. A brief survey may indicate the dimen-
sions of the difficulty.211 
Eleven separate major governmental jurisdictions border on the 
Great Lakes. These are the United States and Canada (in their na-
tional governmental capacity), eight states (Illinois, Indiana, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), 
and the Province of Ontario.212 Each of these jurisdictions has its own 
laws, agencies, policies, programs, and enforcement techniques con-
cerned with or bearing upon Great Lakes pollution problems. In 
addition, several hundred municipalities and local communities, each 
·with its own ordinances and practices, border both sides of the Lakes. 
210. Joint Communique, supra note I, 1J 17. 
211. See generally GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10. 
212. While the Province of Quebec is not a Great Lakes riparian, it was repre• 
sented in the Ministerial Conference's Joint Working Group and may be represented 
on a Great Lakes Pollution Advisory Board. 
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Making sense of the complex governmental situation respecting Great 
Lakes pollution problems in any one of these jurisdictions can be 
difficult; when they are considered together, the problem is immense. 
In the United States there are at least nine federal agencies that are 
heavily involved in problems of Great Lakes pollution. These include 
the Departments of State,213 Agriculture,214 Interior,21u Commerce,216 
Defense,217 Transportation,218 and Health, Education, and Welfare;210 
the Council on Environmental Quality;220 and the Environmental 
Protection Agency.221 Other agencies such as the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
Federal Power Commission, National Council on Marine Resources 
and Engineering Development, National Science Foundation, and 
the Water Resources Council also have strong interests in this area.222 
213. Principally, the Bureau of European Affairs, which has responsibility for rela-
tions with Canada. 
214. Principally, the Soil Conservation Service, Forest Service, Agricultural Re-
search Service, and Economic Research Service. 
215. Principally, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Bureau of Outdoor Recre-
ation, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, U.S. Geological Survey, and National 
Park Service. 
216. Principally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
Economic Development Administration, and Maritime Administration. The NOAA, 
established in 1970, consolidates the major federal oceanic and atmospheric research 
and monitoring programs. Both the Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey now operate within the NOAA. 
217. Principally, the Army Corps of Engineers, Dept. of Navy (which is concerned 
with ship pollution control), and Office of Naval Research. 
218. Principally, the U.S. Coast Guard (which is concerned with ship sanitation and 
oil spills), and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. 
219. Principally, the Public Health Service. 
220. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established January I, 
1970, by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 
(1970). The Act charges the Council with assisting the President in preparing an 
annual environmental quality report and making recommendations to him on national 
policies for improving environmental quality; empowers the Council to analyze con-
ditions and trends in the quality of the environment and to conduct investigations 
relating to the environment; and gives the council responsibility for appraising the 
effect of federal programs and activities in environmental quality. See 43 U.S.C. § 4344 
(1970). 
221. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), officially established on December 
2, 1970, consolidated into one agency the major federal programs dealing with air 
and water pollution, solid waste disposal, pesticides regulation, and environmental 
radiation. Presidential Documents: Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 
15623 (1970). Its offices specifically concerned with Great Lakes pollution are the Office 
of Waters Programs under the Assistant Administrator for Media Programs, and the 
Assistant Administrator for Research and Monitoring. The Great Lakes is a primary 
responsibility of the EPA's Region V regional office. 
222. See GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 22-24. On March 25, 1971, 
President Nixon sent to Congress legislation to create a Department ot Natural Re-
sources, which would include, inter alia, an Administrator for Water Resources. S. 
1431, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 6959, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See CEQ 1971 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
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All national agencies with an active interest in the Lakes are members 
of the Federal Inter-Agency Committee on Great Lakes Research. 
A considerable number of congressional committees are also con-
cerned with various aspects of Great Lakes pollution and may on 
occasion seek to exercise competing jurisdiction over relevant legis-
lation.223 In addition, each of the states bordering the Great Lakes 
has at least one, and frequently several, agencies concerned with 
Great Lakes pollution problems.224 
Two federal-state commissions and one interstate commission 
have a major involvement in Great Lakes problems. ':!;'he Great Lakes 
Basin Commission, established under the authority of the Water 
Resources Planning Act of 1965,225 is composed of representatives of 
the eight Great Lakes states, a number of concerned federal agencies, 
and the Great Lakes (Compact) Commission. Operating with exten-
sive federal financial assistance, this important Commission has re-
sponsibility for improved comprehensive planning of the water and 
related resources in the United States portion of the Great Lakes 
and is designed to be the effective coordinating agent for all federal, 
state, and local agencies and nongovernmental entities with planning 
responsibilities in these fields.226 The Upper Great Lakes Regional 
Commission, created by the Secretary of Commerce under the Public 
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965,227 is composed of 
a federal member appointed by the President and members from the 
states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. It has the task of 
identifying economic problems and potentials of the Upper Lakes 
and recommending public investment to stimulate the lagging econ-
omy of the region. The performance of these responsibilities neces-
223. The Senate and House Committees on Public Works have been particularly 
concerned with water pollution problems. The Senate and House have recently 
passed joint resolutions to create a Joint Committee on the Environment. S.J. Res. 17, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 3, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The Congress 
has also recently reorganized and expanded existing committees to give more explicit 
attention to environmental problems. $ee CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. See 
generally J. DAVIES, supra note 185, at 65-70. 
224. See GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 26-38 for a list of agencies 
as of June 1969. Some reorganization and consolidation of state agencies has occurred 
in the past several years. For more recent developments, see the BNA ENVIRONMENT 
REPORTER, a weekly report on national and state legislative and other developments 
in the environmental field, including water quality. 
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-62d-3 (1970). 
226. See generally GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 24-25; GREAT LAKES 
BASIN COMMN., CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE GREAT LAKES 
BASIN FRAMEWORK STUDY (1971); Great Lakes Basin Commission, What It Is-What 
It Does (Commission pamphlet). The Basin Commission also issues a monthly news-
letter, the Communicator. Its headquarters are located at Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3226 (1970). See 42 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970). 
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sarily involves the Regional Commission in consideration of Upper 
Lakes pollution problems.228 The Great Lakes Commission was es-
tablished by the Great Lakes Basin Compact, an interstate agreement 
among the eight Great Lakes states, and was approved by Congress in 
1968,229 which designated it as a joint state instrumentality on Great 
Lakes water resources development, programs, and problems.230 It 
serves as a clearing house for information, a council for joint con-
sideration of common and regional Great Lakes problems, and an 
instrument for coordinating state views, plans, recommendations, 
programs, and policies.231 
228. E.g., GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note IO,' at 25. 
229. Act of July 24-, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-4-19, 82 Stat. 4-14- (containing text of 
Compact). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 requires congressional consent to such compacts. 
230. The Compact was formed in 1955 through ratification by five of the eight 
riparian states; Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York ratified subsequently. The text 
of the Compact, with notes on its legislative history, is also reprinted in H.R. Doc. 
No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-83 (1968) (Documents on the Use and Control of 
the Waters of Interstate and International Streams). 
It is interesting to note that Article II(B) of the Compact provides: "The Province 
of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or either of them, may become states party 
to this compact by taking such action as their laws and the laws of the Government 
of Canada may prescribe for adherence thereto." 82 Stat. 4-14-. In addition, Article VI 
provides that the Commission shall have power to: 
J. 1Nith respect to the water resources of the Basin or any portion thereof, 
recommend agreements between the governments of the United States and 
Canada. 
K. Recommend mutual arrangements expressed by concurrent or reciprocal 
legislation on the part of Congress and the Parliament of Canada including 
but not limited to such agreements and mutual arrangements as arc pro-
vided for by Article XIII of the ••• [1909 Treaty]. 
M. At the request of the United States, or in the event that a Province shall 
be a party state, at the request of the Government of Canada, assist in the 
negotiation and formulation of any treaty or other mutual arrangement or 
agreement between the United States and Canada with reference to Basin 
or any portion thereof. 
82 Stat. 4-17-18. 
The State Department objected to these provisions wl1en the Compact was presented 
to Congress for its approval on the grounds, inter alia, that Provincial participation 
and the other above-cited provisions would involve the Commission in the field of 
international relations. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 80. Section 2 of the Act of July 
24-, 1968, consequently lixnited congressional consent by providing that the consent 
granted does not extend to the above sections; Section 3 provided that nothing con-
tained in the Act shall be "construed to establish an international agency or to limit 
or affect in. any way the exercise of the treatymaking power or any other power or 
right of the United States." 82 Stat. 4-19. 
231. See, e.g., GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, supra note IO, at 25. Under Art. VII(B) 
of the Compact, the states agree to consider the recommendations of the Great Lakes 
Commission with respect to "[m]easures for combating pollution," 82 Stat. 4-18. 
The Great Lakes Commission is financed entirely by state funds. It bas its head-
quarters at Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
On interstate compacts generally, see 3 R. CLARK, supra note 23, at 332•48; W, 
BARTON, lNTERSTATE COMPACTS IN nm PoLmCAL PROCESS (1967); F. ZIMMERMANN &: M. 
WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACIS (1961). 
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In Canada the recently created Department of the Environment 
now exercises principal responsibility for Great Lakes pollution prob-
lems.232 Other Canadian federal agencies with concerns in this area 
are the Departments of External Affairs; Energy, Mines and Re-
sources; National Health and Welfare; Public Works; and Trans-
port.233 Additional research responsibilities are carried out by the 
Canada Centre for Inland Waters, the Fisheries Research Board of 
Canada, and the Great Lakes Working Group of the Canadian Com-
mittee on Oceanography.234 In the Province of Ontario, the Ontario 
Water Resources Commission has primary responsibility for Great 
Lakes pollution problems; the Department of Lands and Forests and 
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario are also heavily 
involved.235 
Several United States-Canadian institutions other than the Inter-
national Joint Commission are actively engaged in cooperation on 
Great Lakes problems. The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is a 
formal intergovernmental organization established by the Great 
Lakes Fisheries Convention of 1955;236 it is primarily a research 
organization but has also administered an extensive program of sea 
lamprey control.237 The Great Lakes Study Group is an informal 
international organization including representatives of Canadian and 
United States agencies and institutions engaged in research and in-
vestigation related to the development and utilization of Great Lakes 
resources and is intended to facilitate the exchange of information 
and provide informal coordination, including the sponsorship of a 
data repository. Other international cooperative institutions include 
232. The Department of the Environment was established in 1971, incorporating 
as components the former Department of Fisheries and Forestry; essentially all of 
the Water Sector of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, including the 
Inland Waters Branch, the Marine Sciences Branch, the Policy and Planning Branch, 
and the Canada Centre for Inland Waters; the Canadian Meteorological Service; the 
Canadian Wildlife Service; and those units of the Department of National Health 
and Welfare concerned with public health engineering and air pollution. The Depart-
ment will have primary responsibility for support of the IJC. Government Reorganiza-
tion C-207 (1971). See, e.g., Great Lakes Basin Commn. Communicator, Feb. 1971. 
233. See GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 8-10. 
234. Id. at 7-8. 
235. Id. at 10-11. 
236. Convention with Canada on Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10, 1954, [1955] 6 
U.S.T. 2836, T.I.A.S. No. 3326, 238 U.N.T.S. 97 (effective Oct. 11, 1955), as amended 
April 5, 1966, and May 19, 1967, [1967) 18 U.S.T. 1402, T.I.A.S. No. 6297. See also 
Great Lakes Fisheries Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. §§ 931-39c (1970). 
237. See GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 4-5. The sea lamprey is a 
species of eel native to the Atlantic Ocean that entered the Great Lakes system through 
the opening of the Welland Canal; it has multiplied in the absence of its natural 
biological controls and has preyed upon and wreaked havoc among certain Great 
Lakes fish species. 
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the St. Lawrence Seaway Commission, the International Association 
for Great Lakes Research, the Coordinating Committee on Great 
Lakes Basic Hydraulic and Hydrologic Data, and the International 
Field Year for the Lakes. A number of private scientific, professional, 
research, and industry associations, as well as universities and col-
leges in all of the Great Lakes states and Ontario, are also active with 
respect to Great Lakes problems.238 
With so many jurisdictions concerned with controlling Great 
Lakes pollution and a remarkable number of agencies and institu-
tions engaged in studying these problems, the chances of interference, 
overlap, and duplication are obvious.239 While various institutions 
in each country attempt to coordinate national approaches to Great 
Lakes problems, there is as yet no formal machinery for such co-
ordination at the international level. The IJC has played an impor-
tant informal role in this respect, particularly through the operation 
of its joint technical boards. Since the members of these boards are 
drawn from a variety of federal, state, and provincial agencies,240 
the boards serve to bring responsible officials at these levels from the 
United States and Canada into continuing face-to-face contact in a 
context which facilitates the free flow of information and views among 
them. Presumably, some informal coordination results. Indeed, the 
boards have in large part been able to perform their tasks through 
collecting and assessing relevant work already done by the various 
official agencies and other institutions in both countries; typically, 
relatively little new research has been required.241 
Nevertheless, the IJC's role has remained informal, and the recent 
238. Id. at 4-5, 11, 26-40. 
239. See, e.g., the references to these problems in the IJC Low.ER LAKES REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 108, 110-11. The Commission comments that 
[w]hile in some cases the differences among jurisdictions are more apparent than 
real, in others the differences are such that the laws as applied in the various 
jurisdictions are incompatible. Obviously such inconsistency presents serious ob• 
stacles to the effective implementation of any concerted programme of pollution 
control and abatement throughout the Lower Great Lakes. 
Id. at 110. It cites as an example of this incompatability the differing legal require• 
ments for the control of waste discharges from watercraft using the Lakes. Id. 
240. See, e.g., the list of members of the International Lake Erie Water Pollution 
Board and the International Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence River Water Pollution Board, 
and of their respective committees, in the Appendix of the IJC Low.ER LAKES REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 165-67. 
241. For example, in 1960, prior to the Commission's receipt of the Lower Lakes 
Reference, Congress had already appropriated funds under the Federal Water Pollu 
tion Control Act of 1956, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970), for a comprehensive study of 
Great Lakes pollution problems, and that study was already in progress at the time 
of the Reference. IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 8. Additional research 
for the Lower Lakes study was conducted by the responsible government agencies of 
the two governments rather than by the Commission itself. Id. at 8-9. See note 111 
supra and accompanying text. 
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Ministerial Conference was apparently the first effort at a concerted 
and sustained high-level official discussion and exchange of views on 
Great Lakes pollution problems. In the IJC's Lower Lakes Report, 
which formed a basis for the Ministers' discussions, the Commission 
noted: 
In order to achieve effective pollution control and acceptable water 
quality in these boundary waters, the policies and laws of the several 
jurisdictions concerned must have a common goal and the pro-
grammes to achieve that goal need to be coordinated with the pro-
grammes of the other jurisdictions involved in the lakes. Othenvise, 
efforts put forth in one jurisdiction may be frustrated either by in-
action or by inconsistent action in another jurisdiction. Water 
quality surveillance and monitoring to assess the effectiveness of 
control measures undertaken or the need for additional measures 
also need to be coordinated with similar activities in the other juris-
dictions if meaningful results are to be obtained. A high degree of 
cooperation and a free exchange of relevant data and information 
among all jurisdictions concerned are essential elements of an effec-
tive programme to achieve and maintain a satisfactory water quality 
in these boundary waters.242 
With the conclusion of the proposed Agreement and the Com-
mission's strengthened mandate to promote coordination, more for-
mal arrangements for coordination might be considered. One likely 
mechanism for such coordination might be the joint Great Lakes 
pollution advisory board suggested by the Ministers; this board would 
operate under the Commission but would include responsible officials 
from all concerned planning, research, and operating agencies. Al-
ternatively, institutions other than the IJC might be used for this 
purpose. Thus, coordination might be sought, with respect to plan-
ning, through some type of "internationalized" Great Lakes Basin 
Commission; with respect to research, through an expanded Great 
Lakes Study Group; and in the area of actual policy-making, regula-
tion, and implementation, through the establishment of a new high-
level joint United States-Canadian inter-agency committee on Great 
Lakes pollution, which would in effect continue on a permanent 
basis the work of the Ministerial Conference. 
In pursuing the goal of coordination, some caution may be called 
for. Clearly, coordination is desirable in certain areas; there is little 
point in different jurisdictions or groups working at cross-purposes. 
As the Commission suggests, coordination may also be essential to 
the operation of an effective monitoring and surveillance program. 
Moreover, a free exch~ge of data and information, p~rhaps with 
242. IJC Lowm LAKEs R.EPoRT, supra note 10, at 111. See also id. at 120-31. 
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centralized storage and retrieval capabilities, cannot fail to provide 
mutual benefits. Finally, coordination may serve the function of 
identifying and filling gaps in research or action programs. On the 
other hand, coordination has its own costs and may even prove dys-
functional to the extent that it results in inflexible determinations 
of priorities, the stifling of competitive research, or an unwillingness 
to experiment with new approaches. Some overlapping, duplication, 
inefficiency, and even a testing of inconsistent techniques may be 
unavoidable in constructive attempts to solve a problem as complex 
as that of Great Lakes pollution. 
G. Implementation 
A major problem of international cooperation in the environment 
as in other fields is that of implementation. United States-Canadian 
experience supports this judgment. The IJC has no direct authority 
either to implement or to enforce its recommendations. The recom-
mendations come to the governments by way of the Commission's 
formal reports and are typically distributed to concerned agencies 
within each government for comments. In the absence of strong 
objection from within either government they are routinely "ap-
proved." However, there is no obligation upon either government 
actually to implement the Commission's recommendations even if 
approved, and their subsequent impact is hard to determine. 
Until recently, there was apparently no established procedure 
within the United States government for either feeding IJC recom-
mendations into regular policy-making channels or ensuring that 
they were carried out. Traditionally, the State Department, through 
the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, has carried 
primary authority for working with the Commission and taking 
action on its recommendations. The State Department, however, has 
little expertise or interest in the technical aspects of pollution prob-
lems, has only limited channels of regular communication with agen-
cies that do, and has usually treated IJC matters as of comparatively 
iimited importance and as appropriately handled at relatively low 
9fficial levels. The Council on Environmental Quality now shares 
implementing responsibility on certain IJC recommendations con-
cerning environmental matters,243 and the Council may provide a 
more interested, technically qualified, and effective United States gov-
ernmental constituency for the IJC. Canada has traditionally put 
243. Information supplied by U.S. government officials. 
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more emphasis on the Commission and its work, and has apparently 
accorded its recommendations more status and attention. 
In practice, the Commission's influence may be somewhat greater 
than is suggested above, though the means by which this influence 
is exerted are principally informal. First, the Commission's reports 
are significant technical studies that undoubtedly come to the atten-
tion of many relevant policy-making officials, and, because of their 
high quality, may influence official decisions. This influence is, of 
course, the major purpose of the governments' references and the 
Commission's work. Second, the reports reflect the work of the joint 
technical boards, which are themselves composed of influential offi-
cials from a variety of concerned agencies of each government. Since 
these governmental officials are largely responsible for the Commis-
sion's recommendad.ons, they will presumably carry over these find-
ings and judgments into their work within their own agencies. Third, 
the wide publication of the IJC's reports, and also of the interim 
reports which the Commission has adopted the practice of issuing, 
may exert some public pressure on officials to take recommended 
actions, though the extent and impact of these pressures are hard to 
gauge. As a related technique, the Commission has recently instituted 
the practice of convening public meetings to acquaint the public 
with relevant problems and the Commission's recommendations re-
garding them.244 To a very limited extent, the Commission has com-
municated with concerned officials, calling their attention to the lack 
of progress made toward a recommended solution or to particular· 
problems or polluters. On occasion, as in the case in which the 
Commission called broad public attention to the contribution of 
phosphorus-based detergents to Great Lakes eutrophication, it has 
clearly had some effect on public policy,245 though the recent state-
ment by the Surgeon General and by the Administrator of the En-
244. See note 76 supra. 
245. The Commission's 1969 interim reports on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution 
Reference, which stressed the role of phosphorus and particularly phosphorus-based 
detergents in euthrophication of the Lakes, received wide attention and apparently 
played some part in influencing environmental officials at that time to urge consumers 
to avoid phosphate detergents. In February 1970 Canada announced plans to ban 
all phosphates in detergents over a two-year span. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1970, at 2, 
col. 3. A number of states, such as Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, 
and New York, and communities such as Dade and Lake counties in Florida, and Chi-
cago, Detroit, and Akron have subsequently passed legislation to regulate the phosphate 
content of detergents. Most of this legislation is to take effect in 1972 or 1973. Many 
other states and communities are considering phosphates legislation. See CEQ 1971 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 44; Madison (W'is.) Capital Times, Sept. 17, 1971, at 6, cols. 
1-5. 
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vironmental Protection Agency, suggesting that housewives should 
continue to use phosphate-based detergents rather than possibly more 
hazardous substitutes, indicates that this particular impact may prove 
short-lived.246 
Since implementation of the Commission's recommendations rests 
with the various national, state, and provincial governments, a brief 
look at the current situation in regard to measures taken by these 
entities may be of interest. Broadly speaking, there are considerable 
differences among the various jurisdictions in the type and extent of 
relevant legislation and programs, the level of financing, the strictness 
of water quality standards and other control measures, and the pro-
cedures and practical level of enforcement.247 As previously indicated, 
while the United States federal government has in recent years as-
sumed a growing role in water pollution control programs, primary 
authority for establishing and enforcing regulations and standards re-
mains in the states.248 The Council on Environmental Quality has 
noted that, although remarkable progress has been made with respect 
to the scope of both federal and state legislation and programs in the 
past five years, standards remain in many respects inadequate and com-
pliance and enforcement leave much to be desired.249 Nevertheless, 
the federal government appears to have adequate authority under 
existing legislation to implement both the Commission's recommen-
dations respecting Great Lakes pollution and the provisions of the 
proposed Agreement. The federal government also clearly has con-
246. See notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text. 
247. See, e.g., IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 108. 
248. See § l(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § I 15l(b) 
(1970), which declares that the policy of Congress is "to recognize, preserve, and pro• 
tect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in preventing and controlling 
water pollution"; § lO(b) of that Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(b) (1970), which provides that, 
except when the Attorney General has actually obtained a court order of pollution 
abatement on behalf of the United States, "State and interstate action to abate pollu-
tion of • . . navigable waters • • • shall not • • • be displaced by Federal enforce• 
ment action." See also Environment Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No, 
91-224, § 202(b)(2), 84 Stat. 114, which, while stating the general policy of Congress 
in protecting the environment, also states: "The primary responsibility for imple-
menting this policy rests with State and local governments." 
For excellent and comprehensive discussions of federal and state water quality 
legislation and practice, see generany H. Er.Lis, J. BEuscHER, C. HOWARD &: J. DEBRAAL, 
supra note 23; Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 
Part I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IowA L. R.Ev. 186 (1966); Part II: Inter-
state Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432 (1966); Part III: The 
Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REv. 799 (1967). For a critical view, see D. ZWICK 8: M, 
BENsrOCK, supra note 14. 
249. See, e.g., CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra note 7, at 44. See also D. ZWICK &: M. BEN• 
srociK, supra note 14. For several interesting case studies of the problems involved, sec, 
e.g., Polikoff, The Interlake Affair, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, March 1971, at 7: 
Reitze, supra note 15. 
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-stitutional authority. to enact such further legislation in this respect 
as it deems necessary.250 
The principal federal legislation in the water pollution area is 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.251-A 1965 amendment to 
the Basic Act requires the states to establish water quality standards 
for their interstate waters252 and these state standards can then be 
approved as federal standards by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).253 The states retain primary responsibility both for 
drawing up and for enforcing the standards. If the states fail to set 
standards, the EPA may set and enforce them.254 Currently, the stan-
dards of all of the states are "approved," though many of them have 
serious deficiencies.255 The Act also provides certain federal enforce-
ment mechanisms for abating interstate water pollution, but the 
procedures are limited and cumbersome.256 It is interesting to note 
that section 10 (d)(2) of the Act specifically provides that a foreign 
state affected by interstate pollution may participate in the Act's 
enforcement conference on the basis of reciprocity;257 Canada, how-
ever, has never sought to utilize this procedure.25B 
250. See note 23 supra. 
251. 33 u.s.c. §§ Il51-75 (1970). 
252. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § IO(c)(l), Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-234, § 5(a)(l), 79 Stat. 907, amending 33 U.S.C. § 466(g) (1964) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1160(c)(l) (1970)). 
253. The Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] has taken over the 
Secretary of Interior's functions under the Act. Exec. Order No. 11,548, 35 Fed. Reg. 
II677 (1970), 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970). 
254. 33 U.S.C. § II60(c)(I) (1970). See note 253 supra. 
255. See, e.g., CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra note 7, at 44. 
256. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § I0(c)(5), (d)-(g), 33 U.S.C. ll60(c)(5) , 
(d)•(g) (1970). Two basic procedures are provided. The first is a three-step procedure 
consisting of a conference of federal, state, and interstate water quality agency repre-
sentatives, a public hearing, and finally court action. 33 U.S.C. § ll60(d)-(g) (1970). 
Among the conferences convened under the Act are the four-state Lake Michigan 
Enforcement Conference, which convened in 1968 and focused on the need to protect 
Lake Michigan from waste heat discharges; the Lake Superior Enforcement Con-
ference, which convened in 1969 and involved, inter alia, discharges of taconite tailing 
into the Lake from a Reserve Mining Company facility in Minnesota; and the Lake 
Erie Enforcement Conference, which convened in 1970 and studied all forms and 
sources of pollution affecting Lake Erie. The second enforcement procedure calls 
for notification of the applicable water quality standards both to the violator and to 
interested parties, followed by court action if necessary in cases of noncompliance. 33 
U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970). The EPA issued a violation notice to Reserve Mining 
Company because of its failure to present an acceptable abatement plan to the Lake 
Superior Enforcement Conference. See CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13. Sen-
ator Muskie is reported to have noted that there has been almost no enforcement 
under the Act, with only one case reaching the courts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1971, at 
22, col. 3. 
257. 33 U.S.C. § ll60(d)(2) (1970). Similar provisions are contained in the Clean 
Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C. 1857 (1970). 
258. Canada does not have reciprocal legislation, and, in any event, may view the 
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In addition to authority exercised under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, the federal government has recently initiated an 
important program under the authority of the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899,259 which makes permits mandatory for 
all industrial discharges into navigable waters of the United States.200 
Other federal legislation provides for federal control of water pol-
lution in various special contexts (such as oil pollution and pollution 
from vessels), authorizes extensive federal financial and technical 
assistance to state and local water pollution control programs, and 
supports federal efforts in the field of research and development, 
monitoring, and surveillance.261 The Administration is presently 
language of § IO(d)(2) giving it "the rights of a state water pollution agency" as un-
acceptable in terms of its national dignity. 
259. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403-04, §§ 406-09, §§ 411-16, § 418 (1970). The Act makes it un-
lawful, without a permit, to " .•• throw, discharge, or deposit ••• any refuse 
matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and 
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water •• , or into 
any tributary of any navigable water •••• " 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Knowing violation 
of the Act is a misdemeanor, subject to a $2500 fine or six months imprisonment, 
Violators are also subject to civil suits for injunctive relief. The Act was upheld and 
broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Republic Steel Corp,, 
362 U.S. 482 (1960). 
260. On December 23, 1970, the President announced a new program to control 
water pollution from industrial sources through the permit authority of the Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriatiim Act. Exec. Order No. ll,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970), See N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 24, 1970, at I, col. I. See also Dept. of Army Corps of Engrs, Proposed 
Reg. § 209.131, 35 Fed. Reg. 20005 (1970); id., 36 Fed. Reg. 983 (1971). Violators of 
water quality standards-including standards imposed by the EPA when federal-state 
or state standards do not apply or are clearly deficient-are ineligible for permits and 
liable for enforcement proceedings. All dischargers were required to file information 
on discharges by October 1, 1971. See, e.g., CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 10-12; 
Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water 
Quality, II9 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1971). 
But see the recent opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
in Kalur v. Resor, Civil No. 1331-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 21, 1971), ruling that under the 
Act all discharges into nonnavigable waters are illegal and that the government may not 
even issue permits for navigable waters unless it first prepares an environmental im-
pact statement for each permit application. The ruling, if it stands, may raise ques• 
tions as to the administrative practicability of the present permit program. See TIME, 
Jan. 10, 1972, at 61-62. 
261. Much of this legislation is in the form of amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act-for example, the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, approved April 3, 1970, which embodies comprehensive 
federal legislation covering the control of vessel wastes. Section 5(£) of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § ll55(f) (1970), specifically directs the Secre• 
tary of the Interior (now transferred to the Administrator of the EPA) to "conduct 
research and technical development work, and make studies, with respect to the 
quality of the waters of the Great Lakes." Section 15 of the Act, 33 U.S.C, § 1165 
(1970), authorizes the Secretary (the EPA), in cooperation with other government 
agencies, to enter into agreements with state or other public agencies, with the federal 
government paying up to 75% of the costs 
to carry out one or more projects to demonstrate new methods and techni~ues 
and to develop preliminary plans for the elimination or control of pollution, 
within all or any part of the watersheds of the Great Lakes. Such projects shall 
January 1972) Controlling Great Lakes Pollution f)43 
seeking broader authority in this area, including authority to require 
states to set specific effluent discharge requirements, and is seeking 
congressional approval of legislation providing six billion dollars of 
federal funds to support a twelve billion dollar total national pro-
gram; a significant portion of these funds will be directed toward the 
Great Lakes.262 At the present time even more far-reaching legislation 
is under consideration by Congress.263 
Each of the Great Lake states has its own water control legisla-
tion, programs, and agencies; and these differ substantially in 
breadth and effectiveness.264 In general, during the past several years 
demonstrate the engineering and economic feasibility and practicality of removal 
of pollutants and prevention of any polluting matter from entering into the 
Great Lakes in the future and other abatement and remedial techniques which 
will contribute substantially to effective and practical methods of water pollution 
elimination or control. 
33 u.s.c. § 1165(a) (1970). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91ST CONG., 
2D SESS., LAws OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO WATER POLLUTION AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY (Comm. Print 1970). 
262. See President Nixon's Message to Congress, Feb. 8, 1971, Program for a Better 
Environment, H.R. Doc. No. 92-46, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), set out in CEQ 1971 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 284-305. See also Joint Communique, supra note I, 1[ 16. 
263. On November 2, 1971, the Senate approved 86-0, a far-reaching and compre-
hensive 180-page bill, The National Water Quality Standards Act of 1971, sponsored 
by Senator Muskie and approved by the Senate Public Works Committee, which was 
designed to eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into navigable watenvays by 
1985 and in large measure to shift responsibility for controlling water pollution from 
the states to the federal government and the Environmental Protection Agency. S. 
2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. S. 17464 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971). This bill 
would, inter alia, broaden the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act by establishing federal 
effiuent or discharge standards; by extending the ban on dumping without a permit 
to municipal wastes, industrial wastes discharged into sewer systems, outfalls into the 
ocean, and agricultural wastes for livestock over certain numbers on an acre of land; 
and by transferring the permit system from the Army Corps of Engineers to the EPA. 
The bill would permit the states to administer the permit programs once the EPA 
approved their programs for achieving federal effluent standards, but the EPA could 
cancel the state's authority to issue permits if the state did not administer its pro-
gram in conformity with federal law. Moreover, the EPA could veto any state permit 
and also take a violator to court if the state failed to act against him. The bill con-
templates a two-phase program to achieve the national no-discharge standard. Under 
phase one, cities must have secondary treatment plants for sewage under construction 
by 1974, and industries must be using the "best practicable control technology" by 
1976. Under phase two, to be in force by 1981, all industries and communities, if 
they have been unable to achieve the goal of no discharge at reasonable cost, must 
be able to demonstrate that they are at least using the. "best available technology." 
The burden of proof is on the cities and industries. The bill would also authorize 
$14 billion for sewage treatment construction grants for fiscal 1972-1975 and increase 
the percentage of federal sewage treatment plant construction aid. See N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 10. See also BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
719-20 (1971); N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1971, at I, col. 4. 
264. For a listing of the principal current water pollution control laws of the 
various Great Lakes riparian states, and a collection of the relevant state rules, regula-
tion, standards, and criteria, see BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., STATE WATER LAws (2 vols.). 
See also J. DAVIES, supra note 185, at 120-25; GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, 
at 26-38; Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part I: 
State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IowA L. REV. 186 (1966). 
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there has-been·a tendency toward rationalization of pollution control 
administration and a strengthening of legislation.200 The states 
clearly have legal authority to enact legislation and standards imple-
menting the Commission's recommended objectives if they so desire. 
It is interesting to note that the Great Lakes states have enthusiasti-
cally backed the concept of an international Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement and of a strengthened IJC,200 perhaps partly in 
the hope that "internationalizing" the problem will increase the 
likelihood of more extensive federal funding. 
The Canadian federal government has also recently legislated 
extensively in the area of water pollution, though primary responsi-
bility in this regard remains in the Province of Ontario. As previ-
ously indicated, there is apparently some question among Canadian 
constitutional experts about the permissible reach of Canadian fed-
eral power with respect to the broad regulation of Great Lakes pol-
lution, even pursuant to treaty; it has been argued that provincial 
authority may be, for the most part, paramount in this field.201 These 
doubts buttress the likelihood that the Province of Ontario will carry 
the major burden of implementing the IJC's recommendations and 
the provisions of the proposed Agreement. The Joint Communique 
265. See, e.g., the recent Illinois Environmental Protection Act, H. Bill No, 3788, 
Ill. Laws of 1970 (I BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., STATE WATER LAws 766:0101-09): New 
York Environmental Conservation Law, ch. 140, N.Y. Laws of 1970 (2 BNA ENVIRON• 
MENT REP., STATE WATER LAws 861:0081-90); Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Resources Law, Act No. 275, H. Bill No. 2213, Pa. Laws of 1970, effective Jan. 19, 1971 
(2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP .• STATE WATER LAws 891:0051-54). See generally CEQ 1970 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 50; CEQ 1971 R}:PORT, supra note 7, at 170-75. 
266. The Environmental Conference of Great Lakes Governors and Premiers, meet• 
ing at Mackinac Island, Michigan, August 16-17, 1971, adopted resolutions strongly 
supporting the proposed Agreement. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1971, at 62, cols. 1-2. 
The resolutions commended the proposal to extend the IJC's surveillance responsibil· 
ities to Lakes Huron and Superior (Res. No. I): supported the establishment of a 
single IJC Water Quality Board for all of the Great Lakes (Res. No. 2): urged that 
the new Agreement provide the IJC with an independent staff and allied resources 
(Res. No. 3); and recommended that the role of the IJC be strengthened by authorizing 
its Water Quality Board to monitor the effectiveness of governmental water pollution 
control programs, to recommend legislative and program improvements as warranted, 
to coordinate water quality control activities, to direct specific recommendations rela• 
tive to individual waste discharges to appropriate water pollution control agencies, and 
to make public its finding and recommendations (Res. No. 4). Other resolutions 
included a recommendation that national governments expand current programs to 
provide financial assistance to aid communities to construct facilities to abate water 
pollution from combined sewer overflows (Res. No. 6): recommendation of the im-
plementation of a no-discharge concept for sewage from vessels in the Great Lakes 
and the retention of all sewage for discharge at approved land treatment facilities 
(Res. Nos. 7 and 11); acknowledgement of the importance of shoreland management 
policies and control programs (Res. No. 5); and recommendation of the establishment 
of a Michigan-Ontario committee to prepare a proposal for a cooperative program for 
abatement of transboundary air pollution (Res. No. 9). Copy of Resolutions, supplied 
by Office of the Governor of Wisconsin, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
267. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
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indicates that the Canadian government contemplates that a federal-
provincial agreement will be entered into for this purpose.268 . 
The major Canadian federal- legislation in this area is the Canada 
Water Act of 1970.260 The Act provides a framework for federal-pro-
vincial planning and cooperation. Among other things it provides 
for the creation of joint water quality management agencies for 
waters designated for such treatment by the federal and provincial 
governments. These agencies would be empowered by regulation to 
set water quality standards and to implement programs to achieve 
these standards. With regard to international waters and boundary 
waters, it is provided that if provincial cooperation cannot be 
achieved, the federal government itself may designate the waters, 
establish the agencies and standards, and implement the programs.270 
Other federal legislation is applicable to particular aspects of Great 
Lakes pollution problems.271 
The responsibilities of the Province of Ontario respecting Great 
Lakes pollution are exercised principally under the provisions of the 
Ontario Water Resources Commission Act.272 The Act establishes 
the Ontario Water Resources Commission and gives it broad juris-
diction over provincial water management. The Act generally pro-
hibits any pollution that might impair the quality of the water in the 
Province and empowers the Ontario Commission to seek injunctions 
against and prohibit such activities. In addition, the Commission is 
authorized to construct treatment facilities for municipalities, in-
vestigate water pollution and its causes, make regulations prescribing 
standards of water quality, set operating standards for sewage works, 
and make rules for discharges of wastes from boats. In general, the 
Ontario Water Resources Commission has adopted strict standards 
and broad programs, compatible with those recommended by the 
IJC, and is enforcing them vigorously. 
The proposed Agreement is in effect a formal endorsement of the 
Commission's recommendations in its Report on the Lower Lakes 
Reference and lifts these recommendations to the level of an inter-
national obligation. As such, the probabilities of compliance by the 
governments will be greatly enhanced. Nevertheless, the Joint Com-
munique makes clear that the Commission will not be vested with 
268. Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,i 15. 
269. CAN. STAT. c. 52 (1969-1970). The Act is briefly described in the IJC LowER 
LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 109. 
270. Canada Water Act, CAN. STAT. c. 52, § 5(2) (1969-1970). 
•. 271._ See, e.g., the Navigable Waters Protection Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 41 (1952); 
Canada Shipping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 29 (1952), as amended, STAT. CAN. c. 34, vol. 
~. § 25 (1956); Fisheries Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 119 (1952). · 
272, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 281 (1960). 
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any new powers in the area of enforcement. The Communique 
states: 
"While the International Joint Commission would aid the Govern-
ments by providing an independent overview and other assistance, 
the various agencies of the Federal, State and Provincial Govern-
ments would continue to implement the programs and measures 
required to achieve the water quality objectives.273 
However, the Commission's prestige and informal influence on both 
governments and polluting municipalities and enterprises will pre-
sumably increase. 
IV. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 
To attempt any detailed assessment of the proposed Agreement 
at this time, before its negotiation is even completed, would clearly 
be premature. However, some comments might be ventured regard-
ing both the Agreement's general significance and the longer-term 
prospects for American-Canadian Great Lakes cooperation. 
The proposed Agreement would clearly constitute a major ac-
complishment. It represents a significant advance in United States-
Canadian efforts to control Great Lakes pollution and an important 
addition to broader global experience in international evironmental 
cooperation. The Agreement expressly recognizes the problem of 
Great Lakes pollution as a major and independent subject of United 
States-Canadian concern rather than as an adjunct of other water 
problems and reflects firm national commitments by both govern-
ments to take urgent and effective measures to solve the problem. It 
emphasizes the fact that these governmental commitments are a mat-
ter of international as well as national obligation, provides technical 
criteria by which the extent of each government's compliance can be 
determined, and thereby buttresses the pressures within each country 
for adoption of meaningful pollution control programs. Moreover, 
it reflects a more comprehensive, integrated and "basin-wide" ap-
proach to Great Lakes pollution problems than has previously been 
taken. Finally, the Agreement serves to strengthen considerably the 
IJC's international institutional role by recognizing the Commission 
as the primary intergovernmental agent, coordinator, and overseer 
for all Great Lakes pollution control programs. It can be expected 
that the IJC's effectiveness with respect to its monitoring, surveil-
lance, and coordinating activities ·will increase; that its recommenda-
tions will carry added weight; and that, through such devices as 
regular public reports, it will be in a position to exert growing pres-
sure for effective government action. 
273, Joint Communique, supra note 1, 1 12. 
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Yet, without discounting the considerable achievement the Agree-
ment represents, it must still be asked whether this step goes far 
enough-whether even the new Agreement is likely to prove a suf-
ficient answer to the complex and pressing problems of Great Lakes 
pollution. The IJC has conducted a number of Great Lakes pollution 
studies in the past aventy-five years and the two governments already 
have instituted a number of separate and joint Great Lakes pollution 
control programs. But, despite those measures, the process of Great 
Lakes deterioration has continued and indeed seems to grow worse. 
And in substance the new Agreement is simply "more of the same," 
representing only a relatively limited departure from the past. The 
Agreement, in concept and structure, is still primarily a matter of 
binational cooperation rather than international regulation. The 
choice of specific standards and techniques for meeting the interna-
tional water quality objectives remains firmly in each government's 
discretion, and procedures for inducing international compliance are 
weak. Existing IJC powers are strengthened, but the role of the Com-
mission and the scope of cooperation continue to be limited to 
monitoring, surveillance, and coordination; the key functions of im-
plementation, enforcement, and funding are solely in the govern-
ments' hands. Presumably, each government will continue to be 
free to ignore Commission recommendations and to check any Com-
mission activities that prove embarrassing to government policies. 
There have been many suggestions that something more-some 
different, more innovative and far-reaching approach-is needed.274 
The range of possibilities is obviously broad. Some of these possibili-
ties include simple expansion of the IJC's authority, while essentially 
retaining the existing Treaty framework. For example, the IJC could 
be given at least limited powers to establish pollution standards, to 
approve or license particular waste disposal facilities, and to initiate 
complaints of noncompliance before the courts or agencies of either 
country. Other more far-reaching possibilities might involve aban-
doning the present framework of limited cooperation and establish-
ing in its place a supranational Great Lakes Authority, exercising 
direct and comprehensive investigatory, planning, regulatory, and 
enforcement powers over all aspects of Great Lakes environmental 
problems. Conceivably, the Authority might administer and allocate 
274. See Jordan, supra note 35, at 300-01; L. Craine, Development and Use of the 
Great Lakes: Policy and Institutional Needs (presentation to the Great Lakes Panel of 
the National Council on Marine Resources· and Engineering Development at Sym-
posium held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Oct. 29-30, 1968), on file with the Michigan 
Law Review. See also Heeney, supra note 35, at 6; C. Ross, supra note 35, at 8. For a 
broad survey of relevant problems and experience, see A. KNEESE & B. BoWER, supra 
note 14. · · .. · 
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a_substantial pollution control fund, financed by mandatory contri-
butions from the two governments or through special taxes or effluent 
charges on polluting enterprises. It might even enforce its rules 
through a special international tribunal. International and federal 
experience suggests a number of models for broader experiments in 
Great Lakes regulation, such as the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, 275 the Tennessee Valley Authority276 and the Delaware River 
Basin Commission.277 Such proposals for granting the IJC broad 
regulatory powers or for establishing some type of supranational 
Great Lakes agency might, of course, raise constitutional problems 
for each government.278 
There is much validity in the argument that effective solutions 
to Great Lakes pollution problems may ultimately require a more 
broad-ranging international approach than the present structure and 
authority of the current Commission, or even of the Commission un-
der the proposed Agreement, permits. Great Lakes pollution is but 
one aspect of a total Great Lakes Basin ecological and social system 
and cannot be dissociated from the complex and interrelated web of 
physical, hydrologic, geographic, demographic, economic, cultural, 
and political factors which together define and comprise that system. 
For example, approaches in terms of separate programs aimed at in-
dividually controlling water pollution, air pollution, or land use 
management make little sense when measures taken in one area in-
evitably affect the others. The establishment of a supranational Great 
Lakes Authority would permit a rational, comprehensive, integrated, 
275. Established by a Treaty signed at Paris, April 18, 1951, effective July 23, 1952, 
26 U.N.T .S. 140, 1 EUROPEAN Y.B. 359 (1955). See L. LISTER, EUROPE'S CoAL AND ST.EEL 
COMMUNITY (1960); H. MAsON, THE EUROPEAN COAL AND ST.EEL COMMUNITY (1955), 
276. See, e.g., D. LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH (20th anniv. ed. 
1953); C. PRITCHETT, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ADhllNlS• 
TRATION (1943). 
277. The Delaware River Basin Commission is a federal-state agency, established 
by the Delaware River Basin Compact between Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and the United States, consented to by Congress by Act of Sept. 27, 1961, 
Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688. The text of the Compact, together with congressional 
conditions and reservations to consent, is set forth in H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong,, 
2d Sess. 95-127 (1968) (Documents on the Use and Control of the Waters of Interstate 
and International Streams). The Commission reviews all projects that might have 
a substantial effect on the resources of the Delaware River Basin and, as part of this 
review, requires that any project affecting water quality must conform to applicable 
water quality standards. See generally the Commission's Annual Reports; A. KNEESE 
& B. BowER, supra note 14, at 274-81; Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment 
in Co-operative Federalism, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 825 (1963); Hines, Nor Any Drop To 
Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part II: Interstate Arrangements for 
Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432, 454-55 (1966). 
278. These questions would involve not only issues of delegation of national and 
state or provincial power to an international authority but also the differing complexities 
of U.S. federal-state and Canadian federal-provincial relations. CJ. P. HAY, FEDERALISM 
AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PATTERNS FOR NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES ch. 6 (1966), 
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and coordinated approach to these problems in accord with modem 
concepts of "problem-shed" management; it would eliminate the re-
current problems of jurisdictional conflict, duplication, and lack of 
coordination, which trouble present international efforts; and, fi-
nally, it would encourage effective decision-making in a sufficiently 
broad context to permit a more complete analysis and balancing of 
policy alternatives and thus the determination of optimal solu-
tions. 270 
While the concept of a supranational Great Lakes Authority has 
considerable intellectual and dramatic appeal, it seems unlikely that 
any such agreement will be achieved in the near future. Indeed, 
there is much to suggest that the proposed Agreement represents the 
practical limits that United States-Canadian cooperation can at pres-
ent hope to reach, and that attempts to go further in the direction of 
international or supranational regulation might be unrealistic, un-
necessary, and even potentially harmful. 
First, neither the United States nor Canada seems presently in-
terested in broad regulatory schemes. There are many reasons for 
this attitude. Important differences remain between the governments 
concerning their respective share of responsibility for Great Lakes 
problems and the burdens each should properly assume. The eco-
nomic stakes of pollution control and the balance of internal political 
pressures acting upon the governments are still uncertain.28° Further-
more, the potential costs involved in such programs are extremely 
high.281 In this context neither government appears prepared to re-
linquish control over relevant decisions affecting significant national 
interests or to reduce its broad options to respond flexibly to devel-
oping situations. Thus, the relatively limited reach of the proposed 
Agreement may reflect not a lack of imagination-both governments 
have been well aware of the possibility of broader arrangements at 
least since the tabling of the Commission's draft Convention in 1920 
-but political realism. 
Second, any considerable expansion of the IJC's regulatory power 
279. See, e.g., Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 
Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REV. 432 (1966): 
Conditions of water pollution ••• frequently assume a configuration that bears 
little resemblance to the political geography of any of the states affected. Great 
acumen is not required to realize that little success is likely to accrue to attempts 
to regulate pollution of interstate waters unless the control effort has a scope 
of planning and an enforcement authority roughly congruent with the dimensions 
of the problem. The vesting of regulatory power in some form of supra-state 
organization seems essential to effective handling of pollution situations, the causes 
and effects of which overflow state lines. 
See also L. Craine, supra note 274, at 13. 
280. See generally J. DAVIES, supra note 185, for a survey of the political and ad• 
ministrative context of present U.S. efforts to deal with pollution problems. 
281. See text accompanying note 126 supra. 
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or the creation of a new Authority would probably require either 
development of a new treaty or substantial amendment of the 1909 
Treaty. The negotiation of such a treaty or amendment would be 
complex, difficult, and time-consuming, with no guarantee of results. 
In contrast, the proposed Agreement retains and exploits the re-
markable flexibility of the present Treaty and has been compara-
tively easy to achieve. Moreover, it builds on established traditions 
and experience which have in the past proved relatively successful. 
In this respect, there seems to be wisdom in the adage "let well 
enough alone." 
Finally, the proposed Agreement appears in accord with the pres-
ent level of real needs and cooperative possibilities between the two 
governments. It commits the governments to new levels of coopera-
tion in areas in which the immediate pay-offs from such cooperation 
seem highest and the risks to the governments lowest: monitoring, 
surveillance, technical recommendation, and coordination. More-
over, the Agreement is relatively open-ended, and it does not pre-
clude the taking of more far-reaching measures should further 
experience suggest their desirability. Indeed, the Commission will 
presumably now be in a position to give sustained and expert study 
to suggestions for further institutional change, and, if it considers it 
desirable, to recommend that change to the governments. 
As to the directions of future development of the United States-
Canadian Great Lakes cooperation, certain broad trends are possible 
to predict. First, as the IJC's responsibilities grow in importance and 
it begins to deal with issues more central to government concern, the 
Commission may become more political in character. Each of the 
governments will now follow its work more closely and may appoint 
Commissioners who will reflect or be more responsive to their 
government's attitudes and policies. Second, there may well be an 
increasing movement toward treating Great Lakes problems on a 
regional basis-dealing with the entire basin as a single research 
planning, coordinating, and management unit. This tendency is al-
ready evident in the trend toward basin-wide references, the prob-
able appointment of a single continuing pollution advisory board 
for all of the Lakes, and in initial efforts to coordinate the work of the 
Commission's separate water and air pollution boards.282 In this 
connection, American-Canadian Great Lakes cooperation may ex-
·2s2. At its spring 1971 semiannual meeting, the IJC requested its various boards 
that deal with water pollution to initiate a liaison with the International Air Pollution 
Advisory Board in order to ensure that control measures for one type of pollution 
would not nullify control measures for another. (Information supplied by IJC, U.S. 
Section.) 
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pand into the field of long-range planning.283 Third, the Commission, 
with a strengthened staff and the additional prestige of its new status 
and responsibilities under the new Agreement, may exhibit more 
aggressiveness than in the past, both in terms of the strength of its re-
ports and recommendations and in terms of its efforts to cultivate a 
binational public constituency. Finally, if the Agreement proves 
relatively successful, the two governments may be prepared to but-
tress and perhaps increase the Commission's authority. 
Expansion of the Commission's powers and procedures might 
take various directions.284 Thus, it might include authority for the 
Commission to initiate investigations, or at least to petition the gov-
ernments for particular references; broader Commission authority 
respecting issuance of subpoenas and the holding of public hearings; 
or perhaps authority for informal Commission investigation of local 
problems of immediate concern on its own initiative and without the 
necessity for invoking cumbersome and time-consuming reference 
procedures. The Commission might be given greater power to initi-
ate, and perhaps participate in, proceedings against polluters in the 
national courts and agencies of the nvo countries. Formal channels 
of communication between the Commission and national policy-
making and enforcement authorities in each country might be 
strengthened. The Commission might also be given some role as a 
forum for "preventative diplomacy" respecting environmental prob-
lems, perhaps through the institution, under Commission auspices, 
of "confrontation" procedures under which either of the nvo govern-
ments could require the other to consult about proposed environ-
mental measures that could significantly affect it.285 
283. The Chairman of the Great Lakes Basin Commission, reviewing the Advisory 
Board's Lower Lakes Report with the Council on Environmental Quality, stated: 
Effective management of Great Lakes resources requires a comprehensive, co-
ordinated joint effort in both operation and planning on both a short- and long-
range basis. This approach is not to be confused with the artificial stapling together 
of a number of independently arrived at, single-purpose plans and operations 
agreements. Our present problems are largely a result of this approach. Their 
solution surely does not lie in its continued application. 
Great Lakes Basin Commn. Communicator, March 1971, at 6. 
284. See, e.g., the suggestions in Jordan, supra note 35, at 300-01. 
285. Compare the proposal for such "confrontation" procedures made at the March 
1971 meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's 
(OECD) Environmental Committee, OECD Observer 10 (No. 52, 1971), as discussed 
in Stein, The Potential of Regional Organizations in Managing Man's Environment, in 
LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 16. That 
a consultation procedure would find ample use is suggested by the Canadian reaction 
to the recent U.S. "Cannikin" underground nuclear test on Amchitka Island, Alaska, 
which occasioned protests by the Canadian Prime Minister, Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Minister of the Environment, and Ambassador to the U.S.; the 
adoption on October 15, 1971, by the Canadian House of Commons, with only one 
dissenting vote, of a resolution condemning the test; and mass demonstrations in 
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Each government now has the capability-technical, economic, 
and legal-to do what is required to control Great Lakes pollution. 
Thus, the success or failure of efforts to control Great Lakes pollu-
tion will depend ultimately not on what the new Agreement says or 
what the IJC does, but on what the two governments themselves 
choose to do; the outcome will depend upon their willingness to 
adopt the necessary national legislation and standards, to implement 
these programs through effective judicial and administrative enforce-
ment, and to provide the substantial funds required. What the gov-
ernments choose to do will, in turn, depend largely on shifting public 
attitudes and the eventual outcome of the clash of complex compet-
ing political and economic forces now operating upon relevant 
governmental environmental policies in each country. 
In this respect, it may be unrealistic to project more than moder-
ate optimism. There are signs, at least in the United States, that the 
present wave of public environmental concern may be diminishing 
and that politicians may be perceiving the "environmental issue" as 
having less practical political impact than previously assumed. En-
thusiasm for stringent pollution controls has lessened as it has become 
increasingly evident to both the public and politicians that effective 
pollution control will be inconvenient, costly, slow to produce re-
sults, and detrimental to particular industries and communities. 
Countervailing pressures by special interests affected by possible con-
trol programs are growing, and under these pressures government 
attitudes are becoming increasingly ambivalent.286 If these pressures 
increase the course of least resistance for government policy-makers 
may be programs and levels of funding that give the appearance 
rather than the reality of effective action. 
The IJC's role in working out these economic and political con-
flicts will be inherently limited. Its influence, however, will continue 
to be felt in at least two ways. First, the governments, in making 
their policies and decisions in this area will inevitably have to take 
into account the relevant scientific data and technical assessments 
concerning the facts of Great Lakes pollution that are supplied by the 
Commission, and they will hopefully make sounder decisions because 
Canada. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 3; Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1971, 
§ A, at 1, col. l; N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1971, at 29, col. 1. 
286. See generally D. ZWICK 8: M. BENSTOCK, supra note 14. For some recent in-
dications of such pressures, see Kenworthy, Efforts To Place Limits on Environmental 
Agency, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1971, at 33, cols. 5-8; Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1971, at 1, 
col. 5 (reporting that Surgeon General's advice to return to phosphate detergents (see 
notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text) followed pleas from industry); N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 1, and Dec.·11, 1971, at 54, cols. 1-2 (reporting industry opposi-
tion to Senate's approval of bill to clean up watenvays, supra note 263). For a dis-
cussion of competing interest groups, see J. DAVIES, supra note 185, at 77-97. 
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of the availability of these data. Second, by m·aking these facts pub.:. 
lie, the Commission will exerr a continuing public pressure on the 
governments to live up to their professed commitments and to adopt 
policies reasonably related· to the realities of Great Lakes pollution 
problems and long-run public needs. The Commission's performance 
of these functions will in itself represent a substantial contribution, 
amply justifying continued American-Canadian cooperation. · 
V. SOME TENTATIVE LESSONS 
The cooperative arrangements which the United States and Can-
ada have developed in their efforts to control Great Lakes pollution 
reflect a particular historical, geographic, and political context, and 
any attempt at generalization involves risks. Nevertheless, this ex-
perience is one of the few examples we have of a relatively complex 
system of international environmental cooperation and we should try 
to derive what lessons we can. These lessons, both discouraging and 
encouraging, might include the following. 
First, large-scale environmental problems, such as that of Great 
Lakes pollution, are extremely difficult to solve. Despite the long 
history of cooperation in this area, the Lakes continue to deteriorate. 
The roots of the problems often lie in social forces and attitudes that 
defy control-exploitative attitudes toward the environment, eco-
nomic expansion, population increase, and technological change. Our 
knowledge of the specific causes and effects of environmental deteri-
oration; of the multitude of scientific, technical, economic, sociologi-
cal, and other factors and complex interactions involved in that 
deterioration; of the optimal technical and institutional means for 
remedy; and of the time scales such remedies may require, remains 
limited, imprecise, and uncertain. The costs of effectively coping with 
environmental deterioration may be substantial. Finally, alternative 
patterns of solution may alter existing social and economic patterns 
in different ways, and various groups may consequently have high 
stakes in the approach chosen. When environmental issues engage 
such strongly competing interests, they may transcend mere scientific 
and technological treatment and become deeply involved in the po-
litical process.287 
· Second, many environmental problem~ are largely localized, with 
their causes and effects occurring principally within a single nation 
or, at most, geographically contiguous nations. These problems must 
287. See, e.g., IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 129: 
Studies are also necessary to find solutions to legislative, legal and enforcement · 
problems related to water pollution. Indeed the solution of some of these complex 
·social problems may well be as difficult and as time con.suming as the solution 
of some of the scientific and technical problems. · - · 
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necessarily be handled primarily on a national basis, with interna-
tional measures playing only a supplementary role. Moreover, even 
when international measures are appropriate, limited bilateral or 
regional arrangements may often prove more suitable than global 
approaches. The United States and Canada have consistently re-
garded the problem of Great Lakes pollution as primarily a matter 
for solution by national action, with international measures supple-
menting, buttressing, and coordinating rather than replacing country 
programs. It is difficult to see how direct involvement by other na-
tions in the problem of Great Lakes pollution could substantially 
contribute to its solution. 
Third, governments will be reluctant to subject their flexibility 
and freedom of action regarding relevant environmental policies to 
international constraints. The reasons for this reluctance have been 
noted; they include the high potential costs of pollution control pro-
grams, the uncertainty of their national impact, and their consequent 
political sensitivity. Governments will therefore enter into interna-
tional environmental programs only when they are persuaded that 
these programs offer substantial practical benefits unobtainable by 
national action alone, or where these programs involve only minimal 
obligations. Canada and the United States share a deep concern for 
Great Lakes pollution problems, have cooperated in this area for 
almost sixty years, and now concede the urgent need for common and 
joint solutions; moreover, the two countries share common traditions 
and have relatively close political, economic, and cultural ties. De-
spite the strength of the factors favoring cooperation, neither govern-
ment seems yet prepared to delegate substantial powers to the IJC 
or othenvise limit its national freedom of action in significant ways. 
Fourth, since even concerned countries can be expected to be re-
luctant to accept international environmental constraints, it follows 
that the price of setting up agreements between or among any but 
the most strongly concerned countries may be an agreement that is 
watered-down and ineffectual. The commitments will be reduced to 
the "lowest common denominator" of the least interested potential 
party. This factor again suggests that in many contexts bilateral and 
regional environmental programs, involving only countries with a 
direct and urgent concern with the problem, may prove more politi-
cally attainable, far-reaching, and effective than broader global pro-
grams, which may include nations with only marginal interests. 
Moreover, neighboring or regional states may be more likely to share 
common values, congenial legal systems, and traditions of coopera-
tion, and these factors will also buttress the chances for successful 
environmental cooperation. 
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Fifth, in attempting to· deal with international environmental 
problems, governments often prefer loose cooperative arrangements 
to techniques of formal legal prohibition. Specific environmental 
prohibitions will be difficult to agree upon, evidence of violations 
may be hard to establish, and legal remedies may prove cumbersome 
and incapable of dealing effectively with broad-scale, complex, and 
multi-faceted environmental problems, which tend to change over 
time. Again, the fact that neither the United States nor Canada has 
sought to utilize the 1909 Treaty's provisions formally banning pol-
lution, and that the two governments resort instead to the more 
flexible techniques involved in IJC references, strongly support this 
assertion. Furthermore, if formal treaty arrangements and institu-
tions are established, there are strong arguments for making these 
arrangements relatively flexible and open-ended, with a capacity to 
expand and adapt as problems and needs clarify and the parties gain 
confidence in their cooperative activities. The point is not that the 
parties need abdicate control over the growth of the authority and 
activities of such institutions, but that they should plan to permit 
growth through relatively informal procedures rather than through 
the difficult, cumbersome, and time-consuming process of formal 
amendment. The development o~ American-Canadian environmen-
tal cooperation was clearly facilitated by the fact that the IJC was an 
institution already "in place" and capable of such expanded and in-
novative use as the two governments wished to make of it. 
Sixth, on the more positive side, the possibilities for successful 
international cooperation with respect to particular environmental 
problems may be enhanced by a formal acknowledgement of the 
international character of those problems and of the propriety of 
their international treatment. While the provision prohibiting pol-
lution in the 1909 Treaty has had little direct application, it has 
facilitated the subsequent development of international environmen-
tal cooperation through the IJC. 
Seventh, the United States-Canadian experience demonstrates that 
international environmental cooperation can yield useful dividends 
at relatively low costs and with limited political risks. While Great 
Lakes problems are still a long way from solution, the IJC has per-
formed a valuable function in developing government and public 
awareness of Great Lakes pollution problems, providing scientific 
and technical information relevant to rational policy choice, sug-
gesting the nature of the remed_ies required, and furnishing a means 
through which national programs can be better coordinated. It has 
also shown that even partial data may serve sufficiently to identify 
problems and that even partial programs may be worth pµrsuing. · 
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Eighth, some of the functions potentially involved in international 
environmental cooperation, such as monitoring, surveillance, and the 
presentation of technical objectives and options, seem best performed 
by institutions acting in a relatively expert and apolitical capacity. 
The IJC's reputation as an expert impartial body has probably made 
the American and Canadian governments more willing to use it and 
give its reports more credibility. The Commission's technique of 
using joint technical boards, composed of officials drawn from agen-
cies of the participating governments and serving in an expert rather 
than representative capacity, is particularly suggestive as a method 
of deploying substantial expertise without incurring the problems of 
large permanent international staffs and budgets. However, w~en 
international cooperative institutions begin to take on policy-orien-
ted tasks, such as coordination, program recommendation, imple-
mentation, and enforcement, the possibility and usefulness of a 
wholly apolitical orientation may become more questionable. 
Ninth, even limited patterns of international environmental co-
operation may produce useful secondary effects. The IJC's pollution 
studies have helped to create public pressures for effective govern-
ment action in both countries, and the proposed Agreement will 
buttress arguments for greater commitment of government resources 
to this area. Moreover, the work of the Commission's various expert 
boards has resulted in continuing contacts and interaction between 
federal, state, and provincial officials concerned with Great Lakes 
pollution and has helped to establish important informal channels 
of communication, coordination, and influence. 
Finally, the problem of pollution of the Great Lakes has much in 
common with similar pollution problems in many other large lakes 
and enclosed and semi-enclosed seas in other parts of the world, as 
well as in some of the major international rivers.288 Collectively, 
these internationally shared water pollution problems comprise a 
significant segment of the problems that countries are likely to 
recognize within the next few years as requiring international treat-
ment. International initiatives to promote the exchange of experi-
ence in this area, perhaps through periodic international meetings of 
concerned officials or through the establishment of a small inter-
national Secretariat to facilitate exchanges of information on a con-
tinuing basis, might be useful and appropriate. 
288. See note 178 supra. On the problem of Baltic Sea pollution, see A. Sparring, 
supra note 206; Tonselius, The Stagnant Sea, 12 ENVIRONMENT, July-Aug. 1970, at 2-11. 
On the problem of North Sea pollution, see The Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 
1971, at 2, cols. 1-3. See also. the recent report that the Soviet leadership, in a decree 
by the Central Committee, has called for prompt measures to protect the environ• 
ment of Lake Baikal, the world's largest fresh water lake. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1971, 
at 4, cols. 3-6. 
